Tag Archives: economic development

Delaware Senate votes to bail out three casinos

Delaware’s state senate has voted to redirect $10 billion in economic development funding to bail out three gambling casinos. The measure now goes to the House. Two reasons the casinos are failing: increased competition from Maryland and Pennsylvania and having to share a large chuck of revenue with the state. Lawmakers admit the bailout is only a “Band Aid,” and not enough to salvage the operations.

Supporters defend SB 220 as a jobs protection measure. But the real incentive is more likely the revenues involved. Lottery receipts are the fourth largest source of Delaware’s revenues at about 7 percent of the total bringing in $277 billion in 2013, right behind Income taxes, Franchise taxes, and Abandoned Property.

The casinos are certainly in trouble. According to Delaware Newszap.com Dover Downs Gaming & Entertainment saw a $1 million loss in Q1 2014 and is $46 million in debt. During that same first quarter the casino paid the state $16 million in revenue.

Revenue sharing between the state and the casinos has grown more onerous over the past 20 years. In 1997, the casino claimed 50.2 percent of the revenue and the state took 25.2 percent. In 2009, that split reversed, with the state claiming 43.5 percent of revenues and the casino keeping 37.8 percent.

The incentive for the bailout is fairly clear though the economic thinking is convoluted. Why not reduce the tax rate instead? Economist James Butkiewicz at the University of Delaware notes that as a voluntary tax it’s easy revenue and the state doesn’t have to raise taxes elsewhere.

But do casinos deliver for state coffers and economies?  Economists Douglas Walker (whose field is casino economics) and John Jackson find that while lotteries and horse racing tend to increase state revenues, casinos and greyhound racing tend to decrease it. Using recent data, Walker and Jackson find casinos have a positive economic impact. There are many other things to consider when thinking about the effects of casinos. As state creations there is ample opportunity for corruption and regulatory capture. Walker and Calcagno find just such a link in their paper in the journal Applied Economics (Dec 2013), “Casinos and Political Corruption in the United States: A Granger Causality Analysis.” And as a recent article by the WSJ notes oversaturation of casinos on the East Coast has also triggered an interstate “war” for revenues. Delaware’s gaming revenues are down 29 percent since 2011. A Delaware Casino Executive laments that the business model they are using is simply, “unworkable.”




Richmond, Calif., Eminent Domain, and the Problems of Political Privilege

Sign Of The Times - ForeclosureRichmond, California is now moving forward with a proposal to use eminent domain to acquire more than 600 “underwater mortgages” (mortgages with unpaid balances greater their properties’ market value).

Eminent domain has long been used by governments for various public uses, such as highways, roads, and public utilities.  More recently this has been extended to include shopping mallsbusiness parks, and professional sports stadiums. However, while contemplated by other cities, eminent domain has never been used for the purpose of seizing mortgages. Richmond would be the first city to actually carry out such a plan.

On its face, the plan is straightforward. The city has offered to buy these underwater mortgages at discounted rates from the banks and investors currently holding these mortgages. If the offers are rejected, the city will use eminent domain to force the sale of these mortgages to the city. The city will then write down the debt, refinancing the loans for amounts much more in line with current home values.

While the stated objective of this plan is to provide mortgage relief to homeowners hurt by the most recent housing crises, the plan is rife with opportunities for political privilege and favoritism.  Ilya Somin, a law professor at the George Mason University School of Law, has laid out several problems involved with this scheme:

  • Far from benefiting low-income people as intended, the plan will actually harm them. Much of the money to condemn the mortgages and pay litigation expenses will come from taxpayers, including the poor. Most of the poor are renters, not homeowners, so they cannot benefit from this program. But renters do indirectly pay property taxes through the property taxes paid by their landlords, a cost which is built into their rent.
  • The program would also enrich those who took dangerous risks at the expense of the prudent. It isn’t good policy to force more prudent taxpayers to subsidize the behavior of people who took the risk of purchasing high-priced real estate in the midst of a bubble. Doing so will predictably encourage dubious risk-taking in the future.
  • Prudent Richmonders will also lose out from this policy in another way. If lenders believe that the city is likely to condemn mortgages whenever real estate prices fall significantly, they will either be unwilling to lend to future home purchasers in Richmond, or only do so at higher interest rates. That will hurt the local economy and make it more difficult for Richmonders to buy homes.
  • We should also remember that eminent domain that transfers property to private parties is often used to benefit the politically powerful at the expense of the poor and the weak. In Kelo v. City New London (2005), a closely divided Supreme Court ruled that government could take private property and transfer it to influential business interests in order to promote “economic development.” As a result, multiple New London residents lost their homes for a “development” project that still hasn’t built anything on their former property eight years later. Property owners lost their rights and the public has yet to see much benefit. The Richmond policy would create another precedent to help legitimate future Kelos.

