Tag Archives: Indiana

City population dynamics since 1850

The reason why some cities grow and some cities shrink is a heavily debated topic in economics, sociology, urban planning, and public administration. In truth, there is no single reason why a city declines. Often exogenous factors – new modes of transportation, increased globalization, institutional changes, and federal policies – initiate the decline while subsequent poor political management can exacerbate it. This post focuses on the population trends of America’s largest cities since 1850 and how changes in these factors affected the distribution of people within the US.

When water transportation, water power, and proximity to natural resources such as coal were the most important factors driving industrial productivity, businesses and people congregated in locations near major waterways for power and shipping purposes. The graph below shows the top 10 cities* by population in 1850 and follows them until 1900. The rank of the city is on the left axis.

top cities 1850-1900

 

* The 9th, 11th, and 12th ranked cities in 1850 were all incorporated into Philadelphia by 1860. Pittsburgh was the next highest ranked city (13th) that was not incorporated so I used it in the graph instead.

All of the largest cities were located on heavily traveled rivers (New Orleans, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis) or on the coast and had busy ports (New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Brooklyn, and Baltimore). Albany, NY may seem like an outlier but it was the starting point of the Erie Canal.

As economist Ed Glaeser (2005) notes “…almost every large northern city in the US as of 1860 became an industrial powerhouse over the next 60 years as factories started in central locations where they could save transport costs and make use of large urban labor forces.”

Along with waterways, railroads were an important mode of transportation from 1850 – 1900 and many of these cities had important railroads running through them, such as the B&O through Balitmore and the Erie Railroad in New York. The increasing importance of railroads impacted the list of top 10 cities in 1900 as shown below.

top cities 1900-1950

A similar but not identical set of cities dominated the urban landscape over the next 50 years. By 1900, New Orleans, Brooklyn (merged with New York) Albany, and Pittsburgh were replaced by Chicago, Cleveland, Buffalo, and San Francisco. Chicago, Cleveland, and Buffalo are all located on the Great Lakes and thus had water access, but it was the increasing importance of railroad shipping and travel that helped their populations grow. Buffalo was on the B&O railroad and was also the terminal point of the Erie Canal. San Francisco became much more accessible after the completion of the Pacific Railroad in 1869, but the California Gold Rush in the late 1840s got its population growth started.

As rail and eventually automobile/truck transportation became more important during the early 1900s, cities that relied on strategic river locations began to decline. New Orleans was already out of the top 10 by 1900 (falling from 5th to 12th) and Cincinnati went from 10th in 1900 to 18th by 1950. Buffalo also fell out of the top 10 during this time period, declining from 8th to 15th. But despite some changes in the rankings, there was only one warm-weather city in the top 10 as late as 1950 (Los Angeles). However, as the next graphs shows there was a surge in the populations of warm-weather cities during the period from 1950 to 2010 that caused many of the older Midwestern cities to fall out of the rankings.

top cities 1950-2010

The largest shakeup in the population rankings occurred during this period. Out of the top 10 cities in 1950, only 4 (Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York) were still in the top 10 in 2010 (All were in the top 5, with Houston – 4th in 2010 – being the only city not already ranked in the top 10 in 1950, when it was 14th). The cities ranked 6 – 10 fell out of the top 20 while Detroit declined from 5th to 18th. The large change in the rankings during this time period is striking when compared to the relative stability of the earlier time periods.

Economic changes due to globalization and the prevalence of right-to-work laws in the southern states, combined with preferences for warm weather and other factors have resulted in both population and economic decline in many major Midwestern and Northeastern cities. All of the new cities in the top ten in 2010 have relatively warm weather: Phoenix, San Antonio, San Diego, Dallas, and San Jose. Some large cities missing from the 2010 list – particularly San Francisco and perhaps Washington D.C. and Boston as well – would probably be ranked higher if not for restrictive land-use regulations that artificially increase housing prices and limit population growth. In those cities and other smaller cities – primarily located in Southern California – low population growth is a goal rather than a result of outside forces.

