Category Archives: Safety Nets

Manufacturing employment and the prime-age male LFP rate: What’s the relationship?

Recently I wrote about the decline in the U.S. prime-age male labor force participation (LFP) rate and discussed some of the factors that may have caused it. One of the demand-side factors that many people think played a role is the decline in manufacturing employment in the United States.

Manufacturing has typically been a male-dominated industry, especially for males with less formal education, but increases in automation and productivity have resulted in fewer manufacturing jobs in the United States over time. As manufacturing jobs disappeared, the story goes, so did a lot of economic opportunities for working-age men. The result has been men leaving the labor force.

However, the same decline in manufacturing employment occurred in other countries as well, yet many of them experienced much smaller declines in their prime-age male LFP rates. The table below shows the percent of employment in manufacturing in 1990 and 2012 for 10 OECD countries, as well as their 25 to 54 male LFP rates in 1990 and 2012. The manufacturing data come from the FRED website and the LFP data are from the OECD data site. The ten countries included here were chosen based on data availability and I think they provide a sample that can be reasonably compared to the United States.

country 25-54 LFP rate, manuf table

As shown in the table, all of the countries experienced a decline in manufacturing employment and labor force participation over this time period. Thus America was not unique in this regard.

But when changes in both variables are plotted on the same graph, the story that the decline in manufacturing employment caused the drop in male LFP rate doesn’t really hold up.

country 25-54 LFP rate, manuf scatter plot

The percentage point change in manufacturing employment is across the top on the x-axis and the percentage point change in the prime-age male LFP rate is on the y-axis. As shown in the graph the relationship between the two is negative in this sample, and the change in manufacturing employment explains almost 36% of the variation in LFP rate declines (the coefficient on the decline in manufacturing employment is -0.322 and the p-value is 0.08).

In other words, the countries that experienced the biggest drops in manufacturing employment experienced the smallest drops in their LFP rate, which is the opposite of what we would expect if the decline in manufacturing employment played a big role in the decline of the LFP rate across countries.

Of course, correlation does not mean causation and I find it hard to believe that declines in manufacturing employment actually improved LFP rates, all else equal. But I also think the less manufacturing, less labor force participation story is too simple, and this data supports that view.

America and Italy experienced similar declines in their male LFP rates but neither experienced the largest declines in manufacturing employment over this time period. What else is going on in America that caused its LFP decline to more closely resemble Italy’s than that of Canada, Australia and the UK, which are more similar to America along many dimensions?

Whatever the exact reasons are, it appears that American working-age males responded differently to the decline in manufacturing employment over the last 20 + years than similar males in similar countries. This could be due to our higher incarceration rate, the way our social safety net is constructed, differences between education systems, the strength of the economy overall or a number of other factors. But attributing the bulk of the blame to the decline of manufacturing employment doesn’t seem appropriate.

Some private sector pensions also face funding trouble

A new report by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp (PBGC) warns that while the market recovery has helped many multiemployer pension plans improve their funding there remain some plans that,”will not be able to raise contributions or reduce benefits sufficiently to avoid insolvency,” affecting between 1 and 1.5 million of ten million enrollees.

Multiemployer plans are defined as those which unions collectively bargained for, with multiple employers participating within an industry (e.g. building, construction, retail, trucking, mining and entertainment). They are also known as Taft-Hartley plans. Multiemployer plans grew out of the idea of offering pension benefits for unionized employees in transient kinds of work such as construction. These plans have been in trouble for awhile due to a variety of factors. Many plans have taken measures by increasing contributions and in a few cases cutting benefits according to GAO. But those steps have not been nearly enough to fix the growing shortfalls.

When a PBGC-insured pension plan goes insolvent beneficiaries are only guaranteed a fraction of their benefits. Those funds come from the premiums paid by remaining plans. The projected deficit for the ailing multiemployer plans range from $49.6 billion to $79.6 billion in 2022. By contrast the PBGC reports that single employer plans fare better with the current funding deficit of $27.4 billion narrowing to $7.6 billion by 2023.

Source: FY 2013 PBGC Projections Report

 

Lessons from North Carolina’s proposed budget

In today’s Room for Debate at The New York Times, I discuss what’s good and what is worrying about North Carolina’s proposed biennial budget.

The good: a doubling of the state’s Rainy Day Fund and end to the estate tax. But a big controversy surrounds the legislature this week. Lawmakers decided to cut unemployment benefits by one-third. This move disqualifies the state from receiving additional emergency unemployment insurance funds from the federal government, affecting 170,000 jobless in the state.

