Category Archives: Education

Graduate School Opportunities Available Through Mercatus

One of the great parts of working at Mercatus is getting to interact with all of the bright and ambitious students that participate in our academic programs. Mercatus offers four unique graduate programs for students interested in political economy and public policy. The training and education that Mercatus provides are one of a kind.

As part of each program students get access to funding, practical experience, and a wide network of passionate, dedicated scholars. Many graduates from each program go on to develop successful careers in academia and public policy. Ninety-two percent of MA Fellowship graduates, for example, receive a job within 9 months of graduation. Whether you’re pursuing a Master’s, PhD, or law degree, there may be something for you at Mercatus.

The four programs and their details are below.  If you’re interested in learning more and applying, check out our website. Deadlines are right around the corner, with the PhD Fellowship deadline approaching at the end of this week.

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Mercatus PhD Fellowship

The PhD Fellowship is a competitive, full-time fellowship program for students pursuing a doctoral degree in economics at George Mason University. PhD Fellows take courses in market process economics, public choice, and institutional analysis and work on projects that use these lenses to understand global prosperity and change.

Students receive an award up to $200,000 (over five years) for full tuition support and a monthly stipend, as well as experience as a research assistant working closely with Mercatus-affiliated Mason faculty. The application deadline is February 1, 2018.

Mercatus MA Fellowship

The MA Fellowship is a tw0-year, competitive, full-time fellowship program for students pursuing a master’s degree in economics at George Mason University in preparation for a career in public policy. Fellows attend readings groups and career development workshops, spend at least 20 hours per week working with Mercatus scholars and staff, and complete a Mercatus Graduate Policy essay.

Students receive an award of up to $80,000 (over two years) for full tuition support and a monthly stipend, as well as practical experience conducting and disseminating research with Mercatus scholars and staff on pertinent policy issues. The application deadline is March 1, 2018.

Mercatus Adam Smith Fellowship

The Adam Smith Fellowship is a one-year, competitive fellowship program for PhD students at any university and in any discipline. The goal of this fellowship is to introduce students to a framework of ideas they may not otherwise encounter in their studies. Fellows meet a few times out of the year to engage in discussions on key foundational texts in the Austrian, Virginia, and Bloomington schools of political economy and learn how these texts may apply to their research interests.

Students receive a stipend up to $10,000 as well as travel, lodging, and all materials to attend workshops and seminars hosted by the Mercatus Center. The application deadline is March 15, 2018.

Mercatus Frédéric Bastiat Fellowship

The Frédéric Bastiat Fellowship is a one-year, competitive fellowship program for graduate students attending master’s, juris doctoral, and doctoral programs in a variety of disciplines. The goal of this fellowship is to introduce students to the Austrian, Virginia, and Bloomington school of political economy as academic foundations for pursuing contemporary policy analysis. Fellows meet a few times out of the year to engage in discussions on key foundational texts and interact with scholars that work on the cutting edge of policy analysis.

Students receive a stipend of up to $5,000 as well as travel, lodging, and all materials to attend workshops and seminars hosted by the Mercatus Center. The application deadline is March 15, 2018.

 

 

Manufacturing employment and the prime-age male LFP rate: What’s the relationship?

Recently I wrote about the decline in the U.S. prime-age male labor force participation (LFP) rate and discussed some of the factors that may have caused it. One of the demand-side factors that many people think played a role is the decline in manufacturing employment in the United States.

Manufacturing has typically been a male-dominated industry, especially for males with less formal education, but increases in automation and productivity have resulted in fewer manufacturing jobs in the United States over time. As manufacturing jobs disappeared, the story goes, so did a lot of economic opportunities for working-age men. The result has been men leaving the labor force.