You can read Somin’s article here.

It should be noted that there is a legal challenge underway as banks and investors argue that the city’s plan is unconstitutional. However, regardless of the plan’s legality, it is clear that it will do little to support economic development, aid the housing market, or support future investment in the local economy. It seems more about using these mortgages to privilege the few at the expense of the many.

New York’s Population Challenge

Last week at City Journal, Aaron Renn explored the New York region’s loss of domestic residents since 2000. He demonstrates that one of the world’s economic powerhouses is falling victim to the trend of domestic outmigration that New York state is seeing. Between 2000 and 2010, the New YOrk region lost 2 million domestic residents and they took with them billions of dollars of income. In Freedom in the 50 States, Will Ruger and Jason Sorens rank New York as the country’s least-free state based on its regulatory and tax regimes. They point to its tax burden — the highest in the nation —  and indebtedness as a factors contributing to the state losing 9-percent of its domestic population on net since 2000. Renn also posits that high tax rates are a leading cause for residents leaving New York City, many of them moving to Sun Belt states.

While the New York City region is only maintaining a positive population growth rate through births and international immigration, it’s far from the case that no one is willing to suffer its high tax rates in exchange for the city’s economic dynamism and cultural amenities. Rather the city’s exorbitant rental rates demonstrate that millions of people are willing to pay a premium to live in the region in spite of city and state policies that hamper economic development.  The vacancy rate for apartments is below 2-percent, well under many estimates for the natural vacancy rate. While lower taxes at the state and municipal levels in the New York region would reduce the flow of domestic outmigration at the margin, they would also increase competition for the city’s coveted apartments.

Are New York City’s amenities so desirable that its policymakers don’t need to worry about losing more residents to other states than they’re gaining? Its own not-so-distant history indicates that even the Big Apple is susceptible to the ravages of population loss. From 1950 to 1980, the city’s population fell from 7.9 million to 7 million, with most of that loss occurring in the 1970s. This time period corresponded with sharp increases in crime and the city’s famous default. These are predictable consequences of urban population decline, particularly in indebted cities where a decrease in tax base equates with inability to meet obligations to creditors .

While pursuing policy reforms designed to boost the state’s competitive standing to attract businesses and residents is a key piece of ensuring the city does not fall prey to population exodus, perhaps most importantly, city policymakers should examine their land use restrictions that limit would-be residents from moving to the city. Over the past decade, New York’s housing stock has grown only 5.3% in the face of the highest rental rates in the country for much of this time period. Historic preservation, density restrictions, and an onerous review process prevent the city’s housing stock from growing to meet demand.

Renn points out that most of New York’s domestic inmigration comes from midwestern cities and college towns across the country. Presumably many of these new residents are early in their careers and are on the margin of being able to afford New York rents. If New York housing were more attainable, more American young people would select the city as the starting place for their careers and it would attract more of the foreign immigrants essential to maintaining the city’s diversity and innovation. Ed Glaeser explains that those states that are successfully attracting more residents, like Texas and Georgia, are also those in which developers are able to build more housing with fewer restrictions. By allowing more housing in New York City and the surrounding areas, policymakers would both protect their tax base and help to maintain the city as a center of innovation and economic growth. In their effort to retain citizens — and particularly high-income retirees — New York City and New York state policymakers will need to revisit their punishing tax schemes. But at least as importantly they should focus on allowing those residents who would like to move to the city for economic and cultural opportunities to be able to afford to do so.





Are you ready for some (subsidized) football?

This weekend marks the start of the NFL season, and with it comes the fanfare and attention that being the most lucrative professional sport in America has come to demand.  However, this success has fueled the lucrative stadium financing deals that have been secured by these teams over the past 20 years, often at the expense of taxpayers.

