Tag Archives: gulf coast

Post-Katrina HUD funding has underwhelmed in Gulfport

Hurricane Katrina made landfall 10 years ago and devastated much of the gulf coast. In the immediate aftermath of the storm, both public and private aid flooded into the effected areas. Not all of this aid was effective, and my colleagues at the Mercatus Center have meticulously analyzed what worked, what didn’t, and how the region was largely able to get back on its feet.

One project that is still being scrutinized is the Port of Gulfport Restoration Program. In 2007 the Mississippi Development Authority (MDA) requested that $567 million of federal Housing and Urban Development (HUD) funds be diverted to the newly created Port of Gulfport Restoration Program. Prior to Katrina there were 2,058 direct maritime jobs at the port, and the 2007 plan submitted to HUD projected that there would be 5,400 direct, indirect, and induced jobs once the restoration project was complete in 2015. In return for the money the administrators promised HUD that at least 1,300 jobs would be created, and HUD Secretary Julian Castro was recently in Gulfport to check on the progress that has been made. As is typical with HUD projects, the actual progress on the ground has not lived up to the hype.

In September of 2014, nine years after Katrina, the port employed only 814 people. This was well short of even the 2,348 jobs predicted by 2010 in the original 2007 plan. Ignoring the fact that jobs are a poor metric for judging economic development – labor is a cost, not a benefit – the project has failed to live up to the promise made to federal taxpayers who are footing the bill.

HUD funding has a long history of failure. Billions of HUD money has poured into cities such as Detroit and Cleveland since the 1970s with little to show for it. Moreover, any successful HUD story is really just the result of transferring economic activity from one place to another. The $570 million being spent in Gulfport came from taxpayers all over the country who could have spent that money on other things. Moving all of that money to Gulfport caused small declines in economic activity all over the country, such as less investment in local businesses and/or lower demand for local goods and services. These small declines are hard to see relative to the big splash that $570 million in spending creates, but they are real and they do affect people.

Large, federal spending projects rarely live up to their hype and usually waste resources. Local citizens using local assets are often much more effective at revitalizing devastated communities. There are lessons to be learned from Hurricane Katrina, and at the top of the list is don’t expect too much from federally funded programs – they are usually not up to the challenge.

Shortfalls in non-profit disaster rebuilding

This post originally appeared at Market Urbanism, a blog about free-market urban development.

After receiving years of praise for its work in post-Katrina recovery, Brad Pitt’s home building organization, Make It Right, is receiving some media criticism. At the New Republic, Lydia Depillis points out that the Make It Right homes built in the Lower Ninth Ward have resulted in scarce city dollars going to this neighborhood with questionable results. While some residents have been able to return to the Lower Ninth Ward through non-profit and private investment, the population hasn’t reached the level necessary to bring the commercial services to the neighborhood that it needs to be a comfortable place to live.

After Hurricane Katrina, the Mercatus Center conducted extensive field research in the Gulf Coast, interviewing people who decided to return and rebuild in the city and those who decided to permanently relocate. They discussed the events that unfolded immediately after the storm as well as the rebuilding process. They interviewed many people in the New Orleans neighborhood surrounding the Mary Queen of Vietnam Church. This neighborhood rebounded exceptionally well after Hurricane Katrina, despite experiencing some of the city’s worst flooding 5-12-feet-deep and being a low-income neighborhood. As Emily Chamlee-Wright and Virgil Storr found [pdf]:

Within a year of the storm, more than 3,000 residents had returned [of the neighborhood’s 4,000 residents when the storm hit]. By the summer of 2007, approximately 90% of the MQVN residents were back while the rate of return in New Orleans overall remained at only 45%. Further, within a year of the storm, 70 of the 75 Vietnamese-owned businesses in the MQVN neighborhood were up and running.

Virgil and Emily attribute some of MQVN’s rebuilding success to the club goods that neighborhood residents shared. Club goods share some characteristics with public goods in that they are non-rivalrous — one person using the pool at a swim club doesn’t impede others from doing so — but club goods are excludable, so that non-members can be banned from using them. Adam has written about club goods previously, using the example of mass transit. The turnstile acts as a method of exclusion, and one person riding the subway doesn’t prevent other passengers from doing so as well. In the diagram below, a subway would fall into the “Low-congestion Goods” category:

club goods

In the case of MQVN, the neighborhood’s sense of community and shared culture provided a club good that encouraged residents to return after the storm. The church provided food and supplies to the first neighborhood residents to return after the storm. Church leadership worked with Entergy, the city’s power company, to demonstrate that the neighborhood had 500 residents ready to pay their bills with the restoration of power, making them one of the city’s first outer neighborhoods to get power back after the storm.