However, the same decline in manufacturing employment occurred in other countries as well, yet many of them experienced much smaller declines in their prime-age male LFP rates. The table below shows the percent of employment in manufacturing in 1990 and 2012 for 10 OECD countries, as well as their 25 to 54 male LFP rates in 1990 and 2012. The manufacturing data come from the FRED website and the LFP data are from the OECD data site. The ten countries included here were chosen based on data availability and I think they provide a sample that can be reasonably compared to the United States.

country 25-54 LFP rate, manuf table

As shown in the table, all of the countries experienced a decline in manufacturing employment and labor force participation over this time period. Thus America was not unique in this regard.

But when changes in both variables are plotted on the same graph, the story that the decline in manufacturing employment caused the drop in male LFP rate doesn’t really hold up.

country 25-54 LFP rate, manuf scatter plot

The percentage point change in manufacturing employment is across the top on the x-axis and the percentage point change in the prime-age male LFP rate is on the y-axis. As shown in the graph the relationship between the two is negative in this sample, and the change in manufacturing employment explains almost 36% of the variation in LFP rate declines (the coefficient on the decline in manufacturing employment is -0.322 and the p-value is 0.08).

In other words, the countries that experienced the biggest drops in manufacturing employment experienced the smallest drops in their LFP rate, which is the opposite of what we would expect if the decline in manufacturing employment played a big role in the decline of the LFP rate across countries.

Of course, correlation does not mean causation and I find it hard to believe that declines in manufacturing employment actually improved LFP rates, all else equal. But I also think the less manufacturing, less labor force participation story is too simple, and this data supports that view.

America and Italy experienced similar declines in their male LFP rates but neither experienced the largest declines in manufacturing employment over this time period. What else is going on in America that caused its LFP decline to more closely resemble Italy’s than that of Canada, Australia and the UK, which are more similar to America along many dimensions?

Whatever the exact reasons are, it appears that American working-age males responded differently to the decline in manufacturing employment over the last 20 + years than similar males in similar countries. This could be due to our higher incarceration rate, the way our social safety net is constructed, differences between education systems, the strength of the economy overall or a number of other factors. But attributing the bulk of the blame to the decline of manufacturing employment doesn’t seem appropriate.

Teenage unemployment in cities

New research that examines New York’s Summer Youth Employment Program (SYEP) finds that participation in the program positively impacts student academic outcomes. As the authors state in the introduction, youth employment has many benefits:

“Prior research suggests that adolescent employment improves net worth and financial well-being as an adult. An emerging body of research indicates that summer employment programs also lead to decreases in violence and crime. Work experience may also benefit youth, and high school students specifically, by fostering various non-cognitive skills, such as positive work habits, time management, perseverance, and self-confidence.” (My bold)

This is hardly surprising news to anyone who had a summer job when they were young. An additional benefit from youth employment not mentioned by the authors is that the low-skill, low-paying jobs held by young people also provide them with information about what they don’t want to do when they grow up. Working in a fast food restaurant or at the counter of a store in the local mall helps a young person appreciate how hard it is to earn a dollar and provides a tangible reason to gain more skills in order to increase one’s productivity and earn a higher wage.

Unfortunately, many young people today are not obtaining these benefits. The chart below depicts the national teenage unemployment rate and labor force participation rate (LFP) from 2005 to 2015 using year-over-year August data from the BLS.

national teen unemp, LFP

During the Great Recession teenage employment fell drastically, as indicated by the simultaneous increase in the unemployment rate and decline in the LFP rate from 2007 to 2009. From its peak in 2010, the unemployment rate for 16 to 19 year olds declined slowly until 2012. This decline in the unemployment rate coincided with a decline in the LFP rate and thus the latter was partly responsible for the former’s decline. More recently, the labor force participation rate has flattened out while the unemployment rate has continued to decline, which means that more teenagers are finding jobs. But the teenagers who are employed are part of a much smaller labor pool than 10 years ago – nationally, only 33.7% of 16 to 19 year olds were in the labor force in August 2015, a sharp decline from 44% in 2005.