Olympic Stadium London - Anniversary (Blended)Take, for example, the stadium deal given to the Cincinnati Bengals by Hamilton County in Ohio. Still the most lucrative subsidy in the history of professional football, taxpayers were left paying 94 percent of the $449.8 million tab. This amount doesn’t include other costs in the generous lease, such as the agreement by the county to cover all of the costs of operation and capital improvements. The lease also leaves taxpayers on the hook to fund projects that have not even been invented yet, such things as “ticketless entry systems,” “stadium self-cleaning machines,” and even “holographic replay machines.”

The Cincinnati Bengals are certainly not alone in getting these sorts of publicly-funded gifts. The Buffalo Bills recently obtained $95 million in subsidies for stadium upgrades.  In return, the state of New York will be given a luxury suite to promote the sorts of corporate handouts that the state can give to other businesses.  Meanwhile, the Atlanta Falcons will receive $200 million from the city of Atlanta toward a new stadium, funded through bonds backed by the city’s hotel-motel tax.  The Kansas City Chiefs and the Carolina Panthers have also recently received generous taxpayer-funded stadium deals.  The list goes on.  Nearly every NFL stadium built since 1997 has received some public funding.

And what do these deals really do to promote economic development?  Almost nothing.  According to economists Robert Baade and Victor Matheson, researchers looking into the economic impact of new sports facilities “have almost invariably found little or no economic benefits.”  This should come as no surprise to economists and policymakers.  Dennis Coates and Brad Humphreys have surveyed the literature and found “a great deal of consistency among economists doing research in this area. That . . . sports subsidies cannot be justified on the grounds of local economic development, income growth or job creation.”

Why, then, do politicians continue to hand out these privileges at the taxpayers’ expense? One answer is that these sports teams are well-connected and well-organized, giving them an inherent lobbying advantage over a multitude of unorganized taxpayers.  For example, the owner of the Miami Dolphins has created an active political group to attack lawmakers he blames for a failed measure to provide taxpayer support for a $350 million upgrade to Sun Life Stadium.

Another possible explanation is that people love their hometown teams, and most politicians are eager to associate themselves with anything that appears popular.  Even if that means giving these teams handouts at the taxpayers’ expense.

So as the football season begins and continues to play out over the next 6 months, you ought to take some time to enjoy your hometown team.  Odds are, you are already paying for it.

The Economics of Regulation Part 2: Quantifying Regulation

I recently wrote about a new study from economists John Dawson and John Seater that shows that federal regulations have slowed economic growth in the US by an average of 2% per year.  The study was novel and important enough from my perspective that it deserved some detailed coverage.  In this post, which is part two of a three part series (part one here), I go into some detail on the various ways that economists measure regulation.  This will help put into context the measure that Dawson and Seater used, which is the main innovation of their study.  The third part of the series will discuss the endogenous growth model in which they used their new measure of regulation to estimate its effect on economic growth.

From the macroeconomic perspective, the main policy interventions—that is, instruments wielded in a way to change individual or firm behavior—used by governments are taxes and regulations.  Others might include spending/deficit spending and monetary policy in that list, but a large percentage of economics studies on interventions intended to change behavior have focused on taxes, for one simple reason: taxes are relatively easy to quantify.  As a result, we know a lot more about taxes than we do about regulations, even if much of that knowledge is not well implemented.  Economists can calculate changes to marginal tax rates caused by specific policies, and by simultaneously tracking outcomes such as changes in tax revenue and the behavior of taxed and untaxed groups, deduce specific numbers with which to characterize the consequences of those taxation policies.  In short, with taxes, you have specific dollar values or percentages to work with. With regulations, not so much.

In fact, the actual burden of regulation is notoriously hidden, especially when directly compared to taxes that attempt to achieve the same policy objective.  For example, since fuel economy regulations (called Corporate Average Fuel Economy, or CAFE, standards) were first implemented in the 1970s, it has been broadly recognized that the goal of reducing gasoline consumption could be more efficiently achieved through a gasoline tax rather than vehicle design or performance standards.  However, it is much easier for a politician to tell her constituents that she will make auto manufacturers build more fuel-efficient cars than to tell constituents that they now face higher gasoline prices because of a fuel tax.  In econospeak, taxes are salient to voters—remembered as important and costly—whereas regulations are not. Even when comparing taxes to taxes, some, such as property taxes, are apparently more salient than others, such as payroll taxes, as this recent study shows.  If some taxes that workers pay on a regular basis are relatively unnoticed, how much easier is it to hide a tax in the form of a regulation?  Indeed, it is arguably because regulations are uniquely opaque as policy instruments that all presidents since Jimmy Carter have required some form of benefit-cost analysis on new regulations prior to their enactment (note, however, that the average quality of those analyses is astonishingly low).  Of course, it is for these same obfuscatory qualities that politicians seem to prefer regulations to taxes.

