Last week I attended the annual Public Choice Societies conference in Miami, Florida. Among the most interesting papers were:
“Does Economic Freedom Foster Tolerance?” by Niclas Berggren and Therese Nilsson:
Tolerance has the potential to affect both economic growth and wellbeing. It is therefore important to discern its determinants. We add to the literature by investigating whether the degree to which economic institutions and policies are market-oriented is related to difference measures of tolerance. Regression analysis of up to 65 countries reveals that economic freedom is positively related to tolerance towards homosexuals, especially in the longer run, while tolerance towards people of a different race and a willingness to teach kids tolerance are not strongly affect by how free markets are….We furthermore find indications of a causal relationship and of social trust playing a role as a mechanism in the relationship between economic freedom and tolerance and as an important catalyst: the more trust in society, the more positive the effect of economic freedom on tolerance.
“Governance, Bureaucratic Rents and Well-Being Differential Across U.S. States” by Simon Luechinger, Mark Schelker and Alois Stutzer:
We analyze the influence of institutional restrictions on bureaucratic rents. As a measure for these rents, we propose subjective well-being differentials between workers in the public administration and workers in other industries. Based on data for the U.S. states, we estimate the extent to which institutional efforts to strengthen bureaucratic accountability affect differences in well-being. We find that the differences are smaller in states with high transparency, elected auditors, and legal deficit carryover restrictions. These findings are consistent with limited rent extraction under these institutional conditions. No effect is found for performance audits and regulatory review.
“Economic Performance and Government Size” by António Afonos and João Tovar Jalles
Our results, consistent with the presented growth model, show a negative effect of the size of government on growth. Similarly, institutional quality has a positive impact on real growth, and government consumption is consistently detrimental to growth. Moreover, the negative effect of government size on growth is stronger the lower institutional quality, and the positive effect of institutional quality on growth increases with smaller governments. The negative effect on growth of the government size variables is more mitigated for Scandinavian legal origins, and stronger at lower levels of civil liberties and political rights. Finally, for the EU, better overall fiscal and expenditure rules improve growth.
“Leaders, Institutions and Fiscal Discipline” by Heiner Mikosch:
In particular, I find evidence that pure career politicians are fiscally more disciplined than politicians with working experience outside of politics. This contradicts a popular claim that people who have been working in the “real world” outside of politics, are better politicians.
“Institutions, Lobbying, and Economic Performance” by Jac Heckelman and Bonnie Wilson:
They find that economic freedom improves growth but that lobbying detracts from it. Moreover, there may be an interaction between the two. It might be that in economically free societies, lobbying is particularly bad for growth whereas in less-free societies it actually enhance growth. This lends support to their basic hypothesis that:
while economic freedom that emerges spontaneously may be growth promoting, economic freedom that emerges as a result of costly lobbying efforts may be less fruitful.
And here’s one that made me smirk:
“The Right Look: Conservative Politicians Look Better and Voters Reward It” by Niclas Berggren, Henrik Jordahl and Panu Poutvaara:
Political candidates on the right are more beautiful or are seen as more competent than candidates on the left in Australia, Finland, France, and the United States. This appearance gap gives candidates on the right an advantage in elections, which could in turn influence policy outcomes. As an illustration, the Republican share of seats increased by an average of 6% in the 2000–2006 U.S. Senate elections because they fielded candidates who looked more competent. These shifts are big enough to have given the Republicans a Senate majority in two of the four Congresses in the studied time period. The Republicans also won nine of the 15 gubernatorial elections where looks were decisive. By using Finnish data, we also show that beauty is an asset for political candidates in intra-party competition and more so for candidates on the right in low-information elections. Our analysis indicates that this advantage arises since voters use good looks as a cue for conservatism when candidates are relatively unknown
This last one reminded me of this famous paper from a few years ago showing that inferences based solely on appearance predicted 68.8 percent of U.S. Senate races in 2004. (It isn’t good to have a baby face).