Tag Archives: CA

Berkeley, CA and the $15 – oops – $19 living wage

Berkeley, CA’s labor commission – in what should be an unsurprising move at this point in Berkeley’s history – has proposed raising the city’s minimum wage to an astounding $19 per hour by 2020! The labor commission’s argument in a nutshell is that Berkeley is an expensive place to live so worker’s need more money. And while Berkeley may be an expensive place to live, mandating that employers pay a certain wage doesn’t necessarily mean that the workers will get that money. As one Berkeley restaurant owner noted:

“We can raise our prices. But you can’t charge $25 for a sandwich,” said Dorothee Mitrani, who owns La Note. “A lot of mom-and-pop delis and cafes may disappear.”

The article states that Ms. Mitrani’s

…. full-service restaurant now subsidizes her take-out shop, which she said is running in the red as a result of the increases already in place. If the minimum rose to $19, she expects she would have to shut it down.

Of course, there are some politicians – and unfortunately some economists – who insist that raising the minimum wage doesn’t have adverse effects on employment, despite sound theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence to the contrary. My Mercatus center colleague Don Boudreaux has compiled an extensive collection of blog posts at Café Hayek debunking and refuting every pro-minimum wage argument out there, and I encourage interested readers to check them out.

The minimum wage most adversely effects low-skill, inexperienced workers, such as those without a high school degree, below the poverty level, between the ages of 16 – 19, and with some type of disability. So how do the people who fit into those categories currently fare in Berkeley’s labor market?

The table below shows the labor force rate and percentage employed for people 16 and over in each of those categories in the city of Berkeley in 2013 and 2014. The data is from the ACS 1-year survey. (American FactFinder table S2301)

berkely min wage employment 2013-14

As the table shows the labor force rate and the employment rate for each of those categories is already low compared to the overall labor force rate in Berkeley of 67% and employment rate of 62%. From 2013 to 2014 both the labor force rate and the employment rate declined for people without a high school degree, while the employment rate increased in the other categories. Nothing in this table leads me to believe that it would be a good idea to make the workers in these categories more expensive to hire, as it seems it is already difficult for them to find employment and it’s getting more difficult for some.

The table below compares Berkeley to the surrounding San Francisco MSA using only 2014 data.

berkeley min wage emp vs SF MSA

This table reveals that compared to the surrounding area, workers in these categories fare worse in Berkeley. The percentage of people with less than a high school degree who are employed was 11 percentage points lower in Berkeley, while the percentage with a disability was 0.8 points lower and the percentage below the poverty level was 1.5 points lower. Out of the four categories only 16 – 19 year olds had a better chance of being employed in Berkeley than in the surrounding MSA.

Hopefully Berkeley’s city council reviews the labor market reality in their city and thinks about actual consequences vs. intentions before deciding to increase the price that low-skill workers are allowed to charge for their labor. It’s already difficult for low-skill, inexperienced workers to find a job in Berkeley and making it harder won’t help them.

Rent control: A bad policy that just won’t die

The city council of Richmond, CA is thinking about implementing rent control in their city. Richmond is located north of Berkeley and Oakland on the San Francisco Bay in an area that has some of the highest housing prices in the country. From the article:

“Richmond is growing and becoming a more desirable place where people want to live, but that increased demand is putting pressure on the existing housing stock.”

It is true that an increase in the demand for housing will increase prices and rents. Unfortunately, rent control will not solve the problem of too little housing, which is the ultimate cause of high prices.

rent control 1

The diagram above depicts a market for housing like the one in Richmond. Without rent control, when demand increases (D1 to D2) the price rises to R2 and the equilibrium quantity increases from Q1 to Q*. However, with rent control, the price is unable to rise. For example, if the Richmond city council wanted prices to be at the pre-demand-increase level they would set the rent control price equal to R1. But with the increase in demand the quantity demanded at that price is Qd, while the quantity supplied is only Q1. Thus there is a shortage. This is the outcome of a price ceiling.

What this means is that some people will find a place to rent at the old, lower rental price (Q1 people).  But more people will want to rent at that price than there are units available, and since the price cannot rise due to the price control, the available apartments will have to be allocated some other way. This means longer wait times for vacant apartments and higher search costs. It also means lower quality apartments. Since the owners know there are more people who want an apartment than available apartments, they don’t have an incentive to maintain the apartment at the same level as they would if they had to attract customers.