Despite the inherent difficulty, scholars have been analyzing the consequences of regulation for decades, leading to a fairly large literature. Studies typically examine the causal effect of a unique regulation or a small collection of related regulations, such as air quality standards stemming from the Clean Air Act.  Compared to the thousands of actual regulations that are in effect, the regulation typically studied is relatively limited in scope, even if its effects can be far-reaching.  Because most studies on regulation focus only on one or perhaps a few specific regulations, there is a lot of room for more research to be done.  Specifically, improved metrics of regulation, especially metrics that can be used either in multi-industry microeconomic studies or in macroeconomic contexts, could help advance our understanding of the overall effect of all regulations.

With that goal in mind, some attempts have been made to more comprehensively measure regulation through the use of surveys and legal studies.  The most famous example is probably the Doing Business index from the World Bank, while perhaps the most widely used in academic studies is the Indicators of Product Market Regulation from the OECD.  Since 2003, the World Bank has produced the Doing Business Index, which combines survey data with observational data into a single number designed to tell how much it would cost to “do business,” e.g. set up a company, get construction permits, get electricity, register property, etc., in set of 185 countries.  The Doing Business index is perhaps most useful for identifying good practices to follow in early to middle stages of economic development, when property rights and other beneficial institutions can be created and strengthened.

The OECD’s Indicators of Product Market Regulation database focuses more narrowly on types of regulation that are more relevant to developed economies.  Specifically, the original OECD data considered only product market and employment protection regulations, both of which are measured at “economy-wide” level—meaning the OECD measured whether those types of regulations existed in a given country, regardless of whether they were applicable to only certain individuals or particular industries.  The OECD later extended the data by adding barriers to entry, public ownership, vertical integration, market structure, and price controls for a small subset of broadly defined industries (gas, electricity, post, telecommunications, passenger air transport, railways, and road freight).  The OECD develops its database by surveying government officials in several countries and aggregating their responses, with weightings, into several indexes.

By design, the OECD and Doing Business approaches do a good job of relating obscure macroeconomic data to actual people and businesses.  Consider the chart below, taken from the OECD description of how the Product Market Regulation database is created.  As I wrote last week and as the chart shows, the rather sanitized term “product market regulation” actually consists of several components that are directly relevant to a would-be entrepreneur (such as the opacity of a country’s licenses and permits system and administrative burdens for sole proprietorships) and to a consumer (such as price controls and barriers to foreign direct investment).  You can click on the chart below to see some of the other components that are considered in OECD’s product market regulation indicator.

oecd product regulation tree structure

Still, there are two major shortcomings of the OECD data (shortcomings that are equally applicable to similar indexes produced by the World Bank and others).  First, they cover relatively short time spans.  Changes in regulatory policy often require several years, if not decades, to implement, so the results of these changes may not be reflected in short time frames (to a degree, this can be overcome by measuring regulation for several different countries or different industries, so that results of different policies can be compared across countries or industries).

Second, and in my mind, more importantly, the Doing Business Index is not comprehensive.  Instead, it is focused on a few areas of regulation, and then only on whether regulations exist—not how complex or burdensome they are.  As Dawson and Seater explain:

[M]easures of regulation [such as the Doing Business Index and the OECD Indicators] generally proceed by constructing indices based on binary indicators of whether or not various kinds of regulation exist, assigning a value of 1 to each type of regulation that exists and a 0 to those that do not exist.  The index then is constructed as a weighted sum of all the binary indicators.  Such measures capture the existence of given types of regulation but cannot capture their extent or complexity.

