Tag Archives: Kentucky

Why Do We Get So Much Regulation?

Over the past 60 or 70 years, levels of regulation in the United States have been on the rise by almost any measure. As evidence, in the year 1950 there were only 9,745 pages in the US Code of Federal Regulations. Today that number is over 178,000 pages. There is less information about regulation at the state level, but anecdotal evidence suggests regulation is on the rise there too. For example, the Commonwealth of Kentucky publishes its regulatory code each year in a series of volumes known as the Kentucky Administrative Regulations Service (KARS). These volumes consist of books, each roughly 400 or 500 pages or so in length. In 1975, there were 4 books in the KARS. By 2015, that number had risen to 14 books. There are many different theories as to why so much regulation gets produced, so it makes sense to review some of those theories in order to explain the phenomenon of regulatory accumulation.

Perhaps the most popular theory of regulation is that it exists to advance the public interest. According to this view, well-intended regulators intervene in the marketplace due to “market failures”, which are situations where the market fails to allocate resources optimally. Some common examples of market failures include externalities (cases where third parties are impacted by the transactions involving others), asymmetric information (cases where buyers and sellers possess different levels of information about products being sold), public goods problems (whereby certain items are under-provided or not provided at all by the market), and concentration of industry in the form of monopoly power. When market failure occurs, the idea is that regulators intervene in order to make imperfect markets behave more like theoretically perfect markets.

Other theories of regulation are less optimistic about the motivations of the different participants in the rulemaking process. One popular theory suggests regulators work primarily to help powerful special interest groups, a phenomenon known as regulatory capture. Under this view—commonly associated with the writings of University of Chicago economist George Stigler—regulators fix prices and limit entry into an industry because it benefits the industry being regulated. An example would be how regulators, up until the late 1970s, fixed airline prices above what they would have been in a competitive market.

The interest groups that “capture” regulatory agencies are most often thought to be businesses, but it’s important to remember that agencies can also be captured by other groups. The revolving door between the government and the private sector doesn’t end with large banks. It also extends to nonprofit groups, labor unions, and activist groups of various kinds that also wield significant resources and power.

The “public choice theory” of regulation posits that public officials are primarily self-interested, rather than being focused on advancing the public interest. Under this view, regulators may be most concerned with increasing their own salaries or budgets. Or, they may be focused primarily on concentrating their own power.

It’s also possible that regulators are not nearly so calculating and rational as this. The behavioral public choice theory of regulation suggests regulators behave irrationally in many cases, due to the cognitive limitations inherent in all human beings. A case in point is how regulatory agencies routinely overestimate risks, or try to regulate already very low risks down to zero. There is significant evidence that people, including regulators, tend to overestimate small probability risks, leading to responses that are disproportionate to the expected harm. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency’s evaluations of sites related to the Superfund clean-up project routinely overestimated risks by orders of magnitude. Such overreactions might also be a response to public perceptions, for example in response to high-profile media events, such as following acts of terrorism. If the public’s reactions carry over into the voting booth, then legislation and regulation may be enacted soon after.

One of the more interesting and novel theories as to why we see regulation relates to public trust in institutions. A 2010 paper in the Quarterly Journal of Economics noted that there is a strong correlation between trust in various social institutions and some measures of regulation. The figure below is an example of this relationship, found in the paper.

QJE trust

Trust can relate to public institutions, such as the government, but it also extends to trust in corporations and in our fellow citizens. Interestingly, the authors of the QJE article argue that an environment of low trust and high regulation can be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Low levels of trust, ironically, can lead to more demand for regulation, even when there is little trust in the government. One reason for this might be that people think that giving an untrustworthy government control over private affairs is still superior to allowing unscrupulous businesses to have free rein.

The flip-side of this situation is that in high-trust countries, such as Sweden, the public demands lower levels of regulation and this can breed more trust. So an environment of free-market policies combined with trustworthy businesses can produce good market outcomes, more trust, and this too can be a self-fulfilling, allowing some countries to maintain a “good” equilibrium.

This is concerning for the United States because trust has been on the decline in a whole host of areas. A Gallop survey has been asking questions related to trust in public institutions for several decades. There is a long-term secular decline in Gallup’s broad measure of trust, as evidenced by the figure below, although periodically there are upswings in the measure.

gallup trust

Pew has a similar survey that looks at public trust in the government. Here the decline is even more evident.

pew trust

Given that regulation has been on the rise for decades, a decline in trust in the government, in corporations, and in each other, may be a key reason this is occurring. Of course, it’s possible that these groups are simply dishonest and do not merit public trust. Nonetheless, the US might find itself stuck in a self-fulfilling situation, whereby distrust breeds more government intervention in the economy, worse market outcomes, and even more distrust in the future. Getting out of that kind of situation is not easy. One way might be through education about the institutions that lead to free and prosperous societies, as well as to create a culture whereby corruption and unscrupulous behavior are discouraged.

There are a number of theories that seek to explain why regulation comes about. No theory is perfect, and some theories explain certain situations better than others. Nonetheless, the theories presented here go a long way towards laying out the forces that lead to regulation, even if no one theory can explain all regulation at all times.