The only cold-weather cities that were in the top 15 in 2014 that were not in the top 5 in 1950 were Indianapolis, IN (14th) and Columbus, OH (15th). These two cities not only avoided the fate of nearby Detroit and Cleveland, they thrived. From 1950 to 2014 Columbus’ population grew by 122% and Indianapolis’ grew by 99%. This is striking compared to the 57% decline in Cleveland and the 63% decline in Detroit during the same time period.

So why have Columbus and Indianapolis grown since 1950 while every other large city in the Midwest has declined? There isn’t an obvious answer. One thing among many that both Columbus and Indianapolis have in common is that they are both state capitals. State spending as a percentage of Gross State Product (GSP) has been increasing since 1970 across the country as shown in the graph below.

OH, IN state spending as per GSP

In Ohio state spending growth as a percentage of GSP has outpaced the nation since 1970. It is possible that increased state spending in Ohio and Indiana is crowding out private investment in other parts of those states. And since much of the money collected by the state ends up being spent in the capital via government wages, both Columbus and Indianapolis grow relative to other cities in their respective states.

There has also been an increase in state level regulation over time. As state governments become larger players in the economy business leaders will find it more and more beneficial to be near state legislators and governors in order to lobby for regulations that help their company or for exemptions from rules that harm it. Company executives who fail to get a seat at the table when regulations are being drafted may find that their competitors have helped draft rules that put them at a competitive disadvantage. The decline of manufacturing in the Midwest may have created an urban reset that presented firms and workers with an opportunity to migrate to areas that have a relative abundance of an increasingly important factor of production – government.

We don’t need more federal infrastructure spending

Many of the presidential candidates on both sides of the aisle have expressed interest in fixing America’s infrastructure, including Donald Trump, Hilary Clinton, and Bernie Sanders. All of them claim that America’s roads and bridges are crumbling and that more money, often in the form of tax increases, is needed before they fall into further disrepair.

The provision of basic infrastructure is one of the most economically sound purposes of government. Good roads, bridges, and ports facilitate economic transactions and the exchange of ideas which helps foster innovation and economic growth. There is certainly room to debate which level of government – federal, state, or local – should provide which type of infrastructure, but I want to start by examining US infrastructure spending over time. To hear the candidates talk one would think that infrastructure spending has fallen of a cliff. What else could explain the current derelict state?

A quick look at the data shows that this simply isn’t true. A 2015 CBO report on public spending on transportation and water infrastructure provides the following figure.

CBO us infrastructure spending

In inflation adjusted dollars (the top panel) infrastructure spending has exhibited a positive trend and was higher on average post 1992 after the completion of the interstate highway system. (By the way, the original estimate for the interstate system was $25 billion over 12 years and it ended up costing $114 billion over 35 years.)

The bottom panel shows that spending as a % of GDP has declined since the early 80s, but it has never been very high, topping out at approximately 6% in 1965. Since the top panel shows an increase in the level of spending, the decline relative to GDP is due to the government increasing spending in other areas over this time period, not cutting spending on infrastructure.

The increase in the level of spending over time is further revealed when looking at per capita spending. Using the data from the CBO report and US population data I created the following figure (dollars are adjusted for inflation and are in 2014 dollars).

infrastructure spend per cap

The top green line is total spending per capita, the middle red line is state and local spending with federal grants and loan subsidies subtracted out, and the bottom blue line is federal spending. Federal spending per capita has remained relatively flat while state and local spending experienced a big jump in the late 80s, which increased the total as well. This graph shows that the amount of infrastructure spending has largely increased when adjusted for inflation and population. It’s true that spending is down since the early 2000s but it’s still higher than at any point prior to the early 90s and higher than it was during the 35-year-construction of the interstate highway system.

Another interesting thing that jumps out is that state and local governments provide the bulk of infrastructure spending. The graph below depicts the percentage of total infrastructure spending that is done by state and local governments.

infrastructure spend state, local as percent of total

As shown in the graph state and local spending on infrastructure has accounted for roughly 75% of total infrastructure spending since the late 80s. Prior to that it averaged about 70% except for a dip to around 65% in the late 70s.