While resources have poured into the Lower Ninth Ward from outside groups in the form of $400,000 homes from Make It Right $65 million  in city money for a school, police station, and recreation center, the neighborhood has not seen the success that MQVN achieved from the bottom up. This isn’t to say that large non-profits don’t have an important role to play in disaster recovery. Social entrepreneurs face strong incentives to work well toward their objectives because their donors hold them accountable and they typically are involved in a cause because of their passion for it. Large organizations from Wal-Mart to the American Red Cross provided key resources to New Orleans residents in the days and months after Hurricane Katrina.

The post-Katrina success of MQVN relative to many other neighborhoods in the city does demonstrates the effectiveness of voluntary cooperation at the community level and the importance of bottom-up participation for long-term neighborhood stability. While people throughout the city expressed their love for New Orleans and desire to return in their conversations with Mercatus interviewers, many faced coordination problems in their efforts to rebuild. In the case of MQVN, club goods and voluntary cooperation permitted the quick and near-complete return of residents.

Hurricane Season Begins

Today is the first day of the 2010 hurricane season, which NOAA predicts will be more active than usual, with 14 to 23 named storms. (In fairness, NOAA has been way off the mark in recent years, to the relief of the residents of the Gulf and Atlantic coasts.)

The Mercatus Center’s Gulf Coast Recovery Project has put out over 50 studies since 2005 looking at the rebuilding of the Gulf Coast after Hurricane Katrina. Below are links to eight studies that state and local policy makers may find useful today and in the coming months.

  • A Policy Maker’s Guide to Effective Disaster Preparedness and Response. In the years since Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast region of the United States, scholars, policy makers, and concerned citizens have been working to understand what exactly went wrong in the response to the event and how better to prepare for future natural disasters. Post-Katrina New Orleans presents a unique opportunity to study how and how not to undertake the rebuilding of a major population center after such a catastrophe. Proper study of this subject, if conducted objectively and rigorously, will not only save other communities countless dollars but will also save lives.
  • Building a Safe Port in the Storm: Public vs Private Choices in Hurricane Mitigation. This Policy Comment analyzes the connection between hurricane mitigation and insurance. As many people fail to purchase government-subsidized flood and earthquake insurance, some researchers argue that market failure explains the lack of mitigation. But empirical evidence shows that markets do value natural hazards risks, including hurricane mitigation, and thus the case for market failure has been overstated.
  • The Entrepreneur’s Role in Post-Disaster Community Recovery. This Policy Primer recommends that in the aftermath of a disaster, government relax non-disaster regulations in order to allow entrepreneurs, who are in the best position to assess local conditions and needs in the rapidly changing, post-disaster environment, to step in and quickly respond to the community’s needs.
  • The Road Home: Helping Homeowners in the Gulf Post-Katrina. This comment explores Road Home’s policy goals and design, placing them in the context of the destruction wrought by the hurricanes and the role of insurance and government before and after a disaster. It then contrasts Road Home’s goals and design with the policy goals and design of Mississippi’s Homeowner Assistance Program.
  • Disastrous Uncertainty: How Government Disaster Policy Undermines Community Rebound. This Policy Comment looks at the ways in which public policy has had negative unintended consequences on the ability of communities to make informed decisions about sustainable rebuilding after Hurricane Katrina.  Based on fieldwork, the authors explain why social capital and signals generated by market and civil interactions are important to recovery efforts and how policy makers can encourage rather than retard grassroots rebuilding efforts.
  • Making Hurricane Response More Effective: Lessons from the Private Sector and the Coast Guard During Katrina. Many assume that the only viable option for emergency response and recovery from a natural disaster is one that is centrally directed. However, highlighted by the poor response from the federal government and the comparatively effective response from private retailers and the Coast Guard after Hurricane Katrina, this assumption seems to be faulty. Big box retailers such as Wal-Mart were extraordinarily successful in providing help to damaged communities in the days, weeks, and months after the storm. This Policy Comment provides a framework for understanding why private retailers and the Coast Guard mounted an effective response in the Gulf Coast region.
  • Ensuring Disaster: State Insurance Regulation, Coastal Development, and Hurricanes. This policy comment examines how state insurance regulation affects societal vulnerability to hurricanes. States provide insurance for high-risk properties at below market rates primarily through insurance pools. Seven states, including Louisiana and Mississippi, have wind pools, with over 1.8 million policies and a total liability of over $500 billion as of early 2007. Wind pools are financed, in part, through additional charges on other citizens’ premiums throughout the state to cover excess losses from hurricanes. State guaranty funds, which ensure payment of claims of insolvent insurers, also subsidize high-risk properties.

