Author Archives: Emily Washington

New York’s Population Challenge

Last week at City Journal, Aaron Renn explored the New York region’s loss of domestic residents since 2000. He demonstrates that one of the world’s economic powerhouses is falling victim to the trend of domestic outmigration that New York state is seeing. Between 2000 and 2010, the New YOrk region lost 2 million domestic residents and they took with them billions of dollars of income. In Freedom in the 50 States, Will Ruger and Jason Sorens rank New York as the country’s least-free state based on its regulatory and tax regimes. They point to its tax burden — the highest in the nation —  and indebtedness as a factors contributing to the state losing 9-percent of its domestic population on net since 2000. Renn also posits that high tax rates are a leading cause for residents leaving New York City, many of them moving to Sun Belt states.

While the New York City region is only maintaining a positive population growth rate through births and international immigration, it’s far from the case that no one is willing to suffer its high tax rates in exchange for the city’s economic dynamism and cultural amenities. Rather the city’s exorbitant rental rates demonstrate that millions of people are willing to pay a premium to live in the region in spite of city and state policies that hamper economic development.  The vacancy rate for apartments is below 2-percent, well under many estimates for the natural vacancy rate. While lower taxes at the state and municipal levels in the New York region would reduce the flow of domestic outmigration at the margin, they would also increase competition for the city’s coveted apartments.

Are New York City’s amenities so desirable that its policymakers don’t need to worry about losing more residents to other states than they’re gaining? Its own not-so-distant history indicates that even the Big Apple is susceptible to the ravages of population loss. From 1950 to 1980, the city’s population fell from 7.9 million to 7 million, with most of that loss occurring in the 1970s. This time period corresponded with sharp increases in crime and the city’s famous default. These are predictable consequences of urban population decline, particularly in indebted cities where a decrease in tax base equates with inability to meet obligations to creditors .

While pursuing policy reforms designed to boost the state’s competitive standing to attract businesses and residents is a key piece of ensuring the city does not fall prey to population exodus, perhaps most importantly, city policymakers should examine their land use restrictions that limit would-be residents from moving to the city. Over the past decade, New York’s housing stock has grown only 5.3% in the face of the highest rental rates in the country for much of this time period. Historic preservation, density restrictions, and an onerous review process prevent the city’s housing stock from growing to meet demand.

Renn points out that most of New York’s domestic inmigration comes from midwestern cities and college towns across the country. Presumably many of these new residents are early in their careers and are on the margin of being able to afford New York rents. If New York housing were more attainable, more American young people would select the city as the starting place for their careers and it would attract more of the foreign immigrants essential to maintaining the city’s diversity and innovation. Ed Glaeser explains that those states that are successfully attracting more residents, like Texas and Georgia, are also those in which developers are able to build more housing with fewer restrictions. By allowing more housing in New York City and the surrounding areas, policymakers would both protect their tax base and help to maintain the city as a center of innovation and economic growth. In their effort to retain citizens — and particularly high-income retirees — New York City and New York state policymakers will need to revisit their punishing tax schemes. But at least as importantly they should focus on allowing those residents who would like to move to the city for economic and cultural opportunities to be able to afford to do so.

 

 

 

 

Occupational Licensing Hurts Consumers and Limits Entrepreneurship

This week I’m at U.S. News and World Reports looking at how occupational licensing hurts consumers and acts as an obstacle to new business creation. However, licensing requirements are difficult to repeal because they benefit a vested interest. In California, state policymakers were considering a bill to allow nurse practitioners to practice independently, until heavy lobbying from an organization that represents state doctors successfully resulted in a heavily amended bill.

The current political situation in California reflects the typical dynamic of occupational licensing considerations. The supporters of licensing rules often benefit from licensing because it protects them from competition. With improved technology offering greater information sharing, it is also worth questioning the effectiveness of some licensing rules. Today, the pervasion of free online reviews on nearly every service-based business provides consumers with more information about service quality than any license can convey.

The full article is available here.

To merge or not to merge?

Princeton Image

Consolidating municipalities is a common policy prescription from across the political spectrum. In New Jersey in particular, many democratic and republican elected officials have thrown their support behind merging municipalities. In part, this support is based on the experience of Princeton. In 2011, Princeton Borough and Princeton Township moved, the first New Jersey municipalities to do so:

New Jersey GOP Gov. Chris Christie as well as governors in Ohio and Pennsylvania have been urging local governments to seek savings by eliminating unneeded costs. Christie endorsed the Princeton plan and offered to pay 20% of the $1.7-million unification cost, Bloomberg News reported.

