Tag Archives: Dan Rothschild

The Sharing Economy

Over at the Tech Liberation Front, my colleague Adam Thierer has sketched out a few themes in the debate over the sharing economy. His discussion of leveling the regulatory playing field is particularly important. Here is my favorite part:

Alternative remedies exist: Accidents will always happen, of course. But insurance, contracts, product liability, and other legal remedies exist when things go wrong. The difference is that ex postremedies don’t discourage innovation and competition like ex ante regulation does. By trying to head off every hypothetical worst-case scenario, preemptive regulations actually discourage many best-case scenarios from ever coming about.

Adam asks for comments and additional reading suggestions. In that spirit, here are my own additional talking points on the issue:

  • Reviving dead capital: Something that Dan Rothschild has emphasized in a lot of his writings and that I’ve tried to stress when I can is that the “peer production economy” breathes life into otherwise dead capital. Cars, tools, apartments, planes, kitchens, and even dogs are now creating value for people when they otherwise would just be collecting dust (or fleas). This may help to explain the extraordinary value investors see in firms like Uber.
  • Exposing regulatory failure: Another—though not mutually-exclusive—view is that these new firms are making lots of money not because they are doing anything particularly revolutionary. Instead, they are doing well because they have found a way around traditional regulations which have rendered incumbent services truly abysmal and consumers are rewarding them for this. In this sense, Uber is profitable because it isn’t a cartelized taxi company. This is generally the view that Mike Munger expresses in his EconTalk with Russ Roberts. This is probably more applicable to Uber and Lyft than to AirBnB or 1000Tools.com since the ride-sharing firms compete with an industry that has obviously captured its regulator.
  • Transitional gains trap: The whole experience offers us an opportunity to illustrate one of Gordon Tullock’s most-valuable and least-appreciated points. When regulators contrive some artificial exclusivity, they allow incumbent firms to earn above-normal profits (rents). But often these firms are only able to earn above-normal profits for a time (a transitional period). That’s because eventually, the value of the rent is “capitalized” into whatever assets must be purchased in order to enter the industry. These assets may include taxi medallions, specially-outfitted cabs, well-connected lobbyists, or any other asset that is necessary to gain access to the exclusive club. This is important because it means that many of the current incumbents had to pay large sums of money for their exclusive position and, net of these payments, they really aren’t cleaning up. Just as Adam is right to say that “regulatory asymmetry is real” we should also acknowledge that, in many cases, taxi regulations that started out as privileges are now more like burdens.
  • Value is subjective: No two customers have the same values and interests. I may want the windows down on a hot day and you may want them up. It’s simply absurd to think that regulators could devise an objective quality-control checklist for firms to follow or that they could properly vet cab drivers better than consumers. Yet that is exactly the approach they’ve taken (see here for just how clumsy it’s been in VA). The customer rating systems are really revolutionary because they collapse these subjective, multidimensional quality scales down to one simple 5-point rating that captures a driver’s ability to tailor his or her services to the subjective needs of each customer. Your Uber ride begins with a conversation between you and your driver about what is important to you (music, temperature, windows, speed, route, etc.) and ends with a 1 to 5 rating. It’s as simple as that.
  • True competition is a discovery process: Regulations “lock in” the status quo technology (again, because they attempt to objectively state every possible quality that customers might care about). But this misses the whole point of competition. As Hayek taught us, true competition is about discovering things you never knew (and never knew you didn’t know), such as that customers like being able to order cars from their smartphones.
  • Empowering Diffuse Interests: Traditional public choice models predict that small, concentrated interests such as an incumbent taxi industry willtypically prevail in a political battle with a large, diffuse interest such as taxi customers. This time may be different though. Wherever it goes, the peer-production economy has quickly developed a large and happy base of tech-savvy customers. Since the firms themselves have tended to innovate without asking for permission, this has often meant that a city will have tens of thousands of loyal peer-production customers long before its regulators can say “cease and desist.” So in a number of places, we’ve seen regulators move to shut down the peer production economy, then we’ve seen customers protest en masse and regulators withdraw their proposals.
  • Safety: Uber and Lyft drivers carry no cash. Customers have an electronic record of the ride and their driver. Drivers have an electronic record of the customer. These simple solutions accomplish what reams of taxi regulations never could: they ensure that both the customer and the driver are as safe as possible.
  • Flexibility: Because they don’t work for the companies, Uber and Lyft drivers work when they want to. Most of them seem to report that this is one of the best features of the job.
  • Beware of Uber too!: As Milton Friedman put it, one must be careful to distinguish being “pro-free enterprise” from being “pro-business.” The goal here is not to allow Uber to be profitable but to allow competition which will enhance the customer experience. We have already seen that when given the chance, Uber—like most firms—will take an exclusive privilege when one is offered. We must be very careful that Uber isn’t let inside the regulatory velvet rope only to put it back up behind them.

State and Local Economic Development Programs

Fairfax County’s Economic Development Authority has opened a new office in Los Angeles. Their aim is to lure Californians who are fed up with the Golden State’s web of taxes and regulations. 

