Tag Archives: Arizona

Decreasing congestion with driverless cars

Traffic is aggravating. Especially for San Francisco residents. According to Texas A&M Transportation Institute, traffic congestion in the San Francisco-Oakland CA area costs the average auto commuter 78 hours per year in extra travel time, $1,675 for their travel time delays, and an extra 33 gallons of gas compared to free-flow traffic conditions. That means the average commuter spends more than three full days stuck in traffic each year. Unfortunately for these commuters, a potential solution to their problems just left town.

Last month, after California officials told Uber to stop its pilot self-driving car program because it lacked the necessary state permits for autonomous driving, Uber decided to relocate the program from San Francisco to Phoenix, Arizona. In an attempt to alleviate safety concerns, these self-driving cars are not yet driverless, but they do have the potential to reduce the number of cars on the road. Other companies like Google, Tesla, and Ford have expressed plans to develop similar technologies, and some experts predict that completely driverless cars will be on the road by 2021.

Until then, however, cities like San Francisco will continue to suffer from the most severe congestion in the country. Commuters in these cities experience serious delays, higher gasoline usage, and lost time behind the wheel. If you live in any of these areas, you are probably very familiar with the mind-numbing effect of sitting through sluggish traffic.

It shouldn’t be surprising then that these costs could culminate into a larger problem for economic growth. New Mercatus research finds that traffic congestion can significantly harm economic growth and concludes with optimistic predictions for how autonomous vehicle usage could help.

Brookings Senior Fellow Clifford Winston and Yale JD candidate Quentin Karpilow find significant negative effects of traffic congestion on the growth rates of California counties’ gross domestic product (GDP), employment, wages, and commodity freight flows. They find that a 10% reduction in congestion in a California urban area increases both job and GDP growth by roughly 0.25% and wage growth to increase by approximately 0.18%.

This is the first comprehensive model built to understand how traffic harms the economy, and it builds on past research that has found that highway congestion leads to slower job growth. Similarly, congestion in West Coast ports, which occurs while dockworkers and marine terminal employers negotiate contracts, has caused perishable commodities to go bad, resulting in a 0.2 percentage point reduction in GDP during the first quarter of 2015.

There are two main ways to solve the congestion problem; either by reducing the number of cars on the road or by increasing road capacity. Economists have found that the “build more roads” method in application has actually been quite wasteful and usually only induces additional highway traffic that quickly fills the new road capacity.

A common proposal for the alternative method of reducing the number of cars on the road is to implement congestion pricing, or highway tolls that change based on the number of drivers using the road. Increasing the cost of travel during peak travel times incentivizes drivers to think more strategically about when they plan their trips; usually shifting less essential trips to a different time or by carpooling. Another Mercatus study finds that different forms of congestion pricing have been effective at reducing traffic congestion internationally in London and Stockholm as well as for cities in Southern California.

The main drawback of this proposal, however, is the political difficulty of implementation, especially with interstate highways that involve more than one jurisdiction to approve it. Even though surveys show that drivers generally change their mind towards supporting congestion pricing after they experience the lower congestion that results from tolling, getting them on board in the first place can be difficult.

Those skeptical of congestion pricing, or merely looking for a less challenging policy to implement, should look forward to the new growing technology of driverless cars. The authors of the recent Mercatus study, Winston and Karpilow, find that the adoption of autonomous vehicles could have large macroeconomic stimulative effects.

For California specifically, even if just half of vehicles became driverless, this would create nearly 350,000 additional jobs, increase the state’s GDP by $35 billion, and raise workers’ earnings nearly $15 billion. Extrapolating this to the whole country, this could add at least 3 million jobs, raise the nation’s annual growth rate 1.8 percentage points, and raise annual labor earnings more than $100 billion.

What would this mean for the most congested cities? Using Winston and Karpilow’s estimates, I calculated how reduced congestion from increased autonomous car usage could affect Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) that include New York City, Los Angeles, Boston, San Francisco, and the DC area. The first chart shows the number of jobs that would have been added in 2011 if 50% of motor vehicles had been driverless. The second chart shows how this would affect real GDP per capita, revealing that the San Francisco MSA would have the most to gain, but with the others following close behind.

jobsadd_autonomousvehicles realgdp_autonomousvehicles

As with any new technology, there is uncertainty with how exactly autonomous cars will be fully developed and integrated into cities. But with pilot programs already being implemented by Uber in Pittsburgh and nuTonomy in Singapore, it is becoming clear that the technology’s efficacy is growing.