All of this data shows that the federal government – at least in terms of spending – has not ignored the country’s infrastructure over the last 50 plus years, despite the rhetoric one hears from the campaign trail. In fact, on a per capita basis total infrastructure spending has increased since the early 1980s, driven primarily by state and local governments.

And this brings up a second important point: state and local governments are and have always been the primary source of infrastructure spending. The federal government has historically played a small role in building and maintaining roads, bridges, and water infrastructure. And for good reason. As my colleague Veronique de Rugy has pointed out :

“…infrastructure spending by the federal government tends to suffer from massive cost overruns, waste, fraud, and abuse. As a result, many projects that look good on paper turn out to have much lower return on investments than planned.”

As evidence she notes that:

“According to the Danish researchers, American cost overruns reached on average $55 billion per year. This figure includes famous disasters like the Central Artery/Tunnel Project (CA/T), better known as the Boston Big Dig.22 By the time the Beantown highway project—the most expensive in American history—was completed in 2008 its price tag was a staggering $22 billion. The estimated cost in 1985 was $2.8 billion. The Big Dig also wrapped up 7 years behind schedule.”

Since state and local governments are doing the bulk of the financing anyway and most infrastructure is local in nature it is best to keep the federal government out as much as possible. States are also more likely to experiment with private methods of infrastructure funding. As de Rugy points out:

“…a number of states have started to finance and operate highways privately. In 1995, Virginia opened the Dulles Greenway, a 14-mile highway, paid for by private bond and equity issues. Similar private highway projects have been completed, or are being pursued, in California, Maryland, Minnesota, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas. In Indiana, Governor Mitch Daniels leased the highways and made a $4 billion profit for the state’s taxpayers. Consumers in Indiana were better off: the deal not only saved money, but the quality of the roads improved as they were run more efficiently.”

It remains an open question as to exactly how much more money should be devoted to America’s infrastructure. But even if the amount is substantial it’s not clear that the federal government needs to get any more involved than they already are. Infrastructure is largely a state and local issue and that is where the taxing and spending should take place, not in Washington D.C.

 

 

Should Illinois be Downgraded? Credit Ratings and Mal-Investment

No one disputes that Illinois’s pension systems are in seriously bad condition with large unfunded obligations. But should this worry Illinois bondholders? New Mercatus research by Marc Joffe of Public Sector Credit Solutions finds that recent downgrades of Illinois’s bonds by credit ratings agencies aren’t merited. He models the default risk of Illinois and Indiana based on a projection of these states’ financial position. These findings are put in the context of the history of state default and the role the credit ratings agencies play in debt markets. The influence of credit ratings agencies in this market is the subject a guest blog post by Marc today at Neighborhood Effects.

Credit Ratings and Mal-Investment

by Marc Joffe

Prices play a crucial role in a market economy because they provide signals to buyers and sellers about the availability and desirability of goods. Because prices coordinate supply and demand, they enabled the market system to triumph over Communism – which lacked a price mechanism.

Interest rates are also prices. They reflect investor willingness to delay consumption and take on risk. If interest rates are manipulated, serious dislocations can occur. As both Horwitz and O’Driscoll have discussed, the Fed’s suppression of interest rates in the early 2000s contributed to the housing bubble, which eventually gave way to a crash and a serious financial crisis.

Even in the absence of Fed policy errors, interest rate mispricing is possible. For example, ahead of the financial crisis, investors assumed that subprime residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) were less risky than they really were. As a result, subprime mortgage rates did not reflect their underlying risk and thus too many dicey borrowers received home loans. The ill effects included a wave of foreclosures and huge, unexpected losses by pension funds and other institutional investors.

The mis-pricing of subprime credit risk was not the direct result of Federal Reserve or government intervention; instead, it stemmed from investor ignorance. Since humans lack perfect foresight, some degree of investor ignorance is inevitable, but it can be minimized through reliance on expert opinion.