Dawson and Seater go out of their way to mention at least twice that the OECD dataset ignores environmental and occupational health and safety regulations.  Theirs is a good point – in the US, at least, environmental regulations from the EPA alone accounted for about 15% of all restrictions published in federal regulations in 2010, and that percentage has consistently grown for the past decade, as can be seen in the graph below (created using data from RegData).  Occupational health and safety regulations take up a significant portion of the regulatory code as well.

env regs as percentage of total

In contrast, one could measure all federal regulations, not just a few select types.  But then the process requires some usage of the actual legal texts containing regulations.  There have been a few attempts to create all-inclusive time series measures of regulation based on the voluminous legal documents detailing regulatory activity at the federal level.   For the most part, studies have relied on the Federal Register, the government’s daily journal of newly proposed and final regulations.  For example, many scholars have counted pages in the Federal Register to test for the existence of the midnight regulations phenomenon—the observation that the administrations of outgoing presidents seem to produce abnormally large numbers of regulations during the lame-duck period

There are problems with using the Federal Register to measure regulation (I say this despite having used it in some of my own papers).  First and foremost, the Federal Register includes deregulatory activity.  When a regulatory agency eliminates words, paragraphs, or even entire chapters from the CFR, the agency has to notify the public of the changes.  The agency does this by printing a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register that explains the agencies intentions.  Then, once the public has had adequate time to comment on the agencies proposed actions, the agency has to publish a final rule in the Federal Register—another set of pages that detail the final actions the agency is taking.  Obviously, if one is counting pages published in the Federal Register and using that as a proxy for the growth of regulation, deregulatory activity that produces positive page counts would lead to incorrect measurements.  

Furthermore, pages published in the Federal Register may be a biased measure because the number of pages associated with individual rulemakings has increased over time as acts of Congress or executive orders have required more analyses. In his Ten-Thousand Commandments series, Wayne Crews mitigates this drawback to some degree by focusing only on pages devoted to final rules.  The Ten-Thousand Commandments series keeps track of both the annual number of final regulations published in the Federal Register and the annual number of Federal Register pages devoted to final regulations.

Dawson and Seater instead rely on the Code of Federal Regulations, another set of legal documents related to federal regulationsActually, the CFR would be better described as the books that contain the actual text of regulations in effect each year.  When a regulatory agency creates new regulations, or alters existing regulations, those changes are reflected in the next publication of the CFR.  Dawson and Seater collected data on the total number of pages in the CFR in each year from 1949 to 2005. I’ve graphed their data below.

dawson and seater cfr pages

*Dawson and Seater exclude Titles 1 – 3 and 32 from their total page counts because they argue that those Titles do not contain regulation, so comparing this graph with page count graphs produced elsewhere will show some discrepancies.

Perhaps the most significant advantage of the CFR over counting pages in the Federal Register is that it allows for decreases in regulations. However, using the CFR arguably has several advantages over indexes like the OECD product market regulation index and the World Bank Doing Business index.  First, using the CFR captures all federal regulation, not just a select few types.  Dawson and Seater point out:

Incomplete coverage leads to two problems: (1) omitted variables bias, and, in any time series study, (2) divergence between the time series behavior of subsets of regulation on the one hand and of total regulation on the other.

In other words, ignoring potentially important variables (such as environmental regulations) can cause estimates of the effect of regulation to be wrong.

Second, the number of pages in the CFR may reflect the complexity of regulations to some degree.  In contrast, the index metrics of regulation typically only consider whether a regulation exists—a binary variable equal to 1 or 0, with nothing in between.  Third, the CFR offers a long time series – almost three times as long as the OECD index, although it is shorter than the Federal Register time series.

Of course, there are downsides to using the CFR.  For one, it is possible that legal drafting standards and language norms have changed over the 57 years, which could introduce bias to their measure (Dawson and Seater brush this concern aside, but not convincingly in my opinion).  Second, the CFR is limited to only one country—the United States—whereas the OECD and World Bank products cover many countries.  Data on multiple countries (or multiple industries within a country, like RegData offers) allow comparisons of real-world outcomes and how they respond to different regulatory treatments.  In contrast, Dawson and Seater are limited to constructing a “counterfactual” economy – one that their model predicts would exist had regulations stayed at the level they were in 1949.  In my next post, I’ll go into more detail on the model they use to do this.

Do targeted economic development deals work as advertised?

Every so often, journalists write quid pro quo stories about government officials who accept favors (campaign donations, sports tickets, airplane rides, etc.) from people who stand to benefit from government-granted privileges (special tax deals, subsidies, favorable government contracts, etc.).

