Tag Archives: California

The use of locally-imposed selective taxes to fund public pension liabilities

Many eyes are on Kentucky policymakers as they grapple with finding a solution to their $40 billion state-reported unfunded public pension liability. As talks of a potential pension bill surface, various proposals have been made by legislators, but very few have gained traction. One such proposal stands out from the rest. A proposal that has since been shut down suggested imposing selective taxes on tobacco, prescription opiates, and outsourced labor to generate revenue to direct towards paying down the state’s pension debt. Despite its short-lived tenure, this selective tax proposal reflects a recent trend in pension funding reform; a trend that policymakers should be wary of. Implementing new taxes on select goods or services may seem like a good idea as it could, in theory, potentially raise additional revenues, but experience at the local level suggests otherwise.

In chapter 12 of a new Mercatus book on sin taxes, NYU professor Thad Calabrese examines the practice of locally-imposed selective taxes that are used to fund public pension liabilities and doesn’t find much evidence to support their continued usage.

Selective taxes are sales taxes that target specific goods and are also known as ‘sin taxes’ because of their popular usage in taxing less healthy goods such as cigarettes, junk food, or alcohol. In the examples that Calabrese examines, selective taxes are used to target insurance premiums as revenue sources for pensions.

Only a select few states have begun this practice – including Illinois, Pennsylvania, as well as municipalities in West Virginia and Missouri – but it may become more popular if courts begin to restrict the way in which current pension benefits can be modified. Once benefits are taken off the table as an avenue for reform, like in Illinois, policymakers will feel more pressure to find new revenue sources.

The proposal in Kentucky may seem appealing to policymakers, especially because of its potential to raise $600 million a year, but this estimate overlooks the unintended effects that such new taxes could facilitate. Thankfully, the proposal did not go through, but I think some time should be spent looking at what similar proposals have looked like at the local level, so that other states do not get tempted pick up where Kentucky left off.

Calabrese draws on the experiences in Pennsylvania and Illinois to examine how these taxes have operated, how the decoupling of setting and financing employee benefits tends to lead to these taxes, and how the use of these taxes is associated with significantly underfunded pension systems. Below I highlight Pennsylvania’s experience and caution against further usage of this mechanism for pension funding.

How it works (or doesn’t)

In 1895, Pennsylvania implemented a 2 percent tax on out-of-state fire and casualty insurance companies’ premiums on in-state property and then earmarked this for distribution to local governments to pay for pensions. Act 205 of 1984 replaced the original act in which the state of Pennsylvania allocated pension aid based on where the insured property was located and instead the new allocation was based on the number of public employees in a locality.

Calabrese explains how the funds were distributed:

“Each public employee was considered a ‘unit,’ and uniformed employees (such as police and fire) each represented two units. The pool of insurance tax revenue collected by the state was then divided by the sum of municipal units to arrive at a unit value. This distribution could subsidize local governments’ pension expenditures up to 100 percent of the annual cost. In 1985, this tax generated $62.3 million in revenues; as a result, each unit value was worth $1,146 – meaning that local governments received $1,146 for pension funding for each public employee and an additional $1,146 for pension funding for each uniformed public employee. Importantly, 75 percent of municipalities received enough funding from this revenue in 1985 to fully offset their pension costs.”

The new mechanism raised more funds, but it also unexpectedly raised costs. If a municipality had to contribute less than the $1,146 annually for a regular employee or $2,292 for a uniformed employee, for example, the municipality was essentially incentivized to increase benefits to public employees up to this limit, because local public employees would receive increased benefits at no direct budgetary cost to the municipality.

“…the tax likely increased insurance costs for residents and businesses (and then only a small fraction of the cost), but not directly for the government employer. Further, this system privileged benefits relative to other compensation, because these payments (borne at least statutorily by out-of-state companies) could only be used for financing pensions and not other forms of compensation.”

A tax originally implemented to fund pension costs statewide resulted in a system that encouraged more generous benefits.

Despite increased subsidies from the state, only 38 percent of municipalities received sufficient allocated funds from the pool to fully offset the costs of pensions. This was because annual pension contributions were growing at a faster rate than the rate at which the subsidy from the state insurance tax was growing.

To highlight a city with severely distressed pension plans, Philadelphia continued to struggle even following the implementation of the state insurance tax. The police pension plan, nonuniformed plan, and firefighter pension plan were all only 49, 47, and 45 percent funded, respectively. In 2009, the City Council passed a temporary 1 percentage point increase in their sales tax and when the temporary rate was renewed in 2014, any revenue in excess of $120 million was dedicated to the city’s pension plans. Additionally, the state permitted the city to pass a $2 per pack cigarette tax to fund a planned budget deficit for the school system; likely because its income tax capacity was largely exhausted.

Philadelphia’s new taxes technically generated new revenues, but they did little to improve the funding of the city’s pension plans.

The selective taxes implemented to fund pension liabilities in Pennsylvania were effectively a Band-Aid that was two small for the state’s pension funding problem, which in turn required the addition of more, insufficient pension Band-Aids. It merely created a public financing system that encouraged pension benefit growth which led to the passage of additional laws requiring certain pension funding levels. And when these funding levels were not met, even more laws were passed that provided temporary pension funding relief, which further grew liabilities for distressed municipalities.

Act 44 became law in 1993 and provided plan sponsors pension funding relief, but primarily by allowing sponsors to alter actuarial assumptions and thereby reduce required pension contributions. Another law delayed funding by manipulating how the required contribution was calculated, rather than providing any permanent fix.

Moving forward

Selective taxes for the purpose of funding pensions are still a relatively rare practice, but as pension liabilities grow and the landscape of reform options changes, it may become increasingly attractive to policymakers. As Calabrese has demonstrated in his book chapter, however, we should be wary of this avenue as it may only encourage the growth of pension liabilities without addressing the problem in any meaningful way. Reforming the structure of the pension plan or the level of benefits provided to current or future employees would provide the most long-term solution.

A solution with the long-term in mind and that doesn’t involve touching current beneficiaries includes moving future workers to defined contribution plans; plans that are better suited to keeping costs contained. The ballooning costs aren’t stemming solely from overly generous plan benefits, but more seriously are the result of their poor management and incentives for funding, only exacerbated by poor accounting practices. The problem is certainly complicated and moving towards the use of defined contribution plans wouldn’t eliminate all issues, but it would at least set governments on a more sustainable path.

At the very least, policymakers interested in long-term solutions should be cautioned against using selective taxes to fund pensions.