Full-time teenage employment is unique in that it has a relatively high opportunity cost – attending school full time. Out of the teenagers who work at least some portion of the year, most only work during the summer when school is not in session. Some teenagers also work during the school year, but this subset of teenage workers is smaller than the set who are employed during the summer months. Thus a decline in the LFP rate for teenagers may be a good thing if the teenagers who are exiting the labor force are doing so to concentrate on developing their human capital.

Unfortunately this does not seem to be the case. From 2005 to 2013 the enrollment rate of 16 and 17 year olds actually declined slightly from 95.1% to 93.7%.  The enrollment rate for 18 and 19 year olds stayed relatively constant – 67.6% in 2005 and 67.1% in 2013, with some mild fluctuations in between. These enrollment numbers coupled with the large decline in the teenage LFP rate do not support the story that a large number of working teenagers are exiting the labor force in order to attend school full time. Of course, they do not undermine the story that an increasing amount of teenagers who are both in the labor force and attending school at the same time are choosing to exit the labor force in order to focus on school. But if that is the primary reason, why is it happening now?

Examining national data is useful for identifying broad trends in teenage unemployment, but it conceals substantial intra-national differences. For this reason I examined teenage employment in 10 large U.S. cities (political cities, not MSAs) using employment status data from the 5-year American Community Survey (ACS Table S2301. 2012 was the latest data available for all ten cities).

The first figure below depicts the age 16 – 19 LFP rate for the period 2010 – 2012. As shown in the diagram there are substantial differences across cities.

City teenage LFP

For example, in New York (dark blue) only 23% of the 16 – 19 population was in the labor force in 2012 – down from 25% in 2010 – while in Denver 43.5% of the 16 – 19 population was in the labor force. Nearly every city experienced a decline over this time period, with only Atlanta (red line) experiencing a slight increase. Five cities were below the August 2012 national rate of 34% – Chicago, Philadelphia, Atlanta, San Francisco, and New York.

Also, in contrast to the improving unemployment rate at the national level from 2010 – 12 shown in figure 1, the unemployment rate in each of these cities increased during that period. Figure 3 below depicts the unemployment rate for each of the 10 cities.

City teenage unemp rate

In August 2012 the national unemployment rate for 16 – 19 year olds was 24.3%, a rate that was exceeded by all 10 cities analyzed here. Atlanta had the highest unemployment rate in 2012 at 48%. Atlanta’s high unemployment rate and relatively low LFP rate reveals how few Atlanta teens were employed during this period and how difficult it was for those who wanted a job to find one.

The unemployment rate may increase because employment declines or more unemployed people enter the labor force, which would increase the labor force participation rate. Figures 2 and 3 together indicate that the unemployment rate increased in each of these cities due to a decline in employment, not increased labor force participation.

The preceding figures are evidence that the teenage employment situation in these major cities is getting worse both over time and relative to other areas in the country. To the extent that teenage employment benefits young people, fewer and fewer of them are receiving these benefits. From the linked article:

“The substantial drop in teen employment prospects has had a devastating effect on the nation’s youngest teens (16-17), males, blacks, low income youth, and inner city, minority males,” wrote Andrew Sum in a report on teen summer employment for the Center for Labor Market Studies at Northeastern University. “Those youth who need work experience the most get it the least, another example of the upside down world of labor markets in the past decade.”

Unfortunately, in many cities the response to this situation will only exacerbate the problem. Seattle and Los Angeles have already approved local $15 minimum wages, and a similar law in the state of New York that applies only to fast food franchises was recently approved by the state’s wage board. While many people still question the effect of a minimum wage on overall employment, there is substantial empirical evidence that a relatively high minimum wage has a negative effect on employment for the least skilled workers, which includes inner-city teenagers who often attend mediocre schools. Thus it is hard to believe that any of the seemingly well-intentioned increases in the minimum wage that are occurring around the country will have a positive effect on the urban teenage employment situation presented here. A better response would be to eliminate the minimum wage so that in the short run low-skilled workers are able to offer their labor at a price that is commensurate to its value. In the long run worker productivity must be increased which involves K-12 school reform.