With approximately $1,332 GDP per capita and 45,318 potential jobs on the table for the San Francisco Metropolitan Statistical Area, it is a shame that San Francisco just missed a chance to realize some of these gains and to be at the forefront of driving progress in autonomous vehicle implementation.

More labor market freedom means more labor force participation

The U.S. labor force participation (LFP) rate has yet to bounce back to its pre-recession level. Some of the decline is due to retiring baby-boomers but even the prime-age LFP rate, which only counts people age 25 – 54 and thus less affected by retirement, has not recovered.

Economists and government officials are concerned about the weak recovery in labor force participation. A high LFP rate is usually a sign of a strong economy—people are either working or optimistic about their chances of finding a job. A low LFP rate is often a sign of little economic opportunity or disappointment with the employment options available.

The U.S. is a large, diverse country so the national LFP rate obscures substantial state variation in LFP rates. The figure below shows the age 16 and up LFP rates for the 50 states and the U.S. as a whole (black bar) in 2014. (data)

2014-state-lfp-rates

The rates range from a high of 72.6% in North Dakota to a low of 53.1% in West Virginia. The U.S. rate was 62.9%. Several of the states with relatively low rates are in the south, including Mississippi, Alabama and Arkansas. Florida and Arizona also had relatively low labor force participation, which is not surprising considering their reputations as retirement destinations.

There are several reasons why some states have more labor force participation than others. Demographics is one: states with a higher percentage of people over age 65 and between 16 and 22 will have lower rates on average since people in these age groups are often retired or in school full time. States also have different economies made up of different industries and at any given time some industries are thriving while others are struggling.

Federal and state regulation also play a role. Federal regulation disparately impacts different states because of the different industrial compositions of state economies. For example, states with large energy industries tend to be more affected by federal regulation than other states.

States also tax and regulate their labor markets differently. States have different occupational licensing standards, different minimum wages and different levels of payroll and income taxes among other things. Each of these things alters the incentive for businesses to hire or for people to join the labor market and thus affects states’ LFP rates.

We can see the relationship between labor market freedom and labor force participation in the figure below. The figure shows the relationship between the Economic Freedom of North America’s 2013 labor market freedom score (x-axis) and the 2014 labor force participation rate for each state (y-axis).

lab-mkt-freed-and-lfp-rate

As shown in the figure there is a positive relationship—more labor market freedom is associated with a higher LFP rate on average. States with lower freedom scores such as Mississippi, Kentucky and Alabama also had low LFP rates while states with higher freedom scores such as North Dakota, South Dakota and Virginia had higher LFP rates.

This is not an all-else-equal analysis and other variables—such as demographics and industry composition which I mentioned earlier—also play a role. That being said, state officials concerned about their state’s labor market should think about what they can do to increase labor market freedom—and economic freedom more broadly—in their state.

Does Tax Increment Financing (TIF) generate economic development?

Tax increment financing, or TIF, is a method of financing economic development projects first used in California in 1952. Since then, 48 other states have enacted TIF legislation with Arizona being the lone holdout. It was originally conceived as a method for combating urban blight, but over time it has become the go-to tool for local politicians pushing economic development in general. For example, Baltimore is considering using TIF to raise $535 million to help Under Armor founder Kevin Plank develop Port Covington.

So how does TIF work? Though the particulars can vary by state, the basic mechanism is usually similar. First, an area is designated as a TIF district. TIF districts are mostly industrial or commercial areas rather than residential areas since the goal is to encourage economic development.

Usually, in an effort to ensure that TIF is used appropriately, the municipal government that designates the area as a TIF has to assert that economic development would not take place absent the TIF designation and subsequent investment. This is known as the ‘but-for’ test, since the argument is that development would not occur but for the TIF. Though the ‘but-for’ test is still applied, some argue that it is largely pro forma.

Once an area has been designated as a TIF district, the property values in the area are assessed in order to create a baseline value. The current property tax rate is applied to the baseline assessed value to determine the amount of revenue that is used for the provision of local government goods and services (roads, police, fire, water etc.). This value will then be frozen for a set period of time (e.g. up to 30 years in North Carolina), and any increase in assessed property values that occurs after this time and the subsequent revenue generated will be used to pay for the economic development project(s) in the TIF district.

The key idea is that municipalities can borrow against the projected property value increases in order to pay for current economic development projects. A simple numerical example will help clarify how TIF works.