With rent control, only Q1 people get an apartment. Without rent control, as the price rises more units are supplied over time and the new equilibrium has Q* (> Q1) people who get an apartment. Yes, they have to pay a higher price, but the relevant alternative is not an apartment at the lower price: The alternative is that some people who would have been willing to pay the higher price do not get an apartment.

Since Richmond has strict land-use rules like many communities in the San Francisco metro area (you can read all about their minimum lot size and parking space requirements here), rent control is adding to the housing woes of Richmond’s renters and any person who would like to move there.

rent control 2

Land-use restrictions decrease the amount of buildable land which subsequently increases the cost of housing. This is depicted in the diagram above as a shift from S1 to S2. The decrease in supply leads to a new equilibrium rent of R2 > R1 and a reduction in the equilibrium quantity to Q2 (< Q1). So land-use restrictions have already decreased the amount of available housing and increased the price.

If rent control is implemented, depicted in the diagram as the solid red line at the old price (R1), then the quantity supplied decreases even more to Qs. Again, with rent control there is a shortage as the quantity of housing demanded at R1 is Q1 (> Qs). So all of the same problems that occurred in the first example occur here, only here the quantity of housing is decreased not once, but TWICE by the government: Once due to the land use restrictions (Q1 to Q2) and then AGAIN when the rent control is implemented (Q2 to Qs). Restricting the amount of housing available does not help more people find housing, and restricting it again exacerbates the problem.

Trying to find an economist who doesn’t think that rent control is a bad idea is like trying to find a cheap apartment in a city with rent control; it can be done, but you have to spend a lot of time looking. In a Booth IGM poll question about rent control, 95% of the economists surveyed disagreed with the statement that rent control had a positive impact on the amount and quality of affordable rental housing. Yet despite basic economic theory, the agreement among experts, and the empirical evidence (see here, here, and here) rent control remains in some places and is often brought up as a viable policy for increasing the amount of affordable housing. This is truly a shame since what places like Richmond need is more housing, not less housing with artificially low prices.

Varying Priorities in Municipal Bankruptcy

On Monday Reuters reported that a federal judge has found Stockton, CA to be eligible for bankruptcy protection. This decision came despite protests from Wall Street arguing that the city had options available that would have allowed it to pay its creditors in full, such as raising taxes or cutting benefits for city employees:

Creditors have claimed a lack of good faith by Stockton in its decision to fully pay its obligation to the $254 billion Calpers system but impose losses on bondholders and bond insurers.

The expected move by the California city of 300,000 – along with Jefferson County in Alabama and San Bernardino in California – breaks with a long-standing tradition to fully repay bondholders the principal in most major municipal bankruptcies.

While both the judge and city manager Bob Deis have harshly criticized bondholders who refused to negotiate with the city before bankruptcy proceedings began, other cities have taken a very different approach to their creditors in the bankruptcy process. In 2011, the Rhode Island policymakers adopted a law that puts municipal creditors at the head of the line in municipal bankruptcy proceedings. In the state’s  Central Falls bankruptcy, the requirement to pay bondholders 100 cents on the dollar has meant that the city’s pensioners have taken steep benefit cuts, in some cases losing nearly half of their defined benefit pensions.

After Rhode Island enacted this law, the Wall Street Journal explained:

Despite the financial failure, Central Falls suddenly is attractive to some investors because the law makes them more confident about getting paid.

“If we can find someone selling, we will be a buyer” of Central Falls bonds, says Matt Dalton, chief executive of Belle Haven Investments, a White Plains, N.Y., firm with $800 million in municipal-bond investments under management.

The difference in legal climates for bondholders in Rhode Island and California unsurprisingly fosters different attitudes from creditors.  Former Los Angeles Mayor Richard Riordan explains the dangers of cutting off a city’s access to credit by failing to pay bondholders in full:

“I think the unions ought to be scared stiff. This could be a lot worse than just the pensions. What about government bonds? If government bonds can also be restructured, who will buy them?

“The city and the state all issue tax anticipation bonds to meet their payrolls, but if those can be restructured, no one will buy them. Think about what that means for libraries, parks, street paving, police. It will all be on the line.

While cities on both coasts are facing insolvency in their efforts to meet their obligations to their employees and their creditors, they vary in their approaches as to who is first in line for scarce tax dollars.