The issue points to the perennial calls for reform to the federal-state Unemployment Insurance (UI) program. North Carolina is one of many states that must pay the federal government back what it has borrowed to offer extended benefits to its residents, or face higher payroll taxes. Their choices are tough ones to make: raise the state payroll tax (or taxable wage base) and replenish the trust fund – which has its own effects on the economy and the workforce – or cut benefits. A better solution is to re-think our approach to social insurance, something economists, such as Harvard’s Martin Feldstein, have been highlighting the structural flaws of UI since the 1970s.

n.b. update: a reader rightly notes at the NYT – the states must pay back the money they’ve borrowed from the federal government to continue paying benefits. But they don’t have to pay back the temporary EUC program. 

Rhode Island to unionize daycare workers

Last week, the Rhode Island legislature passed a law to permit daycare workers who receive any subsidies from the state to either form a union, or join an existing union such as the SEIU. While they would not be eligible for state pensions or health benefits, and not permitted to strike, the law allows workers to collectively bargain over subsidies, training and professional development and “other economic matters.”

Daycare workers represent a target population for unions. A new law in Minnesota permits daycare workers to unionize so home providers can advocate for higher subsidy payments from the state. In New York in 2010, Governor Paterson pushed for daycare workers to pay union dues to the teachers’ unions in his 2011 budget proposal.

With Rhode Island in the mix, 17 states now permit or strongly encourage daycare workers to unionize. In the rush to unionize private business owners, the ostensible benefits – a voice in the legislature to lobby for higher state subsidies – are touted – and the costs are ignored For example, in Massachusetts, if a private daycare owner accepts clients who pay with state daycare vouchers, the daycare provider must be represented by a union and pay dues. These dues are skimmed off of the state subsidy for low-income parents which is paid directly to the daycare provider. To avoid unionization, the provider would have to turn away low-income families who receive state subsidies for childcare.

The SEIU claims unionization will improve the quality of childcare and offers economic justice for workers. But, the most dramatic result seems to be this:  where daycare workers unionize, the SEIU immediately gains a windfall of new dues transferred from a program meant to help low-income families pay for daycare, (to the tune of $28 million in Michigan, where similar legislation was recently passed).

As James Shrek writes in National Review, one of the more remarkable things about this effort is that it represents a new strategy by unions. The target group for unionization are private individuals or business owners who are also the recipients of government benefits. For instance, at one point in Michigan, a parent receiving Medicaid to care for a disabled child could receive SEIU representation. Some parents found the only result was a reduction in their monthly Medicaid payments and no representation, effectively, “forcing disadvantaged families to pay union dues out of their government benefits.”

As Shrek notes, the Minnesota law, which authorizes AFSCME to unionize in-home daycare providers, also potentially covers short-term summer camps, and grandparents watching their grandkids, or “relative care.”

Shrek asks, does this tactic represent a sign of desperation on the part of unions who are actively seeking new members to the point of organizing, “unions of one”? With a growing number of states joining the trend, it is worth watching how these laws affect those people and families that the unions are claiming to help.

 

 

 

 

The Problem with States’ Rights

This week, Eileen Norcross hosted a fiscal federalism symposium, bringing together scholars of various disciplines to discuss some of the challenges that our system of federalism faces today. Part of the discussion centered around Michael Greve’s new book The Upside-Down Constitution.

One of his key points is a reminder of the reason federalists believed that states’ rights are important. We shouldn’t care about states’ rights for the sake of states’ rights — states are merely groups of residents. Rather, we should care about people’s rights, and how these can be better protected in a federalist system than under a centralized government. This distinction sometimes gets lost when people advocate states’ rights rather than states’ enumerated powers. The problem with advocating states’ rights is that this nuance paves the way for states to collude rather than to compete.

A clear example of this collusion happened in 1984 when Congress passed the National Minimum Drinking Age Act. Because setting a drinking age does not fall under the federal government’s enumerated powers, when Congress wanted to change the rules in this area, it had to bargain using tax dollars. States that kept a drinking age in place below 21 would have lost 10-percent of their federal highway funding dollars.

While this may sound like the federal government is coercing the states, it’s key to remember that the goal of federalism is individuals’ rights. With the National Minimum Drinking Age Act, the states and federal government colluded to bring an end to competition in policy. This Act made state policy in this area the same, taking away Americans’ opportunity to choose to live in states with lower drinking ages.