Like this report in the Post this weekend, most of these stories seem to nudge the reader in the direction of thinking that the solution is more regulation of campaign activity or more oversight of gifts to politicians. My question is: why focus exclusively on the gifts that politicians receive instead of on the privileges that politicians dispense? Why focus on the quid and not the quo?

That’s where a five part series by WAMU’s Julie Patel and Patrick Madden comes in. They are only two stories in, but it is shaping up to be an excellent critique of the entire practice of local economic development privileges:

Construction cranes can be seen throughout the district. Less visible are the symbiotic relationships between land developers and city officials awarding tax breaks and discounted land deals. Those government subsidies are meant to revive neighborhoods, and to create jobs and affordable housing. But in some cases, the benefits never materialized, or the subsidies simply weren’t needed.

And what began as a targeted economic development tool now looks to some like government hand outs that could have paid for other city services.

Appropriately, Patel and Madden plumb the data to look for insider deals and conflicts of interest. But their analysis seems to go beyond that. In tomorrow’s segment, for example, they plan to look at whether targeted economic development tools work as advertised:

Developers receiving subsidies pledge jobs, affordable housing and other benefits for D.C. residents. Yet with little oversight and enforcement, many of the promises were downsized, delayed or broken.

Another intrepid reporter who recently asked this question is Louise Story of the New York Times. She and her team “spent 10 months investigating business incentives awarded by hundreds of cities, counties and states” and assembled a unique database along the way.

If local subsidies worked as advertised, we’d expect to see greater economic growth in those states that give away more subsidies. But simple analysis of Story’s data suggests that, if anything, there is a negative relationship between per capita subsidies and economic growth:

Subsidies and growth

In this graph, the x-axis plots per capita subsidies and the y-axis plots real (inflation-adjusted) state economic growth from 1997 to 2011 (the general time period over which Story has data).

I also ran a series of econometric tests, sometimes controlling for other factors (regional effects, the initial size of state economies, and economic freedom) and sometimes not. In every test I ran, per capita subsidies were negatively associated with state economic growth and often the relationship was statistically significant (I should note that the Mercatus measure of economic freedom was always positively and statistically significantly related to growth).

I’ll be the first to admit that this is a back-of-the-envelope exercise (for example I do not try to control for reverse causality). I hope to see more careful research based on Story’s database soon. But based on what I’ve seen so far, I see no reason to presume that local, targeted economic development schemes work as advertised.

Given the social and economic problems associated with government-granted privileges, I think we should view such schemes with a healthy dose of skepticism.

Separation between art and state

In Utah, the Sutherland Institute is leading an effort to stop state support for the Sundance Film Festival. On the organization’s blog Derek Monson writes:

Given the amount of sexual promiscuity that Sundance Film Festival regularly brings to Utah, it seems similarly indecent that Utah’s major economic development agencies basically endorsed the event: providing “critical support” to the festival as a “global branding” opportunity, and being listed under the event’s “Corporate Support” banner.

The institute’s president Paul Mero says that the organization is opposed to all corporate subsidies. From an economic position — and one of fairness — this makes sense. As Matt has written, subsidies that favor one type of business lead to inefficient investment thereby decreasing economic growth. When Utah policymakers tout the economic benefits that the festival brings to the state, they are ignoring that the festival would likely be held in Park City for its scenic location without a subsidy and the unseen costs of directing taxpayer resources away from what they would otherwise be invested in.

In this case of subsidized art, however, those receiving the subsidies should be as wary as the taxpayers providing them. No one at the Sutherland Institute has suggested placing restrictions on the content of the films allowed at Sundance, rather they object to their tax dollars supporting supporting a film festival, and one that contains films some may find offensive at that. But in many other cases, public funding for art breeds censorship.

In 2010, the Smithsonian’s National Portrait Gallery famously removed a video by David Wojnarowicz which had been a part of an exhibit called Hide/Seek in response to conservative groups and the Catholic League which described the work as  as “designed to insult and inflict injury and assault the sensibilities of Christians.” Understandably, these groups protested their tax dollars being spent on art they found offensive, but just as understandably artists participating in the exhibit objected to government censorship of their colleague’s work. In reaction, AA Bronson asked the National Portrait Gallery to remove his work in protest, but his request was denied by the museum.

The many examples of censorship of government-funded art and art museums provide compelling reasons for art and state to remain separate, both to protect taxpayers and economic growth along with artists’ freedom of expression.