The cost disease and the privatization of government services

Many US municipalities are facing budget problems (see here, here, and here). The real cost of providing traditional public services like police, fire protection, and education is increasing, often at a rate that exceeds revenue growth. The graph below shows the real per-capita expenditure increase in five US cities from 1951 to 2006. (Data are from the census file IndFin_1967-2012.zip and are adjusted for inflation using the US GDP chained price index.)

real per cap spend

In 1951 none of the cities were spending more than $1,000 per person. In 2006 every city was spending well over that amount, with Buffalo spending almost $5,000 per person. Even Fresno, which had the smallest increase, increased per capita spending from $480 to $1,461 – an increase of 204%. Expenditure growth that exceeds revenue growth leads to budget deficits and can eventually result in cuts in services. Economist William Baumol attributes city spending growth to what is known as the “cost disease”.

In his 1967 paper, Baumol argues that municipalities will face rising costs of providing “public” goods and services over time as the relative productivity of labor declines in the industries controlled by local governments versus those of the private sector. As labor in the private sector becomes more productive over time due to increases in capital, wages will increase. Goods and services traditionally supplied by local governments such as police, fire protection, and education have not experienced similar increases in capital or productivity. K-12 education is a particularly good example of stagnation – a teacher from the 1950s would not confront much of a learning curve if they had to teach in a 21st century classroom. However, in order to attract competent and productive teachers, for example, local governments must increase wages to levels that are competitive with the wages that teachers could earn in the private sector. When this occurs, teacher’s wages increase even though their productivity does not. As a result, cities end up paying more money for the same amount of work. Baumol sums up the effect:

“The bulk of municipal services is, in fact, of this general stamp [non-progressive] and our model tells us clearly what can be expected as a result…inexorably and cumulatively, whether or not there is inflation, administrative mismanagement or malfeasance, municipal budgets will almost certainly continue to mount in the future, just as they have been doing in the past. This is a trend for which no man and no group should be blamed, for there is nothing than can be done to stop it.” (Baumol, 1967 p.423)

But is there really nothing than can be done to cure the cost disease? Baumol himself later acknowledged that innovation may yet occur in the relatively stagnant sectors of the economy such as education:

“…an activity which is, say, relatively stagnant need not stay so forever. It may be replaced by a more progressive substitute, or it may undergo an outburst of innovation previous thought very unlikely.” (Baumol et al. 1985, p.807).

The cure for the cost disease is that the stagnant, increasing-cost sectors need to undergo “an outburst of innovation”. But this raises the question; what has prevented this innovation from occurring thus far?

One thing that Baumol’s story ignores is public choice. Specifically, is the lack of labor-augmenting technology in the public-sector industries a characteristic of the public sector? The primary public sector industries have high rates of unionization and the primary goal of a labor union is to protect its dues-paying members. The chart below provides the union affiliation of workers for several occupations in 2013 and 2014.

union membership chart

In 2014, the protective service occupations and education, training, and library occupations, e.g. police officers and teachers, had relatively high union membership rates of 35%. Conversely, other high-skilled occupations such as management, computer and mathematical occupations, architecture and engineering occupations, and sales and office occupations had relatively low rates, ranging from 4.2% to 6.5% in 2014. Installation, maintenance, and repair occupations were in the middle at 14.6%, down from 16.1% in 2013.

The bottom part of the table shows the union membership rate of the public sector in general and of each level of government: federal, state, and local. The highest rate of unionization was at the local level, where approximately 42% of workers were members of a union in 2014, up from 41% in 2013. This is about 14 percentage points higher than the federal level and 12 percentage points higher than the state level. The union membership rate of the private sector in 2014 was only 6.6%.

In addition to the apathetic and sometimes hostile view unions have towards technological advancement and competition, union membership is also associated with higher wages, particularly at the local-government level. Economists Maury Gittleman and Brooks Piece of the Bureau of Labor statistics found that local-government workers have compensation costs 10 – 19% larger than similar private sector workers.