In the table below there are five years. In year 1 the assessed value of the property in the TIF district is $20 million and it is determined that it takes $1 million per year to provide the government goods and services needed in the area (road maintenance, sewage lines, police/fire protection, etc.). A tax rate of 5% is applied to the $20 million of assessed value to raise the necessary $1 million (Tax revenue column).

TIF example table

The municipality issues bonds totaling $1 million to invest in an economic development project in the TIF district. As an example, let’s say the project is renovating an old business park in order to make it more attractive to 21st century startups. The plan is that improving the business park will make the area more desirable and increase the property values in the TIF district. As the assessed value increases the extra tax revenue raised by applying the 5% rate to the incremental value of the property will be used to pay off the bonds (incremental revenue column).

Meanwhile, the $1 million required for providing the government goods and services will remain intact, since only the incremental increase in assessed value is used to pay for the business park improvements. Hence the term Tax Increment Financing.

As shown in the table, if the assessed value of the property increases by $2 million per year for 4 years the municipality will recoup the $1 million required to amortize the bond (I’m omitting interest to keep it simple). Each $1 million dollars of increased value increase tax revenue by $50,000 without increasing the tax rate, which is what allows the municipality to pay for the economic development without raising property tax rates. For many city officials this is an attractive feature since property owners usually don’t like tax rate increases.

City officials may also prefer TIF to the issuance of general obligation bonds since the latter often require voter approval while TIF does not. This is the case in North Carolina. TIF supporters claim that this gives city officials more flexibility in dealing with the particular needs of development projects. However, it also allows influential individuals to push TIF through for projects that a majority of voters may not support.

While TIF can be used for traditional government goods like roads, sewer systems, water systems, and public transportation, it can also be used for private goods like business parks and sports facilities. The former arguably provide direct benefits to all firms in the TIF district since better roads, streetscapes and water systems can be used by any firm in the area. The latter projects, though they may provide indirect benefits to nearby firms in the form of more attractive surroundings and increased property values, mostly benefit the owners of entity receiving the development funding. Like other development incentives, TIF can be used to subsidize private businesses with taxpayer dollars.

Projects that use TIF are often described as ‘self-financing’ since the project itself is supposedly what creates the higher property values that pay for it. Additionally, TIF is often sold to voters as a way to create jobs or spur additional private investment in blighted areas. But there is no guarantee that the development project will lead to increased private sector investment, more jobs or higher property values. Researchers at the UNC School of Government explain the risks of TIF in a 2008 Economic Bulletin:

“Tax increment financing is not a silver bullet solution to development problems. There is no guarantee that the initial public investment will spur sufficient private investment, over time, that creates enough increment to pay back the bonds. Moreover, even if the investment succeeds on paper, it may do so by “capturing” growth that would have occurred even without the investment. Successful TIF districts can place an additional strain on existing public resources like schools and parks, whose funding is frozen at base valuation levels while growth in the district increases demand for their services.”

The researchers also note that it’s often larger corporations that municipalities are trying to attract with TIF dollars, and any subsidies via TIF that the municipality provides to the larger firm gives it an advantage over its already-established, local competitors. This is even more unfair when the local competitor is a small, mom-and-pop business that already faces a difficult challenge due to economies of scale.

There is also little evidence that TIF regularly provides the job or private sector investment that its supporters promise. Chicago is one of the largest users of TIF for economic development and its program has been one of the most widely studied. Research on Chicago’s TIF program found that “Overall, TIF failed to produce the promise of jobs, business development or real estate activity at the neighborhood level beyond what would have occurred without TIF.”

If economic development projects that rely on TIF do not generate additional development above and beyond what would have occurred anyway, then the additional tax revenue due to the higher assessed values is used to pay for an economic development project that didn’t really add anything. Without TIF, that revenue could have been used for providing other government goods and services such as infrastructure or better police and fire protection. Once TIF is used, the additional revenue must be used to pay for the economic development project: it cannot be spent on other services that residents might prefer.

Another study, also looking at the Chicago metro area, found that cities that adopt TIF experience slower property value growth than those that do not. The authors suggest that this is due to a reallocation of resources to TIF districts from other areas of the city. The result is that the TIF districts grow at the expense of the municipality as a whole. This is an example of the TIF working on paper, but only because it is pilfering growth that would have occurred in other areas of the city.