Why Proper Pension Accounting Matters, Stockton Version

For the better part of two years, Eileen has tirelessly worked to help municipalities grapple with the true costs of their pension systems. As I have argued before, Eileen’s work should be seen as pro-worker since it stresses the need for honest accounting and since it relies on the assumption that when we cost out pension plans, we should plan to live up to our promises:

So, what does it mean when people argue for a high discount rate in valuing pension systems? It means that they don’t think it is very likely that we will actually honor our promises to public employees. Thus, they believe we should discount those costs accordingly. They won’t say this, but this is exactly what such an assumption means. Conversely, people like Eileen who feel it is more prudent to use a low discount rate are saying that we should count on actually having to pay these pensions; that we should plan to honor our commitments.

Of course, in many circles, she and others who think it prudent to use a low discount rate are often characterized as being anti-public sector worker.

This week, Stockton, CA, became the largest US city in history to declare bankruptcy. In a recent interview with NPR’s Tess Vigeland, Stockton Vice-mayor Kathy Miller talked about the causes and consequence of the bankruptcy. In so doing, she lent support to Eileen’s work (emphasis added):

I think the most important thing is for the people here, this pendency plan reinforces our commitment to not reducing services to the public any further. For the last three-and-a-half years it’s the residents and our current employees that have borne the brunt of our cuts. Our employees, their compensation has been reduced anywhere from between 9-22 percent. Our workforce is down — 23 percent of our police officers, 30 percent of our firefighters and 43 percent of our other non-safety public employees. That translates to a direct reduction in services that the people living here have already experienced. These people have already given. It’s my belief that if these very generous pensions and health care retiree benefits had been fully costed out at the time they were granted, it would have been immediately apparent that they were not affordable.

Detroit’s Financial Future

This post originally appeared at Market Urbanism.

After flirting with Chapter 9 bankruptcy or a state takeover of its finances, Detroit has reached a deal with the state of Michigan that will allow it to remain independently managed with a requirement for state oversight. The Detroit Free Press reports:

The city has seven days to create the positions of chief financial officer and program management director and 30 days after that to make a hire from a list of three candidates from the mayor and state treasurer. Lewis said the city is compiling a list of candidates.

“We’ve got a lot of requirements that are in the agreement,” Lewis said. “We’ve got a lot of work to do (with the agreement) and then getting to the work of fixing the city. Our focus is on executing the plan and getting the resources here to execute the plan.”

Snyder reiterated that the city “shouldn’t expect” a cash bailout, adding that Detroit is one of many troubled communities in the state. But he said the state would use its resources in a variety of ways to help the city.

Snyder said the agreement assures the things that need to be done will get done, describing it as a “progressive series of steps” that first allow the mayor and the council to make the decisions, and then empowers the project manager to do so if they don’t. “This is a legal document designed to deal with situations when they don’t go right,” he said.

While bankruptcy protection offers the advantage to cities of achieving a more manageable debt load, it doesn’t come without a cost. Bankruptcy would add an additional stigma to Detroit, already known for municipal financial distress, encouraging business disinvestment.

Vallejo, CA filed for bankruptcy in 2008, and as the New York Times explains, the city is still in a difficult financial position. After bankruptcy cities have less room in their budgets to provide public services such as infrastructure, parks, and schools while their tax rates don’t fall accordingly. This contributes to further erosion of the tax base as businesses and residents leave the city.

Municipal bankruptcy is always a two-sided issue involving both revenue and debt. At The Atlantic Cities, Emily Badger covers the equation from the revenue side. While cities often both subsidize and enforce sprawl through road-building, parking requirements, and minimum lot sizes, these policies are detrimental to their property tax equations. She cites the positive example of Asheville, NC as a city that has taken advantage of denser downtown redevelopment to improve its ratio of property taxes to infrastructure costs:

Asheville has a Super Walmart about two-and-a-half miles east of downtown. Its tax value is a whopping $20 million. But it sits on 34 acres of land. This means that the Super Walmart yields about $6,500 an acre in property taxes, while that remodeled JCPenney downtown is worth $634,000 in tax revenue per acre. (Add sales tax revenue, and the downtown property is still worth more than six times as much as the Walmart per acre.)

[. . .]

All of this is also just looking at the revenue side of the ledger. Low-density development isn’t just a poor way to make property-tax revenue. It’s extremely expensive to maintain. In fact, it’s only feasible if we’re expanding development at the periphery into eternity, forever bringing in revenue from new construction that can help pay for the existing subdivisions we’ve already built.

[. . .]

“The thing is it all works fine when you have all this new growth and the new gap is met by all these new permit fees – that’s like free money,” Joe Minicozzi [of Public Interest Projects] says.

Cities should not be in the business of requiring the sort of development that is most expensive for them to support. However, this analysis ignores the debt side of Chapter 9, one that may be even more difficult to tackle politically. Despite the harm that poor financial management causes, local elected officials simply do not have the proper incentives to avoid it.