Mutant Capitalism rears its ugly head in Arlington

Confectionery-giant Nestlé plans to move its U.S. headquarters from California to 1812 North Moore in the Rosslyn area of Arlington in the next few years. This should be great news for the people of Arlington—a world-famous company has decided that Arlington County is the best place to be in the U.S. This must be due to our educated workforce and high quality of life, right?

Maybe. The real attraction might also be the $6 million of state handouts to Nestlé, along with an additional $6 million from Arlington County. Government handouts like these have become a way of life in the U.S. even though the results are often underwhelming.

Federal programs such as the New Markets Tax Credit Program have had at best small effects on economic development, and there is a good chance they just reallocate economic activity from one place to another rather than generate new economic activity. Local programs like Tax Increment Financing appear to largely reallocate economic activity as well. These programs might be good for the neighborhood or city that gets the handout, but it doesn’t help the residents of nearby places who are forced to contribute via their tax dollars.

In the Nestlé case, all of Virginia’s taxpayers are paying for Nestlé to locate in Arlington, which already has a relatively strong economy and is one of the wealthiest counties in Virginia. Why should taxpayers in struggling counties such as Buchanan or Dickenson County be forced to subsidize a company in Arlington? Government handouts to firms are often regressive since companies rarely want to locate in areas with a low-skill—and thus low-income—workforce. Everyone pays, but the most economically successful areas get the benefits.

Government officials often praise the jobs that these deals create and the Nestlé deal is no different: According to the performance agreement, Nestlé must create and maintain 748 new full-time jobs. And even if we ignore the fact that jobs are an economic cost, not a benefit, a closer look reveals that projections and reality usually diverge. For example, Buffalo awarded hundreds of millions of dollars to SolarCity, which promised to create 5,000 jobs. They have since revised that number down to 1,460. There are numerous other examples where the cost per job turned out to be higher than initially projected.

The grant performance agreement also estimates that Nestlé will provide $18.2 million in taxes to the county over the next 10 years, more than enough to offset the grant expenditure. But this doesn’t take into account what would have happened absent the handout. Perhaps some other company would have relocated here for free. Or a local company, or collection of companies, would have eventually rented out the space.

Government grants may also distort the real estate market: There’s a good chance no company had occupied 1812 North Moore because the rent was too high. If so, part of this grant is a handout to the owners of the building, Monday Properties, since now it does not have to lower its rent to attract a tenant. This may lead other property companies to lobby for and expect government handouts to help them find tenants.

Government grants often distort the economy by treating out-of-state companies differently than in-state companies. They encourage relocation by subsidizing it, which discourages expansion. A better strategy is to create a simple, non-intrusive business environment that treats all businesses equally.

Government grants are a characteristic of what my colleague Chris Koopman calls Mutant Capitalism and are antithetical to real capitalism and free enterprise. Capitalism involves businesses competing for consumers on an even playing field—there is no room for government favors that tilt the playing field towards one business or another.

Innovation and economic growth in the early 20th century and lessons for today

Economic growth is vital for improving our lives and the primary long-run determinant of economic growth is innovation. More innovation means better products, more choices for consumers and a higher standard of living. Worldwide, hundreds of millions of people have been lifted out of poverty due to the economic growth that has occurred in many countries since the 1970s.

The effect of innovation on economic growth has been heavily analyzed using data from the post-WWII period, but there is considerably less work that examines the relationship between innovation and economic growth during earlier time periods. An interesting new working paper by Ufuk Akcigit, John Grigsby and Tom Nicholas that examines innovation across America during the late 19th and early 20th century helps fill in this gap.

The authors examine innovation and inventors in the U.S. during this period using U.S. patent data and census data from 1880 to 1940. The figure below shows the geographic distribution of inventiveness in 1940. Darker colors mean higher rates of inventive activity.

geography of inventiveness 1940

Most of the inventive activity in 1940 was in the industrial Midwest and Northeast, with California being the most notable western exception.

The next figure depicts the relationship between the log of the total number of patents granted to inventors in each state from 1900 to 2000 (x-axis) and annualized GDP growth (y-axis) over the same period for the 48 contiguous states.

innovation, long run growth US states

As shown there is a strong positive relationship between this measure of innovation and economic growth. The authors also conduct multi-variable regression analyses, including an instrumental variable analysis, and find the same positive relationship.

The better understand why certain states had more inventive activity than others in the early 20th century, the authors analyze several factors: 1) urbanization, 2) access to capital, 3) geographic connectedness and 4) openness to new ideas.

The figures below show the more urbanization was associated with more innovation from 1940 to 1960. The left figure plots the percent of people in each state living in an urban area in 1940 on the x-axis while the right has the percent living on a farm on the x-axis. Both figures tell the same story—rural states were less innovative.

pop density, innovation 1940-1960

Next, the authors look at the financial health of each state using deposits per capita as their measure. A stable, well-funded banking system makes it easier for inventors to get the capital they need to innovate. The figure below shows the positive relationship between deposits per capita in 1920 and patent production from 1920 to 1930.

innovation, bank deposits 1920-1940

The size of the market should also matter to inventors, since greater access to consumers means more sales and profits from successful inventions. The figures below show the relationship between a state’s transport cost advantage (x-axis) and innovation. The left figure depicts all of the states while the right omits the less populated, more geographically isolated Western states.

innovation, transport costs 1920-1940

States with a greater transport cost advantage in 1920—i.e. less economically isolated—were more innovative from 1920 to 1940, and this relationship is stronger when states in the far West are removed.

The last relationship the authors examine is that between innovation and openness to new, potentially disruptive ideas. One of their proxies for openness is the percent of families who owned slaves in a state, with more slave ownership being a sign of less openness to change and innovation.

innovation, slavery 1880-1940

The figures show that more slave ownership in 1860 was associated with less innovation at the state-level from 1880 to 1940. This negative relationship holds when all states are included (left figure) and when states with no slave ownership in 1860—which includes many Northern states—are omitted (right figure).

The authors also analyze individual-level data and find that inventors of the early 20th century were more likely to migrate across state lines than the rest of the population. Additionally, they find that conditional on moving, inventors tended to migrate to states that were more urbanized, had higher bank deposits per capita and had lower rates of historical slave ownership.

Next, the relationship between innovation and inequality is examined. Inequality has been a hot topic the last several years, with many people citing research by economists Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez that argues that inequality has increased in the U.S. since the 1970s. The methods and data used to construct some of the most notable evidence of increasing inequality has been criticized, but this has not made the topic any less popular.