Local politicians often like tax increment financing because it is relatively flexible and enables them to be entrepreneurial in some sense: local officials as venture capitalists. It’s also an easier sell than a tax rate increase or general obligation bonds that require a voter referendum.

But politicians tend to make bad venture capitalists for several reasons. First, it’s usually not their area of expertise and it’s hard: even the professionals occasionally lose money. Second, as Milton Friedman pointed out, people tend to be more careless when spending other people’s money. Local officials aren’t investing their own money in these projects, and when people invest or spend other people’s money they tend to emphasize the positive outcomes and downplay the negative ones since they aren’t directly affected. Third, pecuniary factors don’t always drive the decision. Different politicians like different industries and businesses – green energy, biotech, advanced manufacturing, etc. – for various reasons and their subjective, non-pecuniary preferences may cause them to ignore the underlying financials of a project and support a bad investment.

If TIF is going to be used it should be used on things like public infrastructure – roads, sewer/water lines, sidewalks – rather than specific private businesses. This makes it harder to get distracted by non-pecuniary factors and does a better – though not perfect – job of directly helping development in general rather than a specific company or private developer. But taxpayers should be aware of the dangers of TIF and politicians and developers should not tout it as a panacea for jump-starting an area’s economy.

State government spending hits new heights

There is a large literature in macroeconomics that examines the extent to which federal spending “crowds out” investment in the private sector. Basic theory and common sense lead to the conclusion that government spending must replace some private sector spending. After all, dollars are scarce – if the government taxes Paul and uses his money to build a road Paul necessarily has less money to invest in his landscaping business. In theory government spending on public goods like roads could be a net gain. This would occur if the additional value produced by spending one more dollar on roads was greater than the additional value produced by investing one more dollar in Paul’s landscaping business. But even in this scenario, Paul himself may be worse off – he’s one dollar poorer and he may not use the new road – and there is still a dead-weight loss due to the tax.

In reality, the federal government does a lot more than build roads, especially productive ones. In 2014, only 1.9% of federal income tax revenue was spent on transportation. And most of the other stuff that the government does is way less productive, like shuffling money around via entitlement programs – Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security – and investing in businesses that later go bankrupt like Solyndra. So while it is possible that a dollar spent by the government is more productive than a dollar spent by a guy like Paul, in a country with America’s spending habits it’s unlikely to be the case.

The same crowding out that occurs at the federal level can occur at the state level. In fact, in many states state spending as a percentage of gross state product (GSP) exceeds federal spending as a percentage of GDP. The graph below shows state spending as a percentage of GSP for all 50 states and Washington D.C. in 1970, 1990, and 2012 (data). The red, dashed line is federal spending as a percentage of GDP in 2012 (21.9%).

state spending gsp graph

As shown in the graph, nearly every state increased their spending relative to GSP from 1970 – 2012 (triangles are above the X’s). Only one state, South Dakota, had lower spending relative to GSP in 2012 than in 1970. In 2012, 15 of the 50 states spent more as a percentage of GSP than the federal government spent as a percentage of GDP (states where the triangle is above the red, dashed line). In 1990 only two states, Arizona and Montana, spent at that level.

It used to be the case that state and local spending was primarily focused on classic government services like roads, water/sewer systems, police officers, firemen, and K-12 education. But state spending is increasingly looking similar to federal spending. Redistributive public welfare expenditures and pension expenditures have increased substantially since 1992. As an example, the tables below provide a breakdown of some key spending areas for two states, Ohio and Pennsylvania, in 1992 and 2012 (1992 data here, 2012 data here). The dollar per capita amounts are adjusted for inflation and are in 2009 dollars.

ohio spending table

penn spending table

As the tables show, spending on public welfare, hospitals, and health increased by 120% in Ohio and 86% in Pennsylvania from 1992 to 2012. Pension expenditures increased by 83% and 125% respectively. And contrary to what many politicians and media types say, funding for higher education – the large majority of state education spending is on higher education – increased dramatically during this time period; up 250% in Ohio and 199% in Pennsylvania. Meanwhile, funding for highways – the classic public good that politicians everywhere insist wouldn’t exist without them – has increased by a much smaller amount in both states.

The state spending increases of the recent past are being driven in large part by public welfare programs that redistribute money, pensions for government employees, and higher education. While one could argue that higher education spending is a productive public investment (Milton Friedman didn’t think so and I agree) it is hard to make a case that public welfare and pension payments are good investments. This alone doesn’t mean that society shouldn’t provide those things. Other factors like equity and economic security might be more important to some people than economic productivity. But this does make it unlikely that the marginal dollar spent by a state government today is as economically productive as that dollar spent in the private sector. Like federal spending, state spending is likely crowding out productive private investment, which will ultimately lower output and economic growth in the long run.