The table below shows the median weekly earnings in 2013 and 2014 for workers in the two most heavily unionized occupational categories; education, training, and library occupations and protective service occupations. In both occupation groups there is a substantial difference between the union and non-union weekly earnings. From the taxpayer’s perspective, higher earnings mean higher costs.

union median wage chart

There needs to be an incentive to expend resources in labor-saving technology for it to occur and it is not clear that this incentive exists in the public sector. In the public sector, taxpayers ultimately pay for the services they receive but these services are provided by an agent – the local politician(s) – who is expected to act on the taxpayer’s behalf when it comes to spending tax dollars. But in the public sector the agent/politician is accountable to both his employees and the general taxpayer since both groups vote on his performance. The general taxpayer wants the politician to cut costs and invest in labor-augmenting technology while the public-employee taxpayer wants to keep his job and earn more income. Since the public-employee unions are well organized compared to the general taxpayers it is easier for them to lobby their politicians/bosses in order to get their desired outcome, which ultimately means higher costs for the general taxpayer.

If Baumol’s cost disease is the primary factor responsible for the increasing cost of municipal government then there is not an easy remedy in the current environment. If the policing, firefighting, and education industries are unreceptive to labor-augmenting technology due to their high levels of unionization and near-monopoly status, one potential way to cure municipalities of the cost disease is privatization. In their 1996 paper, The Cost Disease and Government Growth: Qualifications to Baumol, economists J. Ferris and Edwin West state “Privatization could lead to significant changes in the structure of supply that result in “genuine” reductions in real costs” (p. 48).

Schools, police, and fire services are not true public goods and thus economic efficiency does not dictate that they are provided by a government entity. Schools in particular have been successfully built and operated by private funds for thousands of years. While there are fewer modern examples of privately operated police and fire departments, in theory both could be successfully privatized and historically fire departments were, though not always with great success. However, the failures of past private fire departments in places like New York City in the 19th century appear to be largely due to political corruption, an increase in political patronage, poorly designed incentives, and the failure of the rule of law rather than an inherent flaw in privatization. And today, many volunteer fire departments still exist. In 2013 69% of all firefighters were volunteers and 66% of all fire departments were all-volunteer.

The near-monopoly status of government provided education in many places and the actual monopoly of government provided police and fire protection makes these industries less susceptible to innovation. The government providers face little to no competition from private-sector alternatives, they are highly unionized and thus have little incentive to invest in labor-saving technology, and the importance of their output along with the aforementioned lack of competition allows them to pass cost increases on to taxpayers.

Market competition, limited union membership, and the profit-incentive are features of the private sector that are lacking in the public sector. Together these features encourage the use of labor-augmenting technology, which ultimately lowers costs and frees up resources, most notably labor, that can then be used on producing other goods and services. The higher productivity and lower costs that result from investments in productive capital also free up consumer dollars that can then be used to purchase additional goods and services from other industries.

Privatization of basic city services may be a little unnerving to some people, but ultimately it may be the only way to significantly bring down costs without cutting services. There are over 19,000 municipal governments in the US, which means there are over 19,000 groups of citizens that are capable of looking for new and innovative ways to provide the goods and services they rely on. In the private sector entrepreneurs continue to invent new things and find ways to make old things better and cheaper. I believe that if we allow entrepreneurs to apply their creativity to the public sector we will get similar outcomes.

Education, Innovation, and Urban Growth

One of the strongest predictors of urban growth since the start of the 20th century is the skill level of a city’s population. Cities that have a highly skilled population, usually measured as the share of the population with a bachelor’s degree or more, tend to grow faster than similar cities with less educated populations. This is true at both the metropolitan level and the city level. The figure below plots the population growth of 30 large U.S. cities from 1970 – 2013 on the vertical axis and the share of the city’s 25 and over population that had at least a bachelor’s degree in 1967 on the horizontal axis. (The education data for the cities are here. I am using the political city’s population growth and the share of the central city population with a bachelor’s degree or more from the census data linked to above.)