In theory, innovation has an ambiguous effect on inequality. If there is a lot of regulation and high barriers to entry, the profits from innovation may primarily accrue to large established companies, which would tend to increase inequality.

On the other hand, new firms that create innovative new products can erode the market share and profits of larger, richer firms, and this would tend to decrease inequality. This idea of innovation aligns with economist Joseph Schumpeter’s “creative destruction”.

So what was going on in the early 20th century? The figure below shows the relationship between innovation and two measures of state-level inequality: the ratio of the 90th percentile wage over the 10th percentile wage in 1940 and the wage income Gini coefficient in 1940. For each measure, a smaller value means less inequality.

innovation, inc inequality 1920-1940

As shown in the figures above, a higher patent rate is correlated with less inequality. However, only the result using 90-10 ratio remains statistically significant when each state’s occupation mix is controlled for in a multi-variable regression.

The authors also find that when the share of income controlled by the top 1% of earners is used as the measure of inequality, the relationship between innovation and inequality makes a U shape. That is, innovation decreases inequality up to a point, but after that point it’s associated with more inequality.

Thus when using the broader measures of inequality (90-10 ratio, Gini coeffecieint) innovation is negatively correlated with inequality, but when using a measure of top-end inequality (income controlled by top 1%) the relationship is less clear. This shows that inequality results are sensitive to the measurement of inequality used.

Social mobility is an important measure of economic opportunity within a society and the figure below shows that innovation is positively correlated with greater social mobility.

innovation, social mobility 1940

The measure of social mobility used is the percentage of people who have a high-skill occupation in 1940 given that they had a low-skill father (y-axis). States with more innovation from 1920 to 1940 had more social mobility according to this measure.

In the early 20th century it appears that innovation improved social mobility and decreased inequality, though the latter result is sensitive to the measurement of inequality. However, the two concepts are not equally important: Economic and social mobility are worthy societal ideals that require opportunity to be available to all, while static income or wealth inequality is largely a red herring that distracts us from more important issues. And once you take into account the consumer-benefits of innovation during this period—electricity, the automobile, refrigeration etc.—it is clear that innovation does far more good than harm.

This paper is interesting and useful for several reasons. First, it shows that innovation is important for economic growth over a long time period for one country. It also shows that more innovation occurred in denser, urbanized states that provided better access to capital, were more interconnected and were more open to new, disruptive ideas. These results are consistent with what economists have found using more recent data, but this research provides evidence that these relationships have existed over a much longer time period.

The positive relationships between innovation and income equality/social mobility in the early 20th century should also help alleviate the fears some people have about the negative effects of creative destruction. Innovation inevitably creates adjustment costs that harm some people, but during this period it doesn’t appear that it caused widespread harm to workers.

If we reduce regulation today in order to encourage more innovation and competition we will likely experience similar results, along with more economic growth and all of the consumer benefits.

High-speed rail: is this year different?

Many U.S. cities are racing to develop high speed rail systems that shorten commute times and develop the economy for residents. These trains are able to reach speeds over 124 mph, sometimes even as high as 374 mph as in the case of Japan’s record-breaking trains. Despite this potential, American cities haven’t quite had the success of other countries. In 2009, the Obama administration awarded almost a billion dollars of stimulus money to Wisconsin to build a high-speed rail line connection between Milwaukee and Madison, and possibly to the Twin Cities, but that project was derailed. Now, the Trump administration has plans to support a high-speed rail project in Texas. Given so many failed attempts in the U.S., it’s fair to ask if this time is different. And if it is, will high-speed rail bring the benefits that proponents claim it to have?

The argument for building high-speed rail lines usually entails promises of faster trips, better connections between major cities, and economic growth as a result. It almost seems like a no-brainer – why would any city not want to pursue something like this? The answer, like with most public policy questions, depends on the costs, and whether the benefits actually realize.

In a forthcoming paper for the Mercatus Center, transportation scholar Kenneth Button explores these questions by studying the high-speed rail experiences of Spain, Japan, and China; the countries with the three largest systems (measured by network length). Although there are benefits to these rail systems, Button cautions against focusing too narrowly on them as models, primarily because what works in one area can’t necessarily be easily replicated in another.

Most major systems in other countries have been the result of large public investment and built with each area’s unique geography and political environment kept in mind. Taking their approaches and trying to apply them to American cities not only ignores how these factors can differ, but also how much costs can differ. For example, the average infrastructure unit price of high-speed rail in Europe is between $17 and $24 million per mile and the estimated cost for proposals in California is conservatively estimated at $35 million per mile.

The cost side of the equation is often overlooked, and more attention is given to the benefit side. Button explains that the main potential benefit – generating economic growth – doesn’t always live up to expectations. The realized growth effects are usually minimal, and sometimes even negative. Despite this, proponents of high-speed rail oversell them. The process of thinking through high-speed rail as a sound public investment is often short-lived.

The goal is to generate new economic activity, not merely replace or divert it from elsewhere. In Japan, for example, only six percent of the traffic on the Sanyo Shinkansen line was newly generated, while 55 percent came from other rail lines, 23 percent from air, and 16 percent from inter-city bus. In China, after the Nanguang and Guiguang lines began operating in 2014, a World Bank survey found that many of the passengers would have made the journey along these commutes through some other form of transportation if the high-speed rail option wasn’t there. The passengers who chose this new transport method surely benefited from shorter travel times, but this should not be confused with net growth across the economy.

Even if diverted away from other transport modes, the amount of high-speed rail traffic Japan and China have generated is commendable. Spain’s system, however, has not been as successful. Its network has only generated about 5 percent of Japan’s passenger volume. A line between Perpignan, France and Figueres, Spain that began services in 2009 severely fell short of projected traffic. Originally, it was expected to run 19,000 trains per year, but has only reached 800 trains by 2015.

There is also evidence that high speed rail systems poorly re-distribute activity geographically. This is especially concerning given the fact that projects are often sold on a promise of promoting regional equity and reducing congestion in over-heating areas. You can plan a track between well-developed and less-developed regions, but this does not guarantee that growth for both will follow. The Shinkansen system delivers much of Japan’s workforce to Tokyo, for example, but does not spread much employment away from the capital. In fact, faster growth happened where it was already expected, even before the high-speed rail was planned or built. Additionally, the Tokyo-Osaka Shinkansan line in particular has strengthened the relative economic position of Tokyo and Osaka while weakening those of cities not served.