For more information about these studies or to request hard copies, feel free to email me using the link here.

Haiti’s Road Home: Rebuilding Lessons from the Gulf Coast

The Louisiana Road Home program was established to provide up to $150,000 for homeowners rebuilding in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Almost 5 years after the hurricane devastated the Gulf Coast, the Louisiana Recovery Authority estimates that one third of grant recipients have yet to rebuild and return home. Why? Garett Jones and Neighborhood Effects blogger Daniel Rothschild offered a few reasons last year in Forbes:

While initially designed to rapidly provide rebuilding assistance to residents, [the Road Home program] was loaded down with caveats and clauses meant to engineer a particular rebuilding plan, rather than allow the rebuilding to emerge spontaneously. Government rules became government direction, and private decision making was shoved into the back corner….

The biggest problem with Road Home was that it caused people to wait for promised federal help, and indeed, some people are still waiting. The initial promise of quick and easy government assistance combined with inept program administration and a 57-step application process mean that even [nearly five] years after Katrina, thousands of homeowners are still waiting for their checks…. So government action delayed private action and government plans crowded out local solutions.

Haiti — and the international commission that will direct its reconstruction — should heed lessons from the Gulf Coast recovery.

Yet development economist Jeffrey Sachs, like many other experts, advocates a centralized reconstruction strategy for the country. “There should be one overarching framework. There should be one major multi-donor bank account to finance the heavy outlays required for Haiti’s recovery. There should be a highly professional executive team co-ordinating the international support efforts.”

The Interim Haiti Recovery Commission grants Sach’s wish. It will determine which reconstruction projects deserve funding and then disperse the $9.9 billion pledged by donors. But it must beware entangling Haitians in obstacles that plagued Gulf Coast rebuilders — crowding out of local solutions, creating bureaucratic red tape that delays recovery, and unintentionally encouraging inaction as citizens wait for government or international panaceas.

Evidence from the Road Home program suggests that the federal government’s Katrina recovery strategy encouraged residents to battle for grants rather than innovate creative solutions to overcome their challenges. The international community’s reconstruction strategy in Haiti must avoid doing the same.

Fishing for Property Rights

As oil continues to spill into the Gulf or Mexico, the states around the slick face many tragic consequences including damage to ocean life, the threat of oil washing onto land, and lost tourism.

One of the greatest economic effects will come from damage to the area’s seafood industry. Market Watch reports:

“Looking back at the Exxon Valdez spill, there were significant fishery declines,” said Jackie Savitz, a senior scientist at Oceana, an environmental advocacy group. “There is no question that fishery populations are going to be set back.”

She noted that fish larvae are especially susceptible to oil and that the Gulf is a breeding ground for some of the country’s most commercially valuable species, including bluefin tuna, grouper and snapper.

While an unprecedented supply shock like the BP spill would hurt any industry, Gulf Coast fisheries were in an unenviable position before disaster struck.

The lack of property rights in these fisheries left the area highly susceptible to a Tragedy of the Commons. Without being able to profit from the long-term health of a fishery, fishermen have incentives to overfish in the present.  Gulf Coast fishing is currently regulated primarily by Individual Fishing Quotas, a blunt tool which relies on government command and control rather than market incentives to preserve fisheries.

While oceans often suffer from the Tragedy of the Commons, Elinor Ostrom’s Nobel Prize for her work on common pool resources reminds us that there are solutions.

In Fencing the Fishery, Donald R. Leal explains the importance of allowing commercial fishermen to have a stock in a population’s long-term health, aligning profit incentives with the preservation of fisheries.  Gulf Coast regulators should allow for such market-based solutions to help the region’s economy recover.

Assorted Links

State budget cuts mean prison shutdowns — 17 prsions to be shutdown throughout the U.S. in FY 2010

Will Rhode Island criminalize “indoor prostitution?”

Crazy ants spread through the Gulf Coast

Massachusetts experiences first wave of jobless workers with exhausted benefits — 2,500 workers lose aid

Women in Connecticut boost gun sales —  90 percent increase in gun permits between January and May

New Publication on Gulf Coast Recovery

lk37Today the Mercatus Center released the second edition of our Local Knowledge series focusing on the rebuilding of the Gulf Coast after Hurricane Katrina.

Caring Communities: The Role of Nonprofits in Rebuilding the Gulf Coast focuses on the role that social entrepreneurs and nonprofit groups are playing in leading the recovery.

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