BA, city growth 1

As shown in the figure there is a strong, positive relationship between the two variables: The correlation coefficient is 0.61. It is well known that over the last 50 years cities in warmer areas have been growing while cities in colder areas have been shrinking, but in this sample the cities in warmer areas also tended to have a better educated population in 1967. Many of the cities known today for their highly educated populations, such as Seattle, San Francisco, and Washington D.C., also had highly educated populations in 1967. Colder manufacturing cities such as Detroit, Buffalo, and Newark had less educated workforces in 1967 and subsequently less population growth.

The above figure uses data on both warm and cold cities, but the relationship holds for only cold cities as well. Below is the same graph but only depicts cities that have a January mean temperature below 40°F. Twenty out of the 30 cities fit this criteria.

BA, city growth 2

Again, there is a strong, positive relationship. In fact it is even stronger; the correlation coefficient is 0.68. Most of the cities in the graph lost population from 1970 – 2013, but the cities that did grow, such as Columbus, Seattle, and Denver, all had relatively educated populations in 1967.

There are several reasons why an educated population and urban population growth are correlated. One is that a faster accumulation of skills and human capital spillovers in cities increase wages which attracts workers. Also, the large number of specialized employers located in cities makes it easier for workers, especially high-skill workers, to find employment. Cities are also home to a range of consumption amenities that attract educated people, such as a wide variety of shops, restaurants, museums, and sporting events.

Another reason why an educated workforce may actually cause city growth has to do with its ability to adjust and innovate. On average, educated workers tend to be more innovative and better able to learn new skills. When there is an negative, exogenous shock to an industry, such as the decline of the automobile industry or the steel industry, educated workers can learn new skills and create new industries to replace the old ones. Many of the mid-20th century workers in Detroit and other Midwestern cities decided to forego higher education because good paying factory jobs were plentiful. When manufacturing declined those workers had a difficult time learning new skills. Also, the large firms that dominated the economic landscape, such as Ford, did not support entrepreneurial thinking. This meant that even the educated workers were not prepared to create new businesses.

Local politicians often want to protect local firms in certain industries through favorable treatment and regulation. But often this protection harms newer, innovative firms since they are forced to compete with the older firms on an uneven playing field. Political favoritism fosters a stagnant economy since in the short-run established firms thrive at the expense of newer, more innovative startups. Famous political statements such as “What’s good for General Motors is good for the country” helped mislead workers into thinking that government was willing and able to protect their employers. But governments at all levels were unable to stop the economic forces that battered U.S. manufacturing.

To thrive in the 21st century local politicians need to foster economic environments that encourage innovation and ingenuity. The successful cities of the future will be those that are best able to innovate and to adapt in an increasingly complex world. History has shown us that an educated and entrepreneurial workforce is capable of overcoming economic challenges, but to do this people need to be free to innovate and create. Stringent land-use regulations, overly-burdensome occupational licensing, certificate-of-need laws, and other unnecessary regulations create barriers to innovation and make it more difficult for entrepreneurs to create the firms and industries of the future.

Pre-K for All?

I’m at US News’s Economic Intelligence blog this week, writing about President Obama’s proposal for universal Pre-K. One problem with his proposal is that we don’t have data demonstrating that state- or federally-funded preschool will improve outcomes for children:

Accurately measuring the outcomes of education programs is critical for providing policymakers, educators, and the public with the necessary data to know what works. Without this data we cannot know whether or not putting scarce taxpayer resources toward preschool will provide lasting benefits to participants, let alone provide societal benefits in excess of costs.

New video explores source of union influence in politics

The Moving Picture Institute and Reason TV have partnered on a new video that explores how public sector unions affect political outcomes. Many public sector employees are required to pay union dues, and these dues are in turn used to sway political outcomes.