Passenger volume and line access are not – and should not be – the only metrics of success. Academics have exhibited a fair amount of skepticism regarding high-speed rail’s ability to meet other objectives. When it comes to investment value, many cases have resulted in much lower returns than expected. A recent, extreme example of this is California’s bullet train that is 50 percent over its planned budget; not to mention being seven years behind in its building schedule.

The project in California has been deemed a lost cause by many, but other projects have gained more momentum in the past year. North American High Speed Rail Group has proposed a rail line between Rochester and the Twin Cities, and if it gets approval from city officials, it plans to finance entirely with private money. The main drawback of the project is that it would require the use of eminent domain to take the property of existing businesses that are in the way of the planned line path. Private companies trying to use eminent domain to get past a roadblock like this often do so claiming that it is for the “public benefit.” Given that many residents have resisted the North American High Speed Rail Group’s plans, trying to force the use of eminent domain would likely only destroy value; reallocating property from a higher-value to a lower-value use.

Past Mercatus research has found that using eminent domain powers for redevelopment purposes – i.e. by taking from one private company and giving to another – can cause the tax base to shrink as a result of decreases in private investment. Or in other words, when entrepreneurs see that the projects that they invest in could easily be taken if another business owner makes the case to city officials, it would in turn discourage future investors from moving into the same area. This ironically discourages development and the government’s revenues suffer as a result.

Florida’s Brightline might have found a way around this. Instead of trying to take the property of other businesses and homes in its way, the company has raised money to re-purpose existing tracks already between Miami and West Palm Beach. If implemented successfully, this will be the first privately run and operated rail service launched in the U.S. in over 100 years. And it doesn’t require using eminent domain or the use of taxpayer dollars to jump-start that, like any investment, has risk of being a failure; factors that reduce the cost side of the equation from the public’s perspective.

Which brings us back to the Houston-to-Dallas line that Trump appears to be getting behind. How does that plan stack up to these other projects? For one, it would require eminent domain to take from rural landowners in order to build a line that would primarily benefit city residents. Federal intervention would require picking a winner and loser at the offset. Additionally, there is no guarantee that building of the line would bring about the economic development that many proponents promise. Button’s new paper suggests that it’s fair to be skeptical.

I’m not making the argument that high-speed rail in America should be abandoned altogether. Progress in Florida demonstrates that maybe in the right conditions and with the right timing, it could be cost-effective. The authors of a 2013 study echo this by writing:

“In the end, HSR’s effect on economic and urban development can be characterized as analogous to a fertilizer’s effect on crop growth: it is one ingredient that could stimulate economic growth, but other ingredients must be present.”

For cities that can’t seem to mix up the right ingredients, they can look to other options for reaching the same goals. In fact, a review of the economic literature finds that investing in road infrastructure is a much better investment than other transportation methods like airports, railways, or ports. Or like I’ve discussed previously, being more welcoming to new technologies like driver-less cars has the potential to both reduce congestion and generate significant economic gains.

Eight years after the financial crisis: lessons from the most fiscally distressed cities

You’d think that eight years after the financial crisis, cities would have recovered. Instead, declining tax revenues following the economic downturn paired with growing liabilities have slowed recovery. Some cities exacerbated their situations with poor policy choices. Much could be learned by studying how city officials manage their finances in response to fiscal crises.

Detroit made history in 2013 when it became the largest city to declare bankruptcy after decades of financial struggle. Other cities like Stockton and San Bernardino in California had their own financial battles that also resulted in bankruptcy. Their policy decisions reflect the most extreme responses to fiscal crises.

You could probably count on both hands how many cities file for bankruptcy each year, but this is not an extremely telling statistic as cities often take many other steps to alleviate budget problems and view bankruptcy as a last resort. When times get tough, city officials often reduce payments into their pension systems, raise taxes – or when that doesn’t seem adequate – find themselves cutting services or laying off public workers.

It turns out that many municipalities weathered the 2008 recession without needing to take such extreme actions. Studying how these cities managed to recover more quickly than cities like Stockton provides interesting insight on what courses of action can help city officials better respond to fiscal distress.

A new Mercatus study examines the types of actions that public officials have taken under fiscal distress and then concludes with recommendations that could help future crises from occurring. Their empirical model finds that increased reserves, lower debt, and better tax structures all significantly improve a city’s fiscal health.

The authors, researchers Evgenia Gorina and Craig Maher, define fiscal distress as:

“the condition of local finances that does not permit the government to provide public services and meet its own operating needs to the extent to which these have been provided and met previously.”

In order to determine whether a city or county government is under fiscal distress, the authors study the actual actions taken by city officials between 2007 and 2012. Their approach is unique because it stands in contrast with previous literature that primarily looks to poorly performing financial indicators to measure fiscal distress. An example of such an indicator would be how much cash a government has on hand relative to its liabilities.

Although financial indicators can tell someone a lot about the fiscal condition of their locality, they are only a snapshot of financial resources on hand and don’t provide information on how previous policy choices got them to their current state. A robust analysis of a city’s financial health would require a deeper look. Looking at policy decisions as well as financial indicators can paint a more complete picture of just how financial resources are being managed.

The figure here displays the types of actions, or “fiscal distress episodes”, that the authors of the study found were the most common among cities in California, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. As expected, you’ll see that bankruptcy occurs much less frequently than other courses of action. The top three most common attempts to meet fundamental operating needs and service requirements during times of fiscal distress include (1) large across-the-board budget cuts or cuts in services, (2) blanket reduction in employee salaries, and (3) unusual tax rate or fee increases.

fiscal-distress-episodes

Another thing that becomes clear from this figure is that public workers and taxpayers appear to be adversely affected by the most common fiscal episodes. Cuts in services, reductions in employee salaries, large tax increases, and layoffs all place much of the distress on these groups. By contrast, actions like fund transfers, deferring capital projects, or late budget enactment don’t directly affect public workers or taxpayers (at least in the short term).

I decided to break down how episodes affected public workers and taxpayers for each state examined in the sample. 91% of California’s municipal fiscal distress episodes directly affected public employees or the provision of public services, while the remaining 9% indirectly affected them. Michigan and Pennsylvania followed with 85% and 66% of episodes, respectively, directly affecting public workers or taxpayers through cuts in services, tax increases, or layoffs.

Many of these actions surely happen in tandem with each other in more distressed cities, but it seems that more often than not, the burden falls heavily on public workers and taxpayers.