In many markets, buyers rely on expert opinions when making purchase decisions. For example, when choosing a car we might look at Consumer Reports. When choosing stocks, we might read investment newsletters or review reports published by securities firms – hopefully taking into account potential biases in the latter case. When choosing fixed income most large investors rely on credit rating agencies.

The rating agencies assigned what ultimately turned out to be unjustifiably high ratings to subprime RMBS. This error and the fact that investors relied so heavily on credit rating agencies resulted in the overproduction and overconsumption of these toxic securities. Subsequent investigations revealed that the incorrect rating of these instruments resulted from some combination of suboptimal analytical techniques and conflicts of interest.

While this error occurred in market context, the institutional structure of the relevant market was the unintentional consequence of government interventions over a long period of time. Rating agencies first found their way into federal rulemaking in the wake of the Depression. With the inception of the FDIC, regulators decided that expert third party evaluations were needed to ensure that banks were investing depositor funds wisely.

The third party regulators chose were the credit rating agencies. Prior to receiving this federal mandate, and for a few decades thereafter, rating agencies made their money by selling manuals to libraries and institutional investors. The manuals included not only ratings but also large volumes of facts and figures about bond issuers.

After mid-century, the business became tougher with the advent of photocopiers. Eventually, rating agencies realized (perhaps implicitly) that they could monetize their federally granted power by selling ratings to bond issuers.

Rather than revoking their regulatory mandate in the wake of this new business model, federal regulators extended the power of incumbent rating agencies – codifying their opinions into the assessments of the portfolios of non-bank financial institutions.

With the growth in fixed income markets and the inception of structured finance over the last 25 years, rating agencies became much larger and more profitable. Due to their size and due to the fact that their ratings are disseminated for free, rating agencies have been able to limit the role of alternative credit opinion providers. For example, although a few analytical firms market their insights directly to institutional investors, it is hard for these players to get much traction given the widespread availability of credit ratings at no cost.

Even with rating agencies being written out of regulations under Dodd-Frank, market structure is not likely to change quickly. Many parts of the fixed income business display substantial inertia and the sheer size of the incumbent firms will continue to make the environment challenging for new entrants.

Regulatory involvement in the market for fixed income credit analysis has undoubtedly had many unintended consequences, some of which may be hard to ascertain in the absence of unregulated markets abroad. One fairly obvious negative consequence has been the stunting of innovation in the institutional credit analysis field.

Despite the proliferation of computer technology and statistical research methods, credit rating analysis remains firmly rooted in its early 20th century origins. Rather than estimate the probability of a default or the expected loss on a credit instruments, rating agencies still provide their assessments in the form of letter grades that have imprecise definitions and can easily be misinterpreted by market participants.

Starting with the pioneering work of Beaver and Altman in the 1960s, academic models of corporate bankruptcy risk have become common, but these modeling techniques have had limited impact on rating methodology.

Worse yet, in the area of government bonds, very little academic or applied work has taken place. This is especially unfortunate because government bond ratings frame the fiscal policy debate. In the absence of credible government bond ratings, we have no reliable way of estimating the probability that any government’s revenue and expenditure policies will lead to a socially disruptive default in the future. Further, in the absence of credible research, there is great likelihood that markets inefficiently price government bond risk – sending confusing signals to policymakers and the general public.

Given these concerns, I am pleased that the Mercatus Center has provided me the opportunity to build a model for Illinois state bond credit risk (as well as a reference model for Indiana). This is an effort to apply empirical research and Monte Carlo simulation techniques to the question of how much risk Illinois bondholders actually face.

While readers may not like my conclusion – that Illinois bonds carry very little credit risk – I hope they recognize the benefits of constructing, evaluating and improving credit models for systemically important public sector entities like our largest states. Hopefully, this research will contribute to a discussion about how we can improve credit rating assessments.

 

 

NYC Taxi Reform Doesn’t Go Far Enough

Next week, New York Governor Cuomo is likely to sign a bill that will marginally increase competition in the NYC cab market. The new rule will allow passengers to hail some livery cars in outer boroughs and add 2,000 additional medallions for yellow cabs with wheelchair access.