As the video explains, teachers who want to teach in public schools often don’t have the option of keeping their union dues instead of funding political causes. This helps to explain the union’s incentive to grow the public sector workforce, even if the growth in spending does not result in improved outcomes for taxpayers.

The video does a clear job of explaining that the problem is not individual public employees, but rather the incentives facing the unions that they are required to belong to. This incentive structure at times leads union officials to support their own best interests even ahead of their members’. This was demonstrated in Chicago last fall when the Chicago Tribune revealed that 23 retired union officials receive benefits nearly three times greater than what the city’s typical retirees make, at the expense of not only taxpayers, but also the public employees they represent.

 

Poway and the billion dollar capital appreciation school bond

Where does it cost $1 billion to borrow $105 million? In Poway Unified’s School District. With a pie chart showing the full cost of a $105 million capital appreciation bond being issued in a California school district to finance capital improvements, Will Carless’s local reporting turned into a national story. (Previous work on Poway’s bond financing was put together by a retired Michigan blogger, John Thurrell, who covers municipal finance).

The power of the story surely has much to do with the chart itself, which I reproduce from the original article here:

 The reason this bond is different from garden-variety school borrowing is that the district couldn’t issue a conventional bond without raising property taxes. So they “got creative.” With the help of a financial consultant they instead issued a Capital Appreciation Bond.

With a 40 year time horizon, the district doesn’t have to start making payments on it for 20 years – long after the students who enjoy the improvements have graduated. Future taxpayers will be paying bond investors about 10 times more than the initial loan.

The local taxpayer’s association calls the deal “loan-sharking,” but I also have to wonder what role property taxes and Prop 13’s limits on property tax rate hikes played in this story. Carless details how local officials figured out a way around the politically difficult choice of a tax rate hike: Proposition C. There wasn’t enough revenue coming in from the district’s $55/$1000 per assessed value levy. Proposition C asked voters if they would be willing to extend the levy for another 14 years. The idea was to collect the revenue now and start paying the bond back later. But the CAP maneuver shows that by limiting a direct and stable source of local revenues (via the property tax rate cap – which voters may modify), politicians have the incentive (and may even prefer) to pursue more exotic, and less transparent funding mechanisms.

The news story is also the power of a basic pie chart to convey information. This picture stirred up an online debate over what kinds of information citizens are given when they go to vote on bond issues. In response to the “chart-gone-viral”, the School district is defending its choice of financing while residents are “shocked” and “appalled.”

CAPs are getting a pretty bad rap in the press. One blogger calls them, “the poor community’s way to borrow their way out of insolvency,” with the “cancer spreading” to Los Angeles Unified. While California municipalities appears to have embraced CAPs, Michigan banned them in 1994. The NYT reports that U.S. school districts issued $4 billion in CAPs last year.

Governor O’Malley Ties Taxes to Educational Achievement

Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley has proposed several new taxes that he says are necessary to close the state’s $1.1 billion budget gap.

Image from Flickr user loop-oh

He’s proposing eliminating income tax exemptions for those earning over $100,000 per year along with increased gas taxes, sewer taxes, and a new internet sales tax.

Ben VanMetre argues that these changes are positive reforms to the extent that they make the state’s tax code more neutral. This may be true if the higher gas tax eliminates road spending from the general fund. The income tax change seems more ambiguous though — I’m not sure that I agree that eliminating income tax exemptions for a select group of taxpayers is closing a loophole.

O’Malley is insisting that these taxes increases are necessary to protect Maryland’s quality school system. By some measures, Maryland does in fact have the best public schools in the country. However, a study from the American Legislative Exchange Council suggests that the likely reason for this is that Maryland has a high median income, not because of its high tax rates. Student success is influenced much more by parental income than school spending, the report finds. As a Baltimore Sun editorial explains:

According to an analysis of data from the Annual Survey of State Government Finances from the U.S. Census Bureau, all education spending accounted for 47 percent of Maryland’s total revenue in 2009, the most recent year available. Health spending, which is always cited as the monster in the state budget, ate 9 percent of total revenue in 2009. By comparison, public education represented 26 percent of total revenue in 2000.