The city officials who had to make these hard decisions obviously did so under financially and politically intense circumstances; what many, including researchers like Gorina and Maher, consider to be a fiscal crisis. In fact, 32 percent of the communities across the three states in their sample experienced fiscal distress which, on its own, sheds light on the magnitude of the 2007-2009 recession. A large motivator of Gorina and Maher’s research is to understand what characteristics of the cities who more quickly rebounded from the Great Recession allowed them to prevent hitting fiscal crisis stage in the first place.

They do so by testing the effect of a city’s pre-existing fiscal condition on their likelihood to undergo fiscal distress. After controlling for things like government type, size, and local economic factors, they found that cities that had larger reserves and lower debt tended to weather the recession better relative to other cities. More specifically, declining general revenue balance as a percent of general expenditures and increases in debt as a share of total revenue both increase the odds of fiscal distress for a city.

Additionally, the authors found that cities with a greater reliance on property taxes managed to weather the recession better than governments reliant on other revenue sources. This suggests that revenue structure, not just the amount of revenue raised, is an important determinant of fiscal health.

No city wants to end up like Detroit or Scranton. Policymakers in these cities were forced to make hard choices that were politically unpopular; often harming public employees and taxpayers. Officials can look to Gorina and Maher’s research to understand how they can prevent ending up in such dire situations.

When approaching municipal finances, each city’s unique situation should of course be taken into consideration. This requires looking at each city’s economic history and financial practices, similar to what my colleagues have done for Scranton. Combining each city’s financial context with principles of sound financial management can surely help more cities find and maintain a healthy fiscal path.

Loyalton, CA and the cost of faulty actuarial assumptions

The New York Times has an interesting piece on the pension troubles facing the small town of Loyalton, California (population 769). Loyalton has seen little economic activity since its sawmill closed in 2001. In 2010 the city made a decision to exit Calpers saving the city $30,000. The City Council thought that the decision to exit would only apply to new hires and for the next three years ceased paying Calpers. Four of the the pension plan’s participants are retired and one is fully vested.

In response, Calpers sent the town a bill for $1.6 million – the hypothetical termination liability – for exiting the plan. For years Loyalton operated under the assumptions built into Calpers’ system which values the liability based on asset returns of 7.5 percent. This actuarial value concealed reality. Once a plan terminates Calpers presents employers with the real bill: or the risk-adjusted value of its pension promises based on a bond rate of 3.25 percent.

To see how big a difference that makes to the bottom line for cities, Joe Nation, Stanford professor, has built a very helpful tool that compares the actuarial liability of pension plans with the market value for individual governments in California.

The judge in the Stockton bankruptcy case Christopher Klein characterized the termination liability as presenting struggling towns with a “poison pill” for leaving the system. Another way to look at it is that the risks and costs that were hidden by faulty accounting assumptions based on risky discount rates are coming due as Calpers fails to hit its investment target. The annual costs may start to be shifted, and in the case of termination, fully imposed on local employers.

The four retirees of Loyalton are facing the possibility of drastically reduced pensions. In a town with annual revenues of $1.17 million, Calpers’ bill is far beyond the town’s ability to pay. Negotiations between Calpers and Loyalton are likely to continue. Some ideas floated include putting a lien on the town’s assets or revenues.

 

Does Tax Increment Financing (TIF) generate economic development?

Tax increment financing, or TIF, is a method of financing economic development projects first used in California in 1952. Since then, 48 other states have enacted TIF legislation with Arizona being the lone holdout. It was originally conceived as a method for combating urban blight, but over time it has become the go-to tool for local politicians pushing economic development in general. For example, Baltimore is considering using TIF to raise $535 million to help Under Armor founder Kevin Plank develop Port Covington.

So how does TIF work? Though the particulars can vary by state, the basic mechanism is usually similar. First, an area is designated as a TIF district. TIF districts are mostly industrial or commercial areas rather than residential areas since the goal is to encourage economic development.

Usually, in an effort to ensure that TIF is used appropriately, the municipal government that designates the area as a TIF has to assert that economic development would not take place absent the TIF designation and subsequent investment. This is known as the ‘but-for’ test, since the argument is that development would not occur but for the TIF. Though the ‘but-for’ test is still applied, some argue that it is largely pro forma.

Once an area has been designated as a TIF district, the property values in the area are assessed in order to create a baseline value. The current property tax rate is applied to the baseline assessed value to determine the amount of revenue that is used for the provision of local government goods and services (roads, police, fire, water etc.). This value will then be frozen for a set period of time (e.g. up to 30 years in North Carolina), and any increase in assessed property values that occurs after this time and the subsequent revenue generated will be used to pay for the economic development project(s) in the TIF district.

The key idea is that municipalities can borrow against the projected property value increases in order to pay for current economic development projects. A simple numerical example will help clarify how TIF works.

In the table below there are five years. In year 1 the assessed value of the property in the TIF district is $20 million and it is determined that it takes $1 million per year to provide the government goods and services needed in the area (road maintenance, sewage lines, police/fire protection, etc.). A tax rate of 5% is applied to the $20 million of assessed value to raise the necessary $1 million (Tax revenue column).

TIF example table

The municipality issues bonds totaling $1 million to invest in an economic development project in the TIF district. As an example, let’s say the project is renovating an old business park in order to make it more attractive to 21st century startups. The plan is that improving the business park will make the area more desirable and increase the property values in the TIF district. As the assessed value increases the extra tax revenue raised by applying the 5% rate to the incremental value of the property will be used to pay off the bonds (incremental revenue column).

Meanwhile, the $1 million required for providing the government goods and services will remain intact, since only the incremental increase in assessed value is used to pay for the business park improvements. Hence the term Tax Increment Financing.

As shown in the table, if the assessed value of the property increases by $2 million per year for 4 years the municipality will recoup the $1 million required to amortize the bond (I’m omitting interest to keep it simple). Each $1 million dollars of increased value increase tax revenue by $50,000 without increasing the tax rate, which is what allows the municipality to pay for the economic development without raising property tax rates. For many city officials this is an attractive feature since property owners usually don’t like tax rate increases.

City officials may also prefer TIF to the issuance of general obligation bonds since the latter often require voter approval while TIF does not. This is the case in North Carolina. TIF supporters claim that this gives city officials more flexibility in dealing with the particular needs of development projects. However, it also allows influential individuals to push TIF through for projects that a majority of voters may not support.