The forecast is that Princeton taxpayers will save $3.1 million annually by consolidating services, including those for police and fire protection.

“We have redundancy in government,” borough resident Cole Crittenden told NJ.com in explaining why she supported the merger.

Framing municipal mergers as a way to get more bang for the taxpayer buck makes the proposal difficult for anyone to oppose except for those municipal employees who are redundant after a merger. However, the cost savings of consolidation are not well-understood. In an article in Governing Magazine earlier this week, Justin Marlowe writes:

It turns out that consolidations rarely save money. In fact, for the majority of citizens directly affected in these cases, consolidation has meant higher taxes and spending. Some cities consolidated because a larger government could improve local infrastructure. This has usually meant new debt and new taxes to repay that debt. Others offered generous pensions and health-care benefits to employees pushed out in the consolidation, thus saddling the new government with expensive legacy costs. In the consolidated town of Oak Island, N.C., per capita spending is two or three times higher than before consolidation, and that’s by design. Consolidation allowed this coastal community to offer new services needed to build a vibrant tourist economy.

Superficially, municipal consolidation looks like an opportunity to reduce taxes or to provide increased services for a given level of revenue. However, as Marlowe indicates, larger jurisdictions do not always result in anticipated efficiencies. As policymakers’ gain control of larger jurisdictions and in turn the ability to access more funds from revenue from the state and federal level, they may spend more, rather than less, per capita.

Burden of DC’s Wal-Mart Minimum Wage would be Borne by City’s Poor

Plans to bring six Wal-Marts to the District of Columbia may fall through over city requirements for the big box store to pay an hourly wage of $12.50, more than a 50-percent increase over the District’s $8.25 minimum wage. Yesterday, the DC City Council voted 8-5 to approve this higher minimum wage, creating a higher wage requirement for stores with over 75,000 square-feet and retailers that make over $1 billion annually.

The council passed Large Retailer Accountability Act under the rhetoric that raising the minimum wage would benefit the District’s workers and that Wal-Mart can afford to pay higher wages:

Vincent Orange was one of the most vocal supporters of the bill. “We don’t need Wal-Mart, Wal-Mart needs us,” he said. “The citizens of the District of Columbia demand that we stand up for them.”

While supporters of higher minimum wages say that they are helping their least well-off constituents, in fact raising the minimum wage for Wal-Mart will hurt the very members of the city’s labor force that  council members say they are trying to help. That raising a minimum wage raises unemployment is uncontroversial among most economists. When the employment rate falls with a higher minimum wage, those left without a job will be lowest-skilled workers with the fewest job choices. While a higher minimum wage will benefit a group of employees who keep their jobs and otherwise would have made the lower minimum wage, policymakers must acknowledge the tradeoffs involved in a minimum wage law and that by supporting a minimum wage, they are hurting society’s least well-off members.

Furthermore, by discouraging Wal-Mart from opening stores, DC’s council is doing another disservice to residents by reducing availability of low-cost goods. Again, the burden of this policy decision falls hardest on the city’s lowest-income residents. Because those with lower incomes tend to spend a higher percentage of their income on food and other basic goods sold at Walmart, discouraging the company from opening DC locations is a regressive policy. Even for those who don’t choose to shop at Wal-Mart, the retailer’s low prices create pressure for other city stores to reduce their own prices to compete, benefiting an even wider net of consumers.

Mayor Vincent Gray has the option to veto the bill, which would require a ninth vote from the Council to overturn. If the DC City Council actually wants to benefit the city’s low-income residents, allowing Wal-Mart to provide jobs and affordable goods would create broader, lasting benefits to the community than a restrictive minimum wage. Requiring large stores to pay a higher minimum wage than other retailers would limit consumer choice, especially for consumers who have few choices, and it would eliminate job opportunities for the least-skilled workers.

WMATA’s failures are institutional, not personal

Chris Barnes who writes the DC blog FixWMATA  is supporting a petition to replace the Board of Directors of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. Frustration with the transit agency is growing among Washington-area residents as ongoing system repairs have made the system’s weekend service increasingly unusable. The situation has led to the birth of multiple blogs documenting WMATA’s failures. As an intern in DC from the Czech Republic recently summed up the situation, “Metro is both terrible and expensive.”