The results are sparkly — on paper. Maryland earned the top spot for the third year in a row in Education Week’s survey of the nation’s K-12 public schools last week. But for the wealthiest state in the nation, home to some of the most highly educated parents, it would be surprising if it did not score high. And few know how much that ranking costs at a time when the state faces a $1.6 billion budget gap and legislators are debating whether to raise taxes yet again in a state with one of the largest tax burdens in the nation.

Only 8 percent of Marylanders guessed that the state spends more than $10,000 per pupil, according to a 2008 poll by the Foundation for Educational Choice. According to 2008 data from the National Center for Educational Statistics, the state spends about $15,100 per pupil each year, or about double the cost of tuition at most private and parochial schools.

These results are also consistent with what Eileen Norcross and Frederic Sautet found in their study of New Jersey budget drivers. In New Jersey, the poorest school districts are required to spend as much per-pupil as the state’s wealthiest districts. This sounds like a formula for providing a quality education for New Jersey’s disadvantaged students, but unfortunately throwing money at the problem of poor educational outcomes is not an effective way to improve results. Students in these Abbott districts are some of the most well-funded in the country, yet many of these schools continue to fail their students as they achieve below grade-level test scores and high dropout rates.

Education is not a simple equation in which adding money to school systems provides better results. O’Malley may be able to successfully pass higher taxes in the short term by convincing voters that it’s for the sake of Maryland children. But suggesting that Maryland’s schools perform relatively well because of high tax rates is a misleading statement, detrimental to making real improvements to Maryland schools for the benefit of children from all income backgrounds.

New Education Funding in Illinois Goes to Pensions

Neighborhood Effects readers know that Illinois’s pension problems are much worse than reported. According to the state’s numbers, Illinois’s unfunded pension liabilities amount to roughly $85 billion but as Eileen Norcross and I have argued, the amount is actually closer to $173 billion.

There have been many discussions regarding pension reform in Illinois during the past few months and, unsurprisingly, little has been accomplished. In fact, an article in Statehouse News earlier this week provided evidence that Illinois is continuing to deliberately avoid dealing with the problem by providing temporary quick fixes and banking on the idea that the state’s pension problems will simply disappear when the economy recovers.

According to the article in Statehouse, Illinois’s

12 percent increase in higher education spending this year isn’t going to benefit students. Instead, the additional funding for fiscal 2012 is going into the State Universities Retirement System, or SURS, to address its underfunded pension program…. The dramatic increase in the amount of money being given to SURS, and the other state pension systems, seeks to make up for decades of chronic underfunding by governors and legislators, and shrinking returns on investments because of the stagnant economy.

Education costs are increasing across the country. Students in Illinois paid 30 percent more for a year of college education at a university in 2011 than they did in 2007. Instead of using the additional 12 percent in higher education funds to curb these increasing costs, the state put the money towards its SURS system. This fiscal year students in Illinois are dealing with the consequences of the state’s failure to properly manage its pension system. As pension costs continue to grow in Illinois, the state will likely continue putting more money into the system – which means less money will be available for other areas of the budget.

In related pension news in Illinois, the Daily Herald provided the following quote from Hanover Park Village President Rodney Craig:

We have a fear that at the end of the day the pensions won’t be there

Without serious structural pension reform, Mr. Craig’s fear will most certainly become a reality. Labeling Illinois’s recent pension quick fix as a disappointment would be an understatement. This is nowhere near the type of reform that needs to happen in Illinois. If the state legislature wants to ensure fiscal stability in the future of Illinois’s pension system then they must start by removing the constitutional protection of pension benefits, reducing the rate of accrual for current employees, increasing current employee contributions, closing the current defined benefit plans and moving all employees to a defined contribution plan.