While TIF can be used for traditional government goods like roads, sewer systems, water systems, and public transportation, it can also be used for private goods like business parks and sports facilities. The former arguably provide direct benefits to all firms in the TIF district since better roads, streetscapes and water systems can be used by any firm in the area. The latter projects, though they may provide indirect benefits to nearby firms in the form of more attractive surroundings and increased property values, mostly benefit the owners of entity receiving the development funding. Like other development incentives, TIF can be used to subsidize private businesses with taxpayer dollars.

Projects that use TIF are often described as ‘self-financing’ since the project itself is supposedly what creates the higher property values that pay for it. Additionally, TIF is often sold to voters as a way to create jobs or spur additional private investment in blighted areas. But there is no guarantee that the development project will lead to increased private sector investment, more jobs or higher property values. Researchers at the UNC School of Government explain the risks of TIF in a 2008 Economic Bulletin:

“Tax increment financing is not a silver bullet solution to development problems. There is no guarantee that the initial public investment will spur sufficient private investment, over time, that creates enough increment to pay back the bonds. Moreover, even if the investment succeeds on paper, it may do so by “capturing” growth that would have occurred even without the investment. Successful TIF districts can place an additional strain on existing public resources like schools and parks, whose funding is frozen at base valuation levels while growth in the district increases demand for their services.”

The researchers also note that it’s often larger corporations that municipalities are trying to attract with TIF dollars, and any subsidies via TIF that the municipality provides to the larger firm gives it an advantage over its already-established, local competitors. This is even more unfair when the local competitor is a small, mom-and-pop business that already faces a difficult challenge due to economies of scale.

There is also little evidence that TIF regularly provides the job or private sector investment that its supporters promise. Chicago is one of the largest users of TIF for economic development and its program has been one of the most widely studied. Research on Chicago’s TIF program found that “Overall, TIF failed to produce the promise of jobs, business development or real estate activity at the neighborhood level beyond what would have occurred without TIF.”

If economic development projects that rely on TIF do not generate additional development above and beyond what would have occurred anyway, then the additional tax revenue due to the higher assessed values is used to pay for an economic development project that didn’t really add anything. Without TIF, that revenue could have been used for providing other government goods and services such as infrastructure or better police and fire protection. Once TIF is used, the additional revenue must be used to pay for the economic development project: it cannot be spent on other services that residents might prefer.

Another study, also looking at the Chicago metro area, found that cities that adopt TIF experience slower property value growth than those that do not. The authors suggest that this is due to a reallocation of resources to TIF districts from other areas of the city. The result is that the TIF districts grow at the expense of the municipality as a whole. This is an example of the TIF working on paper, but only because it is pilfering growth that would have occurred in other areas of the city.

Local politicians often like tax increment financing because it is relatively flexible and enables them to be entrepreneurial in some sense: local officials as venture capitalists. It’s also an easier sell than a tax rate increase or general obligation bonds that require a voter referendum.

But politicians tend to make bad venture capitalists for several reasons. First, it’s usually not their area of expertise and it’s hard: even the professionals occasionally lose money. Second, as Milton Friedman pointed out, people tend to be more careless when spending other people’s money. Local officials aren’t investing their own money in these projects, and when people invest or spend other people’s money they tend to emphasize the positive outcomes and downplay the negative ones since they aren’t directly affected. Third, pecuniary factors don’t always drive the decision. Different politicians like different industries and businesses – green energy, biotech, advanced manufacturing, etc. – for various reasons and their subjective, non-pecuniary preferences may cause them to ignore the underlying financials of a project and support a bad investment.

If TIF is going to be used it should be used on things like public infrastructure – roads, sewer/water lines, sidewalks – rather than specific private businesses. This makes it harder to get distracted by non-pecuniary factors and does a better – though not perfect – job of directly helping development in general rather than a specific company or private developer. But taxpayers should be aware of the dangers of TIF and politicians and developers should not tout it as a panacea for jump-starting an area’s economy.

States with lower minimum wages will feel the impact of California’s experiment

California governor Jerry Brown recently signed a law raising California’s minimum wage to $15/hour by 2022. This ill-advised increase in the minimum wage will banish the least productive workers of California – teens, the less educated, the elderly – from the labor market. It will be especially destructive in the poorer areas of California that are already struggling.

And if punishing California’s low-skill workers by preventing them from negotiating their own wage with employers isn’t bad enough, there is reason to believe that a higher minimum wage in a large state like California will eventually affect the employment opportunities of low-skill workers in other areas of the country.

Profit-maximizing firms are always on the lookout for ways to reduce costs holding quality constant (or in the best case scenario to reduce costs and increase quality). Since there are many different ways to produce the same good, if the price of one factor of production, e.g. labor, increases, firms will have an incentive to use less of that factor and more of something else in their production process. For example, if the price of low-skill workers increases relative to the cost of a machine that can do the same job firms will have an incentive to switch to the machine.

To set the stage for this post, let’s think about a real life example; touch screen ordering. Some McDonald’s have touchscreens for ordering food and coffee and San Francisco restaurant eatsa is almost entirely automated (coincidence?). The choice facing a restaurant owner is whether to use a touch screen or cashier. If a restaurant is currently using a cashier and paying them a wage, they will only switch to the touch screen if the cost of switching and the future discounted costs of operating and maintaining the touch screen device are less than the future discounted costs of using workers and paying them a wage plus any benefits. We can write this as

D + K + I + R < W

Where D represents the development costs of creating and perfecting the device, K represents the costs of working out the kinks/the trial run/adjustment costs, I represents the installation costs, and R represents the net present value of the operating and maintenance costs. On the other side of the inequality W represents the net present value of the labor costs. (In math terms R and W are: R = [ ∑ (rk) / (1+i)^n from n=0 to N ] where r is the rental rate of a unit of capital, k is the number of units of capital, and i is the interest rate and W = [ ∑ (wl) /(1+i)^n from n=0 to N ] where w is the wage and l is the amount of labor hours. But if this looks messy and confusing don’t worry about it as it’s not crucial for the example.)

The owner of a restaurant will only switch to a touch screen device rather than a cashier if the left side of the above inequality is less than the right side, since in that case the owner’s costs will be lower and they will earn a larger profit (holding sales constant).

If the cashier is earning the minimum wage or something close to it and the minimum wage is increased, say from $9 to $15, the right side of the above inequality will increase while the left side will stay the same (the w part of W is going up).  If the increase in the wage is large enough to make the right side larger than the left side the firm will switch from a cashier to a touch screen. Suppose that an increase from $9 to $15 does induce a switch to touch screen devices in California McDonald’s restaurants. Can this impact McDonald’s restaurants in areas where the minimum wage doesn’t increase? In theory yes.