While the need for reforms at WMATA is clear, replacing the Board of Directors is unlikely to lead to significant improvements in the system. Rather, WMATA’s problems are institutional, and new actors facing the same incentives as the current WMATA Board are unlikely to produce better results. Some of the institutions preventing a Metro of reasonable quality and cost include:

1) Union work rules. Stephen Smith, my co-blogger at Market Urbanism, has done an excellent job of explaining how union work rules make transit needlessly expensive. One of the biggest culprits is requiring shifts to be at least eight hours and preventing the hiring of part-time workers. WMATA rationally runs trains and buses more often during morning and evening rush hours, but it is not permitted to staff these time periods at levels above mid-day staffing because of the eight-hour shift requirement. Combined with the above-market wages and benefits that WMATA employees make, these bloated employee costs prevent WMATA from achieving a higher farebox recovery rate and having more resources to dedicate to needed capital improvements.

2) Intergovernmental transfers. Over half of WMATA’s current capital improvement budget comes from the federal government, meaning that while the benefits of the system are narrowly bestowed on riders, a large share of the capital improvement costs are spread across U.S. taxpayers. This large dispersal of costs permits much more expensive transit than would be tolerated if all funding came from the localities that benefit from the system. Furthermore, with funds coming from the District, Maryland, Virginia, and the federal government, the flypaper effect comes into play. This means that a $100 million infusion from the federal government to WMATA will not reduce the cost born by local taxpayers by $100 million; rather, total spending on the project will increase with grants from higher level of government. Absent incentives to spend this money well, WMATA demonstrates that high levels of federal funding will not necessarily result efficiently carried out capital improvements.

At Pedestrian Observations, Alon Levy provides a comparison of transit construction costs across countries, and finds that U.S. construction costs are exorbitant. The reasons for these cost disparities are many and not well-understood. One reason for high costs in the U.S., though, may be that the prevalence of  federal funding comes with the strings of costly federal regulations.

3) Accountability. While all U.S. transit systems suffer inefficiencies from intergovernmental transfers and union work rules, DC’s Metro has a unique governance structure that seems to produce particularly bad and costly service. WMATA has the blessing and the curse of being multijurisdictional. On the one hand, the Washington region is not plagued with the agency turf wars that New York City transit sees. Several of the system’s rail lines run through Virginia, DC, and Maryland, providing many infrastructure efficiencies and service improvements over requiring transfers between jurisdictions.

Despite these opportunities to provide improved service at a lower cost, WMATA’s lack of jurisdictional control seems to do more harm than good. No politician can take full credit for running WMATA efficiently, so none prioritize the agency’s performance. It’s a tragedy of the political commons.

Josh Barro has recommended directly electing the Board of Directors of WMATA to create elected officials with an incentive to improve service. This institutional change would be more likely to improve outcomes than replacing the current Board with new members who would face the same incentives. Clearly, WMATA’s Board of Directors is failing in its job to oversee quality and cost-effective transit for the region; however, replacing the board members without changing the institutions that they work under will not likely improve outcomes. Intergovernmental transfers and union work rules limit transit efficiency across the country, but WMATA’s interjurisdictional status exacerbates inefficiencies and waste.

Detroit’s Art is Not the Key to its Revival

This post originally appeared at Market Urbanism, a blog about free-market urban development.

Detroit’s art assets have made news as Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr is evaluating the city’s assets for a potential bankruptcy filing. Belle Isle, where Rod Lockwood recently proposed a free city-state may be on the chopping block, but according to a Detroit Free Press poll, residents are most concerned about the city auctioning pieces from the Detroit Institute of the Arts’ collection.

I’ve written previously about the downsides of publicly funding art from the perspective of free speech, but the Detroit case presents a new reason why cities are not the best keepers of artistic treasures. Pittsburgh’s Post-Gazette contrasts the Detroit Institute of Art’s situation with the benefits of a museum funded with an endowment:

As usual, Andrew Carnegie knew what he was doing.

The steel baron turned philanthropist put the City of Pittsburgh in charge of operating the library he gave it in 1895, but when he added an art museum to the Oakland facility just one year later, he kept it out of city hands.