Via Flickr user Ian Caldwell

The auction of these medallions  is projected to raise $1 billion. This figure might seem outlandish, but last month two medallions sold at auction for over $1 million. That’s right, it costs $1 million for the right to drive a cab in NYC, not accounting for any of the costs associated with owning and operating the vehicle.

The price tag of these medallions that are sold to the highest bidder demonstrates that in a free market, many more drivers would enter the cab industry. Artificially constraining the supply hurts both consumers and those who are not able to drive a cab because they are unable to purchase a medallion.

Unsurprisingly, the Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade remains strongly opposed to this bill. The increase in the supply of medallions will lower the value of the medallions that cab drivers and larger medallion companies already own. Their lobbying efforts reflect their desire to profit through the political system.

While this increase in the number of medallions available for yellow cabs and allowing some livery cars to be hailed represents a small improvement for New Yorkers, the reform does not go nearly far enough. For real reform, Mayor Bloomberg should look to Indianapolis.

Before Stephen Goldsmith was elected as the city’s mayor in 1991, the number of cabs permitted in Indianapolis was limited to 392. Goldsmith created a Regulatory Study Council whose first project was to reform taxi regulations. The RSC recommended eliminating regulatory barriers to entry and allowing cab drivers and companies to determine their own prices. In a case study of regulatory reform in Indianapolis, Adrian Moore writes:

The main resistance came from existing taxi companies, and initially much of the city and county council sided with them in the name of the “public interest.” However, the support for reform by seniors, the inner city poor, minorities, the Urban League, and the disabled soon brought many of them over to the RSC’s side. The RSC expected little support from Democrats on the council, but the strong support for deregulation from that party’s traditional constituents turned the tide.

Some price controls remain in the Indianapolis taxi market, but the city has seen an increase in supply, a decrease in fares, and an improvement in service. Indianapolis and New York City are of course very different, but the laws of supply, demand, and rent-seeking are the same everywhere. By phasing out the medallion system, New York City would benefit consumers and allow many more people to make a living driving cabs. Medallion owners who have invested in some cases over $1 million in the current system would need to be compensated in some way, but not by continuing to profit at the public’s expense.

Rating State Business Tax Climates

Today the Tax Foundation released its annual State Business Tax Climate Index.

Good tax policy is not just about low rates. The Index’s author, Kail Padgitt, writes:

State lawmakers are always mindful of their states’ business tax climates but they are often tempted to lure business with lucrative tax incentives and subsidies instead of broad-based tax reform. This can be a dangerous proposition.

The public choice pressures that Dr. Padgitt is talking about encourage state policy makers to cut special tax deals for politically-important businesses and to keep rates high for those who are aren’t so well-connected. The Business Tax Climate report is a nice antidote to such thinking:

The goal of the index is to focus lawmakers’ attention on the importance of good tax fundamentals: enacting low tax rates and granting as few deductions, exemptions and credits as possible. This “broad base, low rate” approach is the antithesis of most efforts by state economic development departments who specialize in designing “packages” of short-term tax abatements, exemptions, and other give-aways for prospective employers who have announced that they would consider relocating. Those packages routinely include such large state and local exemptions that resident businesses must pay higher taxes to make up for the lost revenue.

The best climates: South Dakota, Alaska, Wyoming, Nevada, Florida, Montana, New Hampshire, Delaware, Utah and Indiana.

And the worst: New York, California, New Jersey, Connecticut, Ohio, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Rhode Island and North Carolina.

Union Pensions: Next Stop on the Bailout Train?

Senator Bob Casey (D-PA) has a proposal in the works. The “Create Jobs and Save Benefits Act” will bail out private sector union pension plans. The idea is to allow the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, the federal guarantor of private sector pensions, to take over the pension liabilities of companies and dedicate tax dollars to paying them off.

The PBGC was established in 1974 to protect workers from the loss of their pensions. It was supposed to be self-financing through a combination of insurance premiums paid by plan sponsors and returns on pension investments. The PBGC itself is currently insolvent.