Opportunity for States to Protect Land Use

This post originally appeared at Market Urbanism, a blog about free market solutions to urban development challenges.

If this season’s political campaign rhetoric has demonstrated anything, it’s that governors love to take credit for job creation. What I haven’t seen any governor mention, though, is that there is huge opportunity for economic growth in relaxing zoning codes. Most obviously, allowing new opportunities for infill development will create construction jobs. More significantly though, in the long run, cities allow for faster economic growth (and job growth) than other locations.

The regulations that prevent cities from growing keep economic progress below what it otherwise would be. While researchers disagree over whether population density or total population is the variable that is most significantly correlated with economic growth, either way zoning plays an important role in holding back job growth, providing policymakers who are willing to deregulate with opportunities to improve their competitive standings next to other cities.

Political incentives stand in the way of this growth opportunity, however. Most zoning restrictions benefit a city’s current residents at the expense of potential residents. For example, minimum lot size requirements serve to raise the price of homes, preventing low-income people from moving into neighborhoods that current residents wish to keep exclusive. By changing this current order, policymakers risk losing the support of their homeowning constituents, and interest likely to be better organized than renters and potential city residents. Limitations on housing supply raise the value of existing homes, artificially raising the value of residents’ assets, which homeowners strongly fight to protect.

At the local level, policymakers are therefore incentivized to privilege homeowners’ interests at the expense of broad economic growth. At the state level however, the incentives may be different, such that economic growth may benefit state policymakers more than protecting home values. State policymakers have constituents who live in a wide variety of municipalities, some where land use restrictions are less binding in some than others. Additionally, homeowners will face greater challenges in organizing to support artificially propping up home values at the state level compared to the municipal level. State policymakers could therefore benefit themselves by setting limits on the how much municipalities are permitted to restrict development. Importantly, limiting the degree to which municipalities can restrict development does not force density; rather, it allows developers to provide more density if residents demand it.

California legislators considered a bill of this model earlier this year which would have limited cities’ abilities to set parking requirements in neighborhoods where transit is widely available. As Stephen explained, this bill came under criticism from both the American Planning Association and the Reason Foundation, both citing the need for local control of land use. However, this misses the key role of higher level governments within a federalism model.

After the Supreme Court decided in Kelo v. City of New London that municipalities have the power to use eminent domain for economic development, 44 states adopted amendments to protect their citizens from eminent domain for non-public use to various degrees. States did not have this type of reaction to Euclid v. Ambler, which set the precedent allowing cities to create zoning codes, but there is nothing stopping them from setting limits on cities’ zoning power now.  Federal and state governments have a role to set a floor of freedom for all of their residents, which gives states an opportunity to set limits on how much their municipalities can restrict land use.

A Congressional Cookie Jar with Oak Tree Roots: The Economic Development Administration

David Bier of the Competitive Enterprise Institute makes the case in a recent paper for the abolition of the Economic Development Administration. The history of the EDA is tied into the programs of the Great Society which spawned many fiscal and programmatic connections between federal, state and local agencies with the ostensible aim of spurring local economic improvement (e.g.The Community Development Block Grant). Fifty years on and these programs haven’t lived up to the grandiose mission statements of their architects. The EDA is part of the framework through which stimulus dollars flowed and Bier’s article underscores the key objections to the application of federal dollars to local economic development.

Interestingly, the EDA has been the subject of several academic studies over the years. The classic public administration book, Implementation, by Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky undertook an early case study of the EDA in Oakland, California with its inaugural goal of hiring long-term unemployed minorities. They conclude that while advocates had “great expectations” the program produced meager results with impulsive project choices and cost overruns. The cause, the authors postulated, was a delay in implementation and cumbersome bureaucracy.

Pressman and Wildavsky seem to have documented a familiar tale of public choice theory: the malincentives present in bureaucracies and tendency toward inefficiency. Their classic book on programmatic breakdown has touched off another debate recently in the literature centered around the question, “What ever happened to the study of policy implementation?” An intellectual dead-end was encountered according to deLeon and deLeon which can be revitalized by considering policy implementation not from the top-down but from the ground-up.