“The city is not to maintain [the art gallery and museum],” Carnegie said in his dedication address. “These are to be regarded as wise extravagances, for which public revenues should not be given, not as necessaries. These are such gifts as a citizen may fitly bestow upon a community and endow, so that it will cost the city nothing.”

Museums and other cultural amenities  are a sign of a city’s success, not drivers of success itself. The correlation between culturally interesting cities and cities with strong economic opportunities is often mistakenly interpreted to demonstrate that if cities do more to build their cultural appeal from the top down, they will encourage job growth in the process. Rather, a productive and well-educated population both demand and supply these amenities. While an art museum may increase tourism on the margin, it is unlikely to draw additional firms or individuals away from other locations. Detroit is sitting on an estimated $2.5 billion in art, enough to put a dent in its $15 billion long-term obligations.

On a recent episode of Econtalk, Ed Glaeser explains that over investing in public amenities relative to demand is a sign of continued challenges for municipalities:

It is so natural and so attractive to plunk down a new skyscraper and declare Cleveland has ‘come back.’ Or to build a monorail and pretend you are going to be just as successful as Disney World, for some reason. You get short-term headlines even when this infrastructure is just totally ill-suited for the actual needs of the city. The hallmark of declining cities is to have over-funded infrastructure relative to the level of demand in that city.

Similarly, cities throwing resources at museums and other amenities designed to attract the “creative class” are highly likely to fail because bureaucrats are poorly-positioned to learn about and respond to their municipalities’ cultural demands. When cities do successfully provide cultural amenities, they are catering primarily to well-educated, high-income residents — not the groups that should be the targets of government programs.

I think it’s highly unlikely that Detroit will sell off any taxpayer-owned art to pay down its debts based on the media and political blow back the possibility has seen. However, seeing the city in a position where it owns enough art to cover a substantial portion of its unsustainable long-term debts demonstrates why municipalities should not be curators. Tying up municipal resources in art is irresponsible. The uncertainty that the city’s debt creates for future tax and service provision is clearly detrimental to economic growth. While assets like museums are nice for residents, they do not attract or keep residents or jobs.

Detroit does have an important asset; new ideas need cheap rent. Detroit’s affordable real estate is attracting start ups with five of the metro area’s young companies making Brand Innovator’s list of American brands to watch. While these budding businesses could be key players in the city’s economic recovery, top-down plans to preserve and increase cultural amenities for these firms’ employees will not.

Chief Resiliency Officers Versus Antifragility

At The Atlantic CitiesEmily Badger writes about a new program from the Rockefeller Foundation called 100 Resilient Cities, focused on equipping cities with a new employee called a Chief Resiliency Officer. The program states its goals as follows:

Building resilience is about making people, communities and systems better prepared to withstand catastrophic events – both natural and manmade – and able to bounce back more quickly and emerge stronger from these shocks and stresses.

[. . .]

There are some core characteristics that all resilient systems share and demonstrate, both in good times and in times of stress:

  • Spare capacity, which ensures that there is a back-up or alternative available when a vital component of a system fails.
  • Flexibility, the ability to change, evolve, and adapt in the face of disaster.
  • Limited or “safe” failure, which prevents failures from rippling across systems.
  • Rapid rebound, the capacity to re-establish function and avoid long-term disruptions.
  • Constant learning, with robust feedback loops that sense and allow new solutions as conditions change.

In his book Antifragile: Things that Gain from DisorderNassim Taleb defines antifragile as something that not only recovers from shocks, but becomes stronger after recovery, in line with the stated objectives of 100 Resilient Cities. Following its Great Fire of 1871, Chicago demonstrated antifragility. It rebounded rapidly from a disaster that killed 300 people and left one-third of city residents homeless, many without insurance after the fire bankrupted local insurers or the blaze destroyed their paperwork. Despite this great loss, residents of Chicago quickly rebuilt their city using private funding and private charity that was small relative to the amount of damage, but without any government funding. In rebuilding, Chicago developed safer building techniques both through entrepreneurship and with new insurance requirements and  new municipal building codes. The city invested in a better-equipped fire fighting force to lower the risk of fire damage in the future. Despite not having the telecommunications that seem critical to allowing fast disaster recovery today, Chicagoans began building new, safer buildings immediately, investing $50 million in the year after the fire, and tripling the real estate value of the burned blocks within 10 years. Its difficult to imagine a twenty-first century city allowing property owners to move so quickly through the approval process, and its difficult to imagine a Chief Resiliency Officer widening this bottleneck.