It is true, of course, that California’s business climate is abysmal. According to Sorens and Ruger, California is number 44 in terms of fiscal freedom (with 50 being the least-free), and 46 in terms of regulatory freedom. Other indices come to the same conclusion. Kail Padgitt of the Tax Foundation, for example, evaluated states based on their business tax climate and California came in at #49.

Virginia, by contrast, does decently well in both reports. By Sorens and Ruger’s measure, the state is the 13th most-economically-free in the nation and by Padgitt’s, its business tax climate is the 12th-best.

Given the important link between taxes and economic prosperity—see studies by Agostini and Tulayasathien (2003); Mark, McGuire, and Papke (2000); Harden and Hoyt (2003); and Gupta and Hofmann (2003) or reviews by Helen Ladd (1998) or Padgitt (2010)—it might seem only natural for Virginia to highlight its relatively low-tax environment. 

The irony, however, is that taxpayer-funded projects like an economic development office located 2,285 miles away from the county make it more-difficult for Fairfax to maintain its competitive tax rates. More expensive than the office itself are the handful of subsidies and tax expenditures that the state and the county offer to businesses that relocate or that meet special criteria (these subsidies include the option for the state to dole out “discretionary, deal-closing” benefits).

Proponents of economic development programs will no doubt contend that these expenses pay for themselves. But the economic literature is far from conclusive on that score.

Some studies find that targeted incentives lead to employment growth in the industries they target.

But others find evidence to suggest that these results are exaggerated. Examining 366 Ohio firms, for example, Gabe and Kraybill (2002) found that incentives have large effects on announced employment growth but modest or even negative effects on actual employment growth.

According to a recent Wall Street Journal article, some states and localities have begun to notice this discrepancy. John Garcia, the economic development director in my hometown of Albuquerque recently announced that the city was trying to collect nearly half a million dollars in property tax abatements that were given to a call center that relocated and then closed shortly thereafter.

But the real question is not whether these types of incentives are a good deal for the firms that receive them (one would think they would be!), but rather are they a good deal for the state at-large?

In a case study examining Virginia giveaways, Alwang, Peterson, and Mills (2001) draw attention to the fact that “most economic development events involve winners and losers.” For example, other firms may have to pay higher costs for purchased inputs. They found that the benefits doled out to one firm cost others more than $1 million, annually.  

Sweet deals can also crowd-out legitimate government expenditures on true public goods. Burstein and Rolnick (1996), write:

[W]hen competition takes the form of preferential treatment for specific businesses, it misallocates private resources and causes state and local governments to provide too few public goods.

Furthermore, cost-benefit analyses of economic development deals rarely account for the so-called rent-seeking losses that such deals inevitably invite: firms will sink millions of dollars into societally useless activities—lobbying and ingratiating themselves to the politicians—in an effort to win these privileges. The money they spend on smart and expensive lobbyists, lawyers, and accountants would be better spent developing new products and services that actually provide value to customers. These losses are hard to measure but that does not mean that they don’t exist.

In my view, states and localities should aggressively compete with one another over businesses. And part of that competition should involve figuring out ways to provide public goods at the lowest possible tax and regulatory cost. But this cost should be low for everyone, not just for the politically-connect firms.

HT to my colleague, Dan Rothschild, for directing me to the news about Fairfax County.

Data is not Information: Would you like a Receipt for your Taxes?

If you received a receipt indicated what portion of your taxes went to fund individual government agencies and programs, would it change how you view your taxes, or government spending? Depends on whether the data is providing you with information.

NPR links to a study by Third Way of what such a receipt might look like.

Seems like a good idea? Consider what is not seen.

At Sometimes Right, Dan Rothschild offers a thorough critique. There is the potential for gaming numbers and political incentives to aggregate or disaggregate spending to make it appear big or small. The idea ignores the fungibility of revenues, and the behavioral effects of federal spending on state and local budgets, the private sector, non-profits, and civil society.

Just because a only a couple hundred of your tax dollars were appropriated to the Department of Agriculture doesn’t make farm subsidies a good idea. In other words, such a receipt, while a nice idea, ultimately provides a misleading picture of the true effect of federal spending on governments, individuals, and society.

The Road Home?

Our own Daniel Rothschild testified last week before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, about the role of state and federal governments in obstructing home building in devastated New Orleans neighborhoods. From Louisiana’s Daily World:

Daniel Rothschild, director of the Gulf Coast Recovery Project at George Mason University, said the problem isn’t necessarily that government officials are discriminating, but that they’re becoming overly involved in recovery efforts.

“Federal and state policies designed to rebuild homes sowed confusion and uncertainty, making it difficult for people to make informed choices about how, when and where to rebuild,” Rothschild said.

He said the government should set clear, simple rules, then get out of the way to allow rebuilding to take place from the ground up.

“Community leaders, clergy, social entrepreneurs have leveraged social capital and local knowledge to spur rebuilding, and over 1 million Americans have volunteered their time, some for weeks and some for years,” he said. “They got it fixed and built houses one at a time.”

For more Mercatus work on the problems created by post-disaster government uncertainty, and how we could encourage rebuilding efforts, see some of our extensive publications on the subject.