Once some McDonald’s restaurants make the switch the costs for other McDonald’s to switch will be lower. The reason for this is that the McDonald’s that switch later will not have to pay the D or K costs; the development or kinks/trial run/adjustment costs. Once the technology is developed and perfected the late-adopting McDonald’s can just copy what has already been done. So after the McDonald’s restaurants in high wage areas install and perfect touch screen devices for ordering, the other McDonald’s face the decision of

I + R < W

This means that it may make sense to adopt the technology once it has been developed and perfected even if the wage in the lower wage areas does not change. In this scenario the left side decreases as D and K go to 0 while the right side stays the same. In fact, one could argue that the R will decline for late-adopting restaurants as well since the maintenance costs will decline over time as more technicians are trained and the reliability and performance of the software and hardware increase.

What this means is that a higher minimum wage in a state like California can lead to a decline in low-skill employment opportunities in places like Greenville, SC and Dayton, OH as the technology employed to offset the higher labor costs in the high minimum wage area spread to lower wage areas.

Also, firm owners and operators live in the real world. They see other state and local governments raising their minimum wage and they start to think that it could happen in their area too. This also gives them an incentive to switch since in expectation labor costs are going up. If additional states make the same bad policy choice as California, firm owners around the country may start to think that resistance is futile and that it’s best to adapt in advance by preemptively switching to more capital.

And if you think that touch screen ordering machines aren’t a good example, here is a link to an article about an automated burger-making machine. The company that created it plans on starting a chain of restaurants that use the machine. Once all of the bugs are worked out how high does the minimum wage need to be before other companies license the technology or create their own by copying what has already been done?

This is one more way that a higher minimum wage negatively impacts low-skill workers; even if workers don’t live in an area that has a relatively high minimum wage, the spread of technology may eliminate their jobs as well.

A $15 minimum wage will excessively harm California’s poorest counties

Lawmakers in California are thinking about increasing the state minimum wage to $15 per hour by 2022. If it occurs it will be the latest in a series of increases in the minimum wage across the country, both at the city and state level.

Increases in the minimum wage make it difficult for low-skill workers to find employment since the mandated wage is often higher than the value many of these workers can provide to their employers. Companies won’t stay in business long if they are forced to pay a worker $15 per hour who only produces $12 worth of goods and services per hour. Statewide increases may harm the job prospects of low-skill workers more than citywide increases since they aren’t adjusted to local labor market conditions.

California is a huge state, covering nearly 164,000 square miles, and contains 58 counties and 482 municipalities. Each of these counties and cities has their own local labor market that is based on local conditions. A statewide minimum wage ignores these local conditions and imposes the same mandated price floor on employers and workers across the state. In areas with low wages in general, a $15 minimum wage may affect nearly every worker, while in areas with high wages the adverse effects of a $15 minimum wage will be moderated. As explained in the NY Times:

“San Francisco and San Jose, both high-wage cities that have benefited from the tech boom, are likely to weather the increase without so much as a ripple. The negative consequences of the minimum wage increase in Los Angeles and San Diego — large cities where wages are lower — are likely to be more pronounced, though they could remain modest on balance.

But in lower-wage, inland cities like Bakersfield and Fresno, the effects could play out in much less predictable ways. That’s because the rise of the minimum wage to $15 over the next six years would push the wage floor much closer to the expected pay for a worker in the middle of the wage scale, affecting a much higher proportion of employees and employers there than in high-wage cities.”

To put some numbers to this idea, I used BLS weekly wage data from Dec. of 2014 to create a ratio for each of California’s counties that consists of the weekly wage of a $15 per hour job (40 x $15 = $600) divided by the average weekly wage of each county. The three counties with the lowest ratio and the three counties with the highest ratio are in the table below, with the ratio depicted as a percentage in the 4th column.

CA county weekly min wage ratio

The counties with the lowest ratios are San Mateo, Santa Clara, and San Francisco County. These are all high-wage counties located on the coast and contain the cities of San Jose and San Francisco. As an example, a $600 weekly wage is equal to 27.7% of the average weekly wage in San Mateo County.

The three counties with the highest ratios are Trinity, Lake, and Mariposa County. These are more rural counties that are located inland. Trinity and Lake are north of San Francisco while Mariposa County is located to the east of San Francisco. In Mariposa County, a $600 weekly wage would be equal to 92.6% of the avg. weekly wage in that county as Dec. 2014. The data shown in the table reveal the vastly different local labor market conditions that exist in California.

The price of non-tradeable goods like restaurant meals, haircuts, automotive repair, etc. are largely based on local land and labor costs and the willingness to pay of the local population. For example, a nice restaurant in San Francisco can charge $95 for a steak because the residents of San Francisco have a high willingness to pay for such meals as a result of their high incomes.

Selling a luxury product like a high-quality steak also makes it relatively easier to absorb a cost increase that comes from a higher minimum wage; restaurant workers are already making relatively more in wealthier areas and passing along the cost increase in the form of higher prices will have a small effect on sales if consumers of steak aren’t very sensitive to price.

But in Mariposa County, where the avg. weekly wage is only $648, a restaurant would have a hard time attracting customers if they charged similar prices. A diner in Mariposa County that sells hamburgers is probably not paying its workers much more than the minimum wage, so an increase to $15 per hour is going to drastically affect the owner’s costs. Additionally, consumers of hamburgers may be more price-sensitive than consumers of steak, making it more difficult to pass along cost increases.

Yet despite these differences, both the 5-star steakhouse in San Francisco and the mom-and-pop diner in Mariposa County are going to be bound by the same minimum wage if California passes this law.

In the table below I calculate what the minimum wage would have to be in San Mateo, Santa Clara, and San Francisco County to be on par with a $15 minimum in Mariposa County.

CA comparable min wage

If the minimum wage was 92.6% of the average wage in San Mateo it would be equal to $50.14. Using the ratio from a more developed but still lower-wage area – Kern County, where Bakersfield is located – the minimum wage would need to be $37.20 in San Mateo. Does anyone really believe that a $50 or $37 minimum wage in San Mateo wouldn’t cause a drastic decline in employment or a large increase in prices in that county?