Does statehood trigger Leviathan? A case study of New Mexico and Arizona

I was recently asked to review, “The Fiscal Case Against Statehood: Accounting for Statehood in New Mexico and Arizona, by Dr. Stephanie Moussalli for EH.net (the Economic History Association).

I highly recommend the book for scholars of public choice, economic history and accounting/public finance.

As one who spends lots of time reading  state and local financial reports in the context of public choice, I was very impressed with Moussalli’s insights and tenacity. In her research she dives into the historical accounts of territorial New Mexico and Arizona to answer two questions.  Firstly, did statehood (which arrived in 1912) lead to a “Leviathan effect” causing government spending to grow. And secondly, as a result of statehood, did accounting improve?

The answer to these questions is yes. Statehood did trigger a Leviathan effect for these Southwestern states –  findings that have implications for current policy – in particular the sovereignty debates surrounding Puerto Rico and Quebec. And the accounts did improve as a result of statehood, an outcome that controls for the fact that this occurred during the height of the Progressive era and its drive for public accountability.

A provocative implication of her findings that cuts against the received wisdom:  Are the improved accounting techniques that come with statehood a necessary tool for more ambitious spending programs? Does accounting transparency come with a price?

What makes this an engaging study is Moussalli’s persistence and creativity in bringing light to a literature void. She stakes out new research territory, and brings a public choice-infused approach to what might otherwise be bland accounting records. She rightly sees in the historical ledgers the traces of the political and social choices of individuals; and the inescapable record of their decisions. In her words, “people say one thing and do another.” The accounts speak in a way that historical narrative does not.

For more read the review.

 

New Edition of Rich States, Poor States out this Week

The fifth edition of Rich States, Poor States  from the American Legislative Exchange Council is now available. Utah took the top spot in the ranking of states’ economic competitiveness, as it has every year the study has been produced. Utah excels in the ranking system because it is a right-to-work state, it has a flat personal income tax, and no estate tax, among other factors considered in the study.

The other states that round out the top ten for Economic Outlook include South Dakota, Virginia, Wyoming, North Dakota, Idaho, Missouri, Colorado, Arizona, and Georgia. On the bottom end of the ranking, the states with the worst Economic Outlook are Hawaii, Maine, Illinois, Vermont, and New York at number 50 for the fourth year in a row.

Several measures of economic competitiveness offer supporting evidence that these states have some of the worst policies for business including Mercatus’ Freedom in the 50 States and the Tax Foundation’s State Business Tax Climate Index.

The authors of Rich States, Poor States, Arthur Laffer, Stephen Moore, and Jonathan Williams demonstrate Tiebout Competition in action. They find a strong correlation between the states that have high Economic Outlook rankings with the states that are experiencing the highest population growth through domestic migration. Likewise, the states that experienced the largest losses due to out-migration include Ohio and New York, ranking 37th and 50th respectively.

The study draws attention to the role that unfunded pension liabilities play for states’ future competitiveness, as this debt will require difficult and unpopular policy decisions as current tax dollars have to be used to fund past promises. Laffer, Moore, and Williams draw a comparison between Wisconsin’s recent reforms that put it on a more sustainable path compared to its neighbor Illinois:

In stark contrast to Wisconsin’s successes, the story in Illinois is not so uplifting. Over the last 10 years, Illinois legislators have continuously ignored the pension burden in their state—so much so that Illinois has one of the worst pension systems in the nation, with an estimated unfunded liability ranging from $54 billion to $192 billion, depending on your actuarial assumptions. Furthermore, the official state estimates do not include the $17.8 billion in pension obligation bond payments that are owed. In addition, Illinois policymakers have spent beyond their means, borrowed money they don’t have, and made promises to public employee unions that they cannot fulfill. Not only did Illinois face significant unfunded pension liabilities, but also lawmakers had to confront large deficits and potential cuts to state programs.

While the policies that improve state economic competitiveness are clear, the path to achieving them is difficult after voters grow accustomed to programs that their states cannot afford. However the bitter medicine of reform is worthwhile, as we know that economic freedom is not only better for business, but evidence shows it also improves individuals’ well-being.