A bureaucrat like a Chief Resiliency Officer would not be able to learn the lessons from a natural disaster that the residents of Chicago did in their rebuilding efforts because this knowledge is dispersed, only to be discovered by individuals acting in what they believe to be their own best interest. Taleb describes bureaucrats as fragilistas because they do not suffer from downside risks and therefore cannot learn and grow stronger from shocks. If a disaster strikes a city equipped with a Chief Resiliency Officer and it turns out the city was ill-prepared, he or she will not be held accountable for failing to predict what may have been a very low-probability event. In fact, we often see government efforts toward making cities more resilient introducing fragility contrary to their stated intentions. For example, federal flood insurance minimizes the downside risk of owning flood-prone property. In turn, this encourages more people to live in the highest risk areas, putting them at greater risk when disaster strikes. Cities will not have an opportunity to learn from this to better prepare for future flooding because their rebuilding is subsidized; however, bureaucrats cite this insurance as a success because it facilitates rebuilding without adapting to risk.

The Transportation Security Administration offers a preview of what bureaucratic disaster prevention looks like; top down planning for low-probability events results in attempts to prevent the catastrophic events that we’ve seen in the past without realizing that we’re unlikely to see these same events in the future. As TSA critic Bruce Schneier explains:

Taking off your shoes is next to useless. “It’s like saying, ‘Last time the terrorists wore red shirts, so now we’re going to ban red shirts,’” Schneier says. If the T.S.A. focuses on shoes, terrorists will put their explosives elsewhere. “Focusing on specific threats like shoe bombs or snow-globe bombs simply induces the bad guys to do something else. You end up spending a lot on the screening and you haven’t reduced the total threat.”

Likewise, preparing for low-probability natural disasters, such as 100-year storms, is not something that can be done from the top down. To the extent an event is foreseeable, some individuals and firms will prepare for it, as we saw with Goldman Sachs’ generator and sand bagging efforts in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy. The disaster revealed successful preparation methods, allowing more individuals and the city as a whole to learn and be better prepared for the next disaster. Chief Resiliency Officers are unlikely to accurately foresee low-probability shocks to their cities. To the extent that they protect cities from these shocks, they will likely take away the learning process that would make cities better able to withstand larger shocks, introducing fragility instead of greater resiliency.

Freedom in the 50 States and Migration

In last month’s publication of Freedom in the 50 StatesWill Ruger and Jason Sorens point to net domestic migration as an indicator that Americans demonstrate their preferences for more libertarian states by where they choose to live. They explain, ”

In each case, the bivariate relationship between freedom and migration is positive. However, it is strongest for fiscal freedom and weakest for personal freedom.”

The authors go on to use regression analysis to control for some of the other variables that likely cause people to move from one state to another:

We also try a regression specification including state cost of living from 2000, as estimated by political scientists William D. Berry, Richard C. Fording and Russell L. Hanson.7 This is an index variable linked to a value of 10 for the national average in 2007, the last date for which a value is available. There is some concern that this variable is endogenous to freedom. For instance, it correlates with the Wharton land-use regulation variable at r = 0.67, implying that strict land-use regulation drives up the cost of living. It also correlates with fiscal freedom at −0.35, perhaps implying that taxation can also drive up cost of living.

Finally, we also try including growth in personal income from 2000 to 2007 from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, adjusted for change in state cost of living from Berry, Fording, and Hanson. This variable is even more clearly endogenous to economic freedom, as well as to migration (more workers means more personal income). Nevertheless, we want to put the hypothesis that freedom attracts people to the strictest reasonable tests.

With this more in-depth analysis, the authors find that the three types of freedom they study — fiscal, regulatory, and personal — are all positively associated with net migration (PDF p. 97). In particular, the relationship between land use regulation and migration strikes me as an interesting one. States with the strictest land use regulations prevent in-migration by disallowing new housing development. According to Census data, New York City grew by about 2-percent between 2000 to 2010, including natural growth and foreign immigration. This is a significant slowdown from the 1990s. While the Big Apple wouldn’t be expected to attract new residents through libertarian policies, it does offer many economic and cultural opportunities that people might value. Ed Glaeser explains that by preventing new development, city- and state-level restrictions have prevented more people from being able to move to New York City:

The high prices that persist in New York City suggest that the demand for city living isn’t falling. Case-Shiller data, which captures the metropolitan area rather than the city, shows that the New York area’s prices have risen by 67 percent since 2000 (32 percent in real terms), more than any metropolitan area in the sample except Los Angeles.