When multiple levels of government pay for a given service, such as roads, many opportunities arise for this type of collusion, leading to the growth of government and the erosion of competition between governments. A competitive federalism means both that governments have incentives to provide the policy environments that their residents want and that people will have greater variety of policy climates to choose from. If the drinking age is an important issue to a family, competitive federalism could provide them with the option of living in a city or state with a higher or lower minimum age.

In the coming year, we hope to pursue research exploring what institutions limit competition within American federalism and what institutions prevent collusion between the federal, state, and local jurisdictions.

 

Twenty states face bill for Unemployment Benefits

The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities has a new analysis highlighting the $35 billion bill that 20 states owe to the federal government for covering benefit extensions. The report points to one of the design problems with the current program. The joint federal-state unemployment insurance program (UI) is financed via a payroll tax. States have kept the tax too low and thus did not build up enough reserves in the UI fund to weather the recession. This isn’t the first time UI has run into this problem, in fact it’s a perennial issue. Alan Krueger of Princeton provides a summary of some of the structural weakness in UI, a program unchanged since the New Deal.

While it is widely recognized that UI is structurally broken, solutions vary considerably. In a paper for The Brookings Institute, Rosen and Kletzer suggest “strengthening the federal role” in UI that would require states to harmonize eligibility criteria and benefit levels, increased eligibility and benefits financed by a higher FUTA tax. In addition Rosen and Kletzer propose a wageloss insurance program for those who become employed at a lower wage than their previous job; and lastly private accounts for the self-employed.

The Tax Foundation proposes another set of fixes. These include loosening up restrictions in the program to allow states to experiment with alternative programs, as well as the establishment of individual accounts.

In September the Obama Administration proposed a ‘sweeping reform’ of the current program. Included was the wageloss subsidy for the employed. In last week’s SOTU the president stressed transforming UI into an employment program via job training services. But these new appendages avoid the problem that UI was created to address: how to smooth private consumption during times of temporary and involuntary unemployment?

What about a private insurance model? Trooper Sanders makes the case at The Huffington Post.

Medicare fraud: bogus clinics in barns

Each year the Medicare program loses millions of dollars to fraud. Applicants simply set up fake clinics using stolen medical IDs and real addresses in barns, UPS stores and abandoned apartments. It’s called the drop box scheme and apparently it’s hard to catch every bogus clinic operator given the ease of presenting what looks like a legitimate medical clinic on paper. Reuters tracks down the scheme. But it’s just one of several the program has to contend with. Other kinds of fraud documented by GAO include “rent-a-patient” and “pill mills.”

 

Government Safety Nets and Private Safety Nets

Extensive research has found that government provision of charitable services tends to crowd out private charity.

In a pair of papers, for example, Andreoni and Payne found that when U.S. charities receive an extra $1,000 in government grants, they tend to receive about $750 less in other donations (2003, 2011). That is, public charity crowds out about 75 percent of private charity.

It appears that the effect cannot be explained by individuals giving less. Instead, it appears that charities themselves tend to reduce their fundraising when they receive more government money.

In a new paper, Andreoni and Payne exploit a more detailed Canadian dataset to delve deeper into the question. They find that crowding-out exceeds 100 percent. Of this, “77 percent can be attributed to reduced fundraising by the charities.” Interestingly:

Direct giving by individuals (tax-receipted gifts) is only reduced if the charity reduces its fundraising—crowding out of gifts from individuals is fully the result of reduced fundraising. In fact, the government grants have a small effect of crowding-in individual donors, which is consistent with a view that individuals are either unaware of changes in government grants, or are using them as signals of the quality of the charity.

Thus:

Each $1000 in grants reduces revenue from other sources by about $1000, but this total crowding out is not due to declining individual donations, but rather due to reduced revenue from foundations and other charities, and from holding fewer fundraising events.

In other safety net news, the University of Chicago’s Casey Mulligan finds that the government safety net has gotten more generous in the last few years:

Inflation-adjusted spending on means-tested subsidies have increased sharply since 2007, and most of this growth was due to changes in eligibility rules, and increases in subsidies per eligible person, rather than increases in the number of people who would have been eligible under pre-recession subsidy rules. The non-elderly parts of the safety net have increased from about $10,000 per year of non- or under-employment by non-elderly household heads and spouses in 2007 to almost $15,000 per year in 2010, adjusted for inflation. From 2007 to 2010, inflation-adjusted safety net spending increased $35,000 for every added year of non-employment or under-employment. As a result, the average private returns to employment are substantially less than they were in 2007.

If you are interested in giving to charities that do not rely on taxpayer funding, this article uses Charity Navigator data to evaluate the best charities that take no government cash.