Tax Foundation Releases New State Business Tax Climate Index

On Wednesday the Tax Foundation released the updated State Business Tax Climate Index by Mark Robyn. Wyoming, South Dakota, and Nevada ranked highest on the index because they have low overall tax burdens and tax policies that introduce minimal distortions to business behavior.

The three states at the bottom of the ranking — New Jersey, New York, and California — were also the worst-ranked states last year. Unsurprisingly, these three states are also experiencing domestic outmigration as individuals and businesses leave for locations with lower tax burdens. A study by Jed Kolko, David Neumark, and Marisol Cuella Mejia demonstrates that the SBTCI is one of the most accurate indexes for predicting economic outcomes.

 

Illinois had the largest change in ranking over last year’s, dropping 12 spots. Robyn writes on the importance of tax policy in business decisions:

Anecdotes about the impact of state tax systems on business investment are plentiful. In Illinois early last decade, hundreds of millions of dollars of capital investments were delayed when then-Governor Blagojevich proposed a hefty gross receipts tax. Only when the legislature resoundingly defeated the bill did the investment resume. In 2005, California-based Intel decided to build a multi-billion dollar chip-making facility in Arizona due to its favorable corporate income tax system. In 2010 Northrup Grumman chose to move its headquarters to Virginia over Maryland, citing the better business tax climate. Anecdotes such as these reinforce what we know from economic theory: taxes matter to businesses, and those places with the most competitive tax systems will reap the benefits of business-friendly tax climates.

The Tax Foundation is not alone in finding these states relatively lacking in economic freedom. Indexes developed by the Mercatus Center and the American Legislative Exchange Council also ranked these states as among the least economically competitive in the country.

While lawmakers may be tempted to try to improve their states’ rankings in these types of indexes with special business tax breaks or increasing state spending, all three studies demonstrate that the best way to improve a state’s competitiveness ranking is to provide a climate of low, stable taxes that do not favor specific industries.

 

Mayor-Elect Stanton Offers an Excellent Introduction to Public Choice

Tonight on Marketplace, Kai Ryssdal interviewed a handful of newly-elected and reelected mayors about their plans and priorities. Greg Stanton, the new mayor-elect of Phoenix, gave a surprisingly honest description of his aim:

In Phoenix, we really need to be working with local entrepreneurs, with local business — we need to be working with the federal government as well — to make sure that Phoenix and Arizona get more than our fair share of the jobs program that has been introduced through Congress.

Note that the Mayor-elect doesn’t want his fair share. He wants more than his fair share. Perhaps it was a Freudian slip? I suppose we can’t blame him. He is only responding to his incentives. Though they may not be as open about as Mr. Stanton, the unfortunate reality is that when the national government is doling out money to local governments, every other mayor in the country faces the same incentive.

As Bastiat put it some 150 years ago: “Government is the great fiction through which everybody endeavors to live at the expense of everybody else.”

Tennessee Valley Authority downgraded by S&P

The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)’s bond rating has been downgraded from AAA to AA+, though, “the fundamental financial strength of the TVA is unchanged.” The TVA is a wholly-owned entity of the federal government, and the downgrade reflects, “the negative outlook of the United States as the TVA’s sponsoring sovereign.” Moody’s confirmed the TVA’s AAA rating on the basis that TVA is self-funded and a self-sufficient public power system that finances its operations based on its own user-generated revenues. In the event of fiscal stress, the TVA operates under an implicit federal guarantee.

The TVA doesn’t think the downgrade will have any material impact on its finances as the authority’s stand-alone credit rating remains unchanged (at least  in the short-term, according to S&P) and it doesn’t rely on federal subsidies.

S&P downgraded several other power authorities in the United States: Texas, Oregon, Arizona, New York and Florida, Arizona and Colorado.

 

Medicaid Rules are Weird

In case yesterday’s post on economic freedom was a bit long for your taste, I was on the Fox Business Channel yesterday talking about, among other things, economic freedom.

At the end, I discuss Arizona and their Medicaid program. In my view, a reasonable cost-containment approach to Medicaid would put benefits on a sliding scale: the most-needy would be eligible for larger benefits, while those with higher incomes and/or greater wealth would be eligible for fewer benefits.

Unfortunately, the federal government won’t let states do that. Another thing they won’t let states do? Scale back non-emergency taxi service to Medicaid recipients. After an 8 month review, the Feds recently denied Arizona’s petition to eliminate this service. They will, apparently, permit the state to no longer finance certain transplant procedures. Does this strike anyone else as bizarre?