If California’s lawmakers insist on implementing a minimum wage increase they should adjust it so that it doesn’t disproportionately affect workers in poorer, rural areas. But of course this is unlikely to happen; I doubt that the voters of San Mateo, Santa Clara, and San Francisco County will be as accepting of a $37 + minimum wage as they are of a $15 minimum wage that won’t directly affect many of them.

A minimum wage of any amount is going to harm some workers by preventing them from getting a job. But a minimum wage that ignores local labor market conditions will cause relatively more damage in poorer areas that are already struggling, and policy makers who ignore this reality are excessively harming the workers in these areas.

Puerto Rico’s labor market woes

Puerto Rico – a U.S. territory – has $72 billion dollars in outstanding debt, which is dangerously high in a country with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of only $103.1 billion. The Puerto Rican government failed to pay creditors in August and this was viewed as a default by the credit rating agency Moody’s, which had already downgraded Puerto Rico’s bonds to junk status earlier this year. The Obama administration has proposed allowing Puerto Rico to declare bankruptcy, which would allow it to negotiate with creditors and eliminate some of its debt. Currently only municipalities – not states or territories – are allowed to declare bankruptcy under U.S. law. Several former Obama administration officials have come out in favor of the plan, including former Budget Director Peter Orszag and former Director of the National Economic Council Larry Summers. Others are warning that bankruptcy is not a cure-all and that more structural reforms need to take place. Many of these pundits have pointed out that Puerto Rico’s labor market is a mess and that people are leaving the country in droves. Since 2010 over 200,000 people have migrated from Puerto Rico, decreasing its population to just over 3.5 million. This steady loss of the tax base has increased the debt burden on those remaining and has made it harder for Puerto Rico to get out of debt.

To get a sense of Puerto Rico’s situation, the figure below shows the poverty rate of Puerto Rico along with that of three US states that will be used throughout this post as a means of comparison: California (wealthy state), Ohio (medium-wealth state), and Mississippi (low-wealth state). All the data are 1-year ACS data from American FactFinder.

puerto rico poverty

The poverty rate in Puerto Rico is very high compared to these states. Mississippi’s poverty rate is high by US standards and was approximately 22% in 2014, but Puerto Rico’s dwarfed it at over 45%. Assisting Puerto Rico with their immediate debt problem will do little to fix this issue.

A government requires taxes in order to provide services, and taxes are primarily collected from people who work in the regular economy via income taxes. A small labor force with relatively few employed workers makes it difficult for a county to raises taxes to provide services and pay off debt. Puerto Rico has a very low labor force participation (LFP) rate relative to mainland US states and a very low employment rate. The graphs below plot Puerto Rico’s LFP rate and employment rate along with the rates of California, Mississippi, and Ohio.

puerto rico labor force

puerto rico employ rate

As shown in the figures, Puerto Rico’s employment rate and LFP rate are far below the rates of the US states including one of the poorest states, Mississippi. In 2014 less than 45% of Puerto Rico’s 16 and over population was in the labor force and only about 35% of the 16 and over population was employed. In Mississippi the LFP rate was 58% while the employment rate was 52%. Additionally, the employment rate fell in Puerto Rico from 2010-14 while it rose in each of the other three states. So at a time when the labor market was improving on the mainland things were getting worse in Puerto Rico.

An educated labor force is an important input in the production process and it is especially important for generating innovation and entrepreneurship. The figure below shows the percent of people 25 and over in each area that have a bachelor’s degree or higher.

puerto rico gt 24 education attain

Puerto Rico has a relatively educated labor force compared to Mississippi, though it trails Ohio and California. The percentage also increased over this time period, though it appears to have stabilized after 2012 while continuing to grow in the other states.

Puerto Rico has nice beaches and weather, so a high percentage of educated people over the age of 25 may simply be due to a high percentage of educated retirees residing in Puerto Rico to take advantage of its geographic amenities. The next figure shows the percentage of 25 to 44 year olds with a bachelor’s degree or higher. I examined this age group to see if the somewhat surprising percentage of people with a bachelor’s degree or higher in Puerto Rico is being driven by educated older workers and retirees who are less likely to help reinvigorate the Puerto Rican economy going forward.

puerto rico 25to44 educ attain

As shown in the graph, Puerto Rico actually fares better when looking at the 25 – 44 age group, especially from 2010-12. In 2012 Puerto Rico had a higher percentage of educated people in this age group than Ohio.

Since then, however, Puerto Rico’s percentage declined slightly while Ohio’s rose, along with Mississippi’s and California’s. The decline in Puerto Rico was driven by a decline in the percentage of people 35 to 44 with a bachelor’s or higher as shown in the next figure below.

puerto rico 35to44 educ attain

The percentage of 35 to 44 year olds with a bachelor’s or advanced degree fell from 32% in 2012 to 29.4% in 2014 while it rose in the other three states. This is evidence that educated people in their prime earning years left the territory during this period, most likely to work in the US where there are more opportunities and wages are higher. This “bright flight” is a bad sign for Puerto Rico’s economy.

One of the reforms that many believe will help Puerto Rico is an exemption from compliance with federal minimum wage laws. Workers in Puerto Rico are far less productive than in the US, and thus a $7.25 minimum wage has a large effect on employment. Businesses cannot afford to pay low-skill workers in Puerto Rico such a high wage because the workers simply do not produce enough value to justify it. The graph below shows the median individual yearly income in each area divided by the full time federal minimum wage income of $15,080.

puerto rico min wage ratio

As shown in the graph, Puerto Rico’s ratio was the highest by a substantial amount. The yearly income from earning the minimum wage was about 80% of the yearly median income in Puerto Rico over this period, while it was only about 40% in Mississippi and less in Ohio and California. By this measure, California’s minimum wage would need to be $23.82 – which is equal to $49,546 per year – to equal the ratio in Puerto Rico. California’s actual minimum wage is $9 and it’s scheduled to increase to $10 in 2016. I don’t think there’s a single economist who would argue that more than doubling the minimum wage in California would have no effect on employment.

The preceding figures do not paint a rosy picture of Puerto Rico: Its poverty rate is high and trending up, less than half of the people over 16 are in the labor force and only about a third are actually employed, educated people appear to be leaving the country, and the minimum wage is a severe hindrance on hiring. Any effort by the federal government to help Puerto Rico needs to take these problems into account. Ultimately the Puerto Rican government needs to be enabled and encouraged to institute reforms that will help grow Puerto Rico’s economy. Without fundamental reforms that increase economic opportunity in Puerto Rico people will continue to leave, further weakening the commonwealth’s economy and making additional defaults more likely.