The plan being discussed would rescue multi-employer plans jointly run by companies and unions. Moody’s estimates such plans face long-term deficits of $165 billion. Senator Casey’s proposal would cover the most troubled plans including the Teamsters Central State fund.

A pension bailout would be unprecedented. And it opens the door for the bailout of state and local government pension plans, with unfunded liabilities estimated at $3 trillion. When will states begin to run out of assets to meet their obligations? Joshua Rauh estimates Illinois will be the first to run of out pension fund assets in 2018, followed by Indiana, Connecticut and New Jersey in 2019. And that’s assuming an 8% return on investments and 3% revenue growth. In other words, it could be sooner.

Legal Plunder

How does law enforcement finance operations? Increasingly, police departments across the country pay for their activities, equipment and supplies by seizing the assets of people who have never committed a crime. It’s a process called civil forfeiture, and it’s at best, controversial. At worst, it provides direct monetary incentive for states and the federal government to steal property from innocent citizens. Gives a whole new meaning to Bastiat’s “legal plunder.”

Radley Balko explains how civil forfeiture perverts the “protect and serve” motto by introducing a profit motive: Continue reading

Bans in Bars

Last week, two state legislatures voted on smoking bans. The bill in Kansas passed, but a similar bill in Indiana failed. With the new Kansas law, 38 states now restrict smoking in some public places, and 28 states forbid smoking in bars.

Proponents of anti-smoking legislation argue that second-hand smoke is dangerous and that state residents have a right to breathe clean indoor air. While medical evidence demonstrates that in fact second-hand smoke is a risk, these activists ignore that individuals are free not to patronize businesses that allow smoking, and businesses are free to ban smoking if they choose to do so.

A Michigan restaurant owner explains:

“Eleven years ago, there were 2,200 smoke-free restaurants in the state,” Deloney said. “Now there are more than 6,000. That’s a 174 percent increase.

“They know exactly what their customers want,” he said. “It’s not rocket science. To believe that because there is no state law there are no choices for smoke-free dining is ignorant.”

A study conducted by the National Restaurant Association suggests that smoking bans significantly hurt sales for many restaurants. This finding is unsurprising, since presumably restaurants design policies to maximize their profits. If they think that the majority of their profits come from people who prefer non-smoking areas, restaurants would voluntarily adopt such a ban. In Ohio, some taxpayers are disturbed that the state has spent over $2 million to enforce smoking bans in a time of massive state budget shortfalls.

Smoking bans limit options for smokers and profits for those who wish to serve them. A current debate is raging in Brooklyn about whether or not bars should allow parents to bring their babies in. At present, this decision is left up to bar owners and market forces. Hopefully it will not be the next issue taken into the hands of state lawmakers.

States Move to Revoke Tax Exemptions for Charities

Hawaii, Indiana, and Pennsylvania are a few of the states thinking about getting rid of the tax exemptions for non-profits. Steep declines in revenues have prompted states and counties to reconsider breaks for charities. States argue non-profits partake of government services but get a free ride on taxes, while charities claim that they are helping governments by providing services for the needy. Hawaii State Representative Calvin Say believes revoking exemptions for non-profits (as well as other tax-favored groups) could result in $500 to $750 million to help close the state’s $1.2 billion shortfall.

Revoking tax breaks is never popular. As the New York Times reports, the Payment-in-lieu-of-Taxes (PILOT) program used by many local governments evolved as a compromise. In 2005, Harvard and MIT brokered a deal with the city of Cambridge to pay $60 million over 20 years for city services in lieu of making property tax payments. (For more on PILOT programs see this 2006 Mercatus Center study by Frederic Sautet and John Shoaf).

Through tax policy, governments influence charitable activities and giving. The way exemptions are awarded or taken away can cause great controversy. For example, as states go on the hunt for revenues, some organizations, like churches, will remain exempt.

For a discussion of “The Politics of Giving”, see this month’s Reason for an interview with Adam Meyerson, President of The Philanthropy Roundtable.