Politicians operate on election cycles, and during their time in office they generally seek to provide their constituents with the best possible services at the lowest tax rate. This leads them to put off payment on long term debt and liabilities using accounting gimmicks and fiscal evasion techniques to spend more on goods that residents will see in the near term.

A combination of debt and declining revenue has put Detroit in the position it’s in today. Its urban development strategy must be a part of the property tax revenue solution. Perhaps the new officials that the city hires will help with debt management, but this additional oversight is unlikely to overcome the incentives of election cycles.

Bankruptcy in Birmingham

Jefferson County, AL has filed for bankruptcy protection, joining the ranks of Vallejo, CA; Central Falls, RI; Boise, ID; and Harrisburg, PA. In this case, the debt that the county used to finance a new sewer system is the main driver of insolvency. The county currently owes about $4.15 billion on the sewer system.

The Associated Press reports:

The problems were years in the making.

Its debt ballooned after a federally mandated sewer project was beset with corruption, court rulings that didn’t go its way and rising interest rates when global markets struggled.

Since 2008, Jefferson County tried to save itself the cost and embarrassment of filing for bankruptcy. But after three years, commissioners voted 4-1 to bring the issue to an end.

“Jefferson County has, in effect, been in bankruptcy for three years,” said Commissioner Jimmie Stephens, who made the motion to file for protection in federal bankruptcy court in northern Alabama.

While the last few years have seen a few cases of municipalities filing for Chapter 9, Jefferson County’s case represents by far the largest. Unlike other recent bankruptcies that were a result of both poor financial management and the economic downturn, Jefferson County’s problems were in part a result of corrupt public officials. Twenty-two people have been convicted for illegally refinancing the sewer bonds to benefit local and Wall Street financiers. Residents in Alabama’s largest county will likely face higher sewer rates as a result.

But the biggest problem for residents when municipalities file for bankruptcy protection is the resulting policy uncertainty. Businesses are typically reluctant, with good reason, to move to a bankrupt municipality. The shadow of Chapter 9 means that for years, residents and businesses will be paying higher taxes in exchange for fewer services because of the remaining debt burden. This will put the county and even the state in a poor competitive standing for new jobs.

In 1994, Orange County, CA, filed for Chapter 9 protection on $1.7 billion in debt, and residents there are still paying taxes toward that debt today. In the short term, Jefferson County will face painful and immediate cuts. The Birmingham Business Journal spoke with Commissioner Jimmie Stephens on what the future holds for the county:

“We’re looking at all of these services that are not mandated by the constitution and, from there, we will begin the reductions and take it as far as we need to, keeping in mind the services that the citizens need,” he said.

 

Harrisburg, PA Bankruptcy Proceedings Continue

On October 11, Harrisburg, PA filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy, the first state capital to do so in several decades. Now, the city council must develop a plan for the city’s finances going forward. If the state does not approve the council’s plan by November 25th, Harrisburg’s finances could be turned over to a receiver and the city would not have a say in the budget process.

The state is engouraging Harrisburg to pay off its remaining debts primarily by raising property taxes, but the council has been reluctant to raise taxes on its residents, 29% of whom live in poverty. To limit the pain for city residents, Councilman Brad Koplinski supports bankruptcy:

“If the bankruptcy is allowed to proceed, I feel that unfortunately it’s the most beneficial option, because it will allow us to get the city out from under its debt,” Koplinski said at the meeting [held yesterday].

Today, the city’s debt totals about five times its yearly general-fund revenue, and lawmakers have few options to turn to for increased revenues. Vallejo, CA and Central Falls, RI also recently filed for Chapter 9 protection. In both cities, budget problems were driven in large part by increasing unfunded pension liabilities. In Harrisburg, however, the problem developed because the city borrowed $242 million to finance an incinerator that turned out not to be as profitable as expected.

Unfortunately for Harrisburg, even municipal bankruptcy is not a silver bullet for ailing city finances. The Vallejo case illustrates that while bankruptcy gives municipalities some bargaining power for negotiating pensions and can reduce the debt burden, filing for Chapter 9 will not eliminate past obligations. Harrisburg will likely emerge from bankruptcy with a heavy debt burden and nowhere to turn for increased revenue. In this case, bankruptcy may be the city’s best option, but other municipal lawmakers should look to the Vallejo example when promising lavish projects on borrowed money. There is no easy way out of municipal debt.