Pressman and Wildavsky sliced into their analysis in keeping with the dominant theories of the time. They view the EDA in a top-down fashion – as a single federal programmatic entity acting on subordinate levels of state and local government. Since their 1973 classic, advances made by Vincent and Elinor Ostrom and others point to the fruitfulness of thinking in terms of polycentric rather than monocentric orders. That is, to consider policies in horizontal instead of vertical terms. Map out the multiple decision nodes that connect government, marketplace and community.

B. Guy Peters in his article, Implementation Structures as Institutions, notes that in the last decade, the public administration literature now strives to make just such connections in understanding how policies are implemented. It’s an important advance which allows for a more complex and nuanced picture of the effects of programs. Such analysis may help answer one perennial question: how is it that small-budget, experimental programs inspired by mid-century economic theories grow deep roots and resist any kind of reform, alteration or pruning for generations?

When we consider federal spending programs and trace their effects we often see the fleeting connections and feel a sense of unease. A former EDA administrator calls the program, “A Congressional Cookie Jar.” From his vantage point the program is an expense account for politicians to sprinkle federal dollars on their districts. But as EDA grants are scattered among municipal governments, what else happens along the way? How do constituencies coalesce? Who benefits and who loses? Where do the dollars go and how are connections forged between private, non-profit and public sector actors. Metaphorically speaking, how did a single-shot grant in the mid-1960s become an oak forest?

Undermining Competition is No Way to Compete

Money is tight for state and local governments, and that’s never more obvious than when lawmakers work to finalize budgets before the new fiscal year starts on July 1. A common priority for lawmakers, particularly in the revenue department, is to bring new business to the state. That’s why various state economic development websites claim to offer would-be-entrepreneurs the perfect set of enticements to start or expand one’s businesses.

Even on the national stage, President Obama frequently cites the need to compete with India and China in calling for more spending (or, to use his preferred phrase, “more investment”). Unfortunately, politicians often believe that the way to out-compete other governments is to undermine genuine competition at home by offering some firms and industries an uncompetitive edge.

This week, for example, the D.C. Council unanimously voted to give the daily deal company, LivingSocial, a $32,500,000 get-out-of-tax free card. Two years ago, the state of Illinois offered LivingSocial rival, Groupon, a similar though less-lucrative deal: $3,500,000 in state funds to hire 250 employees. In some industries, these types of special deals are business as usual. Film production companies, for example, can get special tax treatment in 40 out of 50 states. In Virginia, film production companies pay no sales tax on production-related products and are allowed refundable individual and corporate income tax credits. Needless to say, Virginia companies in other lines of work aren’t so lucky.

Interestingly, these types of deals are as likely to be opposed by progressives as they are to be opposed by market-oriented economists. In 2010, the left-leaning Center on Budget and Policy Priorities released a report that was critical of film subsidies. The author argued:

Like a Hollywood fantasy, claims that tax subsidies for film and TV productions — which nearly every state has adopted in recent years — are cost-effective tools of job and income creation are more fiction than fact. In the harsh light of reality, film subsidies offer little bang for the buck.

I couldn’t agree more. Back in March, I also found myself largely agreeing with the left-of-center D.C. Fiscal Policy Institute’s Ed Lazere, as we both lambasted government business incentives on the Kojo Nnamdi Show.

Though special deals for particular firms or industries are often sold in the name of competition, they are exceedingly anti-competitive. When one firm or one industry obtains a privilege from government, it obtains a measure of monopoly power. While the profits of the firm go up, so do the prices that consumers pay. And while it is harder to quantify, would-be competitors who aren’t so lucky to have government’s favor also lose. But that’s not all. Privileged firms tend to offer lower-quality products and they tend to be less-attentive to cost-cutting. Then there is the social waste associated with obtaining privileges: each year, firms expend millions of dollars on lobbying and other political activity in an attempt to obtain privilege. At the societal level, privileges undermine long-run growth and may even lead to short-term macroeconomic instability. Government-granted privileges are often dispensed on the basis of personal connection rather than merit. This, in turn, can undermine the legitimacy of both the public and the private sector. In a new paper, out soon, I document these and other problems with government-granted privilege.

There is nothing wrong with a government and its leaders attempting to compete with other governments. But the best way to compete is to offer a sound, economically free, environment in which any firm that creates value for its customers is free to prosper. It is a good indication that a government has failed to create such an environment if it feels the need to suspend or otherwise alter the rules of the game for certain favored firms and industries.