But the combination of economic strength and high prices need not lead to population growth if an area doesn’t build many more units. In that case, high housing demand leads only to higher prices — not more people.

[…]

The Bloomberg administration has worked hard to allow more building, but the recent Census numbers seem to suggest that a combination of slow growth and continuing high prices implies that New York’s barriers to building, such as a complex zoning code and ever more Historic Preservation Districts, are still shutting out families that would like to move to the city.

This is just one city-level example, but New York City demonstrates that locations with the strictest land use regulations are not just discouraging in-migration with policies that limit residents’ freedom, they are also preventing people from moving to their jurisdictions by restricting growth in housing stock.

Happy Tax Freedom Day

Today, the Tax Foundation notes that Americans have worked enough to pay off their 2013 taxes, leaving the rest of the year’s earnings available for private consumption and investment:

Tax Freedom Day is the day when the nation as a whole has earned enough money to pay its total tax bill for the year. A vivid, calendar based illustration of the cost of government, Tax Freedom Day divides all federal, state, and local taxes by the nation’s income. In 2013, Americans will pay $2.76 trillion in federal taxes and $1.45 trillion in state taxes, for a total tax bill of $4.22 trillion, or 29.4 percent of income. April 18 is 29.4 percent, or 108 days, into the year.

Because of the increase in payroll taxes and income taxes on high income earners as part of the fiscal cliff deal, Tax Freedom day falls three days later this year than it did last year. While many limited government advocates will view this tax burden as too large, the Tax Foundation website points out that the $4.22 trillion we will pay in taxes this year will not cover the full cost of government spending. Including this year’s deficit spending, which is a tax on future earnings, would push Tax Freedom Day out to May 9th.

Varying Priorities in Municipal Bankruptcy

On Monday Reuters reported that a federal judge has found Stockton, CA to be eligible for bankruptcy protection. This decision came despite protests from Wall Street arguing that the city had options available that would have allowed it to pay its creditors in full, such as raising taxes or cutting benefits for city employees:

Creditors have claimed a lack of good faith by Stockton in its decision to fully pay its obligation to the $254 billion Calpers system but impose losses on bondholders and bond insurers.

The expected move by the California city of 300,000 – along with Jefferson County in Alabama and San Bernardino in California – breaks with a long-standing tradition to fully repay bondholders the principal in most major municipal bankruptcies.

While both the judge and city manager Bob Deis have harshly criticized bondholders who refused to negotiate with the city before bankruptcy proceedings began, other cities have taken a very different approach to their creditors in the bankruptcy process. In 2011, the Rhode Island policymakers adopted a law that puts municipal creditors at the head of the line in municipal bankruptcy proceedings. In the state’s  Central Falls bankruptcy, the requirement to pay bondholders 100 cents on the dollar has meant that the city’s pensioners have taken steep benefit cuts, in some cases losing nearly half of their defined benefit pensions.

After Rhode Island enacted this law, the Wall Street Journal explained:

Despite the financial failure, Central Falls suddenly is attractive to some investors because the law makes them more confident about getting paid.

“If we can find someone selling, we will be a buyer” of Central Falls bonds, says Matt Dalton, chief executive of Belle Haven Investments, a White Plains, N.Y., firm with $800 million in municipal-bond investments under management.

The difference in legal climates for bondholders in Rhode Island and California unsurprisingly fosters different attitudes from creditors.  Former Los Angeles Mayor Richard Riordan explains the dangers of cutting off a city’s access to credit by failing to pay bondholders in full:

“I think the unions ought to be scared stiff. This could be a lot worse than just the pensions. What about government bonds? If government bonds can also be restructured, who will buy them?

“The city and the state all issue tax anticipation bonds to meet their payrolls, but if those can be restructured, no one will buy them. Think about what that means for libraries, parks, street paving, police. It will all be on the line.

While cities on both coasts are facing insolvency in their efforts to meet their obligations to their employees and their creditors, they vary in their approaches as to who is first in line for scarce tax dollars.