More labor market freedom means more labor force participation

The U.S. labor force participation (LFP) rate has yet to bounce back to its pre-recession level. Some of the decline is due to retiring baby-boomers but even the prime-age LFP rate, which only counts people age 25 – 54 and thus less affected by retirement, has not recovered.

Economists and government officials are concerned about the weak recovery in labor force participation. A high LFP rate is usually a sign of a strong economy—people are either working or optimistic about their chances of finding a job. A low LFP rate is often a sign of little economic opportunity or disappointment with the employment options available.

The U.S. is a large, diverse country so the national LFP rate obscures substantial state variation in LFP rates. The figure below shows the age 16 and up LFP rates for the 50 states and the U.S. as a whole (black bar) in 2014. (data)

2014-state-lfp-rates

The rates range from a high of 72.6% in North Dakota to a low of 53.1% in West Virginia. The U.S. rate was 62.9%. Several of the states with relatively low rates are in the south, including Mississippi, Alabama and Arkansas. Florida and Arizona also had relatively low labor force participation, which is not surprising considering their reputations as retirement destinations.

There are several reasons why some states have more labor force participation than others. Demographics is one: states with a higher percentage of people over age 65 and between 16 and 22 will have lower rates on average since people in these age groups are often retired or in school full time. States also have different economies made up of different industries and at any given time some industries are thriving while others are struggling.

Federal and state regulation also play a role. Federal regulation disparately impacts different states because of the different industrial compositions of state economies. For example, states with large energy industries tend to be more affected by federal regulation than other states.

States also tax and regulate their labor markets differently. States have different occupational licensing standards, different minimum wages and different levels of payroll and income taxes among other things. Each of these things alters the incentive for businesses to hire or for people to join the labor market and thus affects states’ LFP rates.

We can see the relationship between labor market freedom and labor force participation in the figure below. The figure shows the relationship between the Economic Freedom of North America’s 2013 labor market freedom score (x-axis) and the 2014 labor force participation rate for each state (y-axis).

lab-mkt-freed-and-lfp-rate

As shown in the figure there is a positive relationship—more labor market freedom is associated with a higher LFP rate on average. States with lower freedom scores such as Mississippi, Kentucky and Alabama also had low LFP rates while states with higher freedom scores such as North Dakota, South Dakota and Virginia had higher LFP rates.

This is not an all-else-equal analysis and other variables—such as demographics and industry composition which I mentioned earlier—also play a role. That being said, state officials concerned about their state’s labor market should think about what they can do to increase labor market freedom—and economic freedom more broadly—in their state.

New Study of Medicaid, Focusing on Kentucky

University of Kentucky Professor of Economics and Mercatus-affiliated scholar John Garen has a new paper on the growth of Medicaid in Kentucky.  It is an enlightening read.  For one thing, I learned that the latest estimates suggest that Medicaid crowds-out private insurance at the rate of 50 to 60 percent (i.e., 5 to 6 out of every 10 new entrants to the program would have obtained private insurance).  The latest estimate, which looks at crowd-out in long-term care insurance, was obtained by Jeffrey Brown and Amy Finkelstein (incidentally, the latter just coauthored a piece that found Medicaid patients tend to be healthier than those without insurance, other things being equal).

I also learned about a number of reforms that have been shown to reduce costs and/or improve patient satisfaction. For example, Arkansas, New Jersey, and Florida have all received waivers to institute “Cash and Counseling” programs for disabled Medicaid recipients.  Under this type of program, enrollees are given a budget for various personal and household Medicaid services.  Then:

[W]ith guidance from a counselor, [they] can select the type, amount, and vendor of the services they purchase.  In other words, they receive a voucher.  Studies of this program indicate it has resulted in high recipient satisfaction, less fraud, and has saved on the use of expensive institutional care.

Here is one such study of the program.

Here is John’s website.

Do pensions affect state borrowing costs?

The Center for Retirement Research at Boston College has published a new brief that looks at the relationship between pension funding and the cost of government borrowing. Recently Moody’s announced it would look at states’ unfunded pension liabilities along with outstanding debt in its evaluations. (When they did so, Moody’s found Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, and Rhode Island topped the list of state indebtedness).

Authors Alicia Munnell, Jean-Pierre Aubry and Laura Quinby have taken a look at Moody’s ratings process and find that the agency puts more emphasis on the state’s management and finances, than on its economy and debt when assigning ratings, thus pension funding is “underweighted.”

A regression analysis tests the extent to which pension funding (percent of the Annual Required Contribution paid) affects the spread between yields on state-issued bonds and Treasury bonds. They find that it does, and that increasing the percent of the annual contribution paid (by one standard deviation) reduces the required interest rate on state-bonds by 3 basis points – a small impact relative to other factors.

The authors conduct another regression to see what effect Moody’s ratings have. They find that Moody’s incorporation of pensions into their analyses hasn’t had a significant impact on bond ratings.

They caution that as pensions become a larger part of state budgets the magnitude of the ARC’s effect on the spread could increase.

Assorted Links

Jeff Dircksen at the National Taxpayers Union writes about a new ranking of state governments:

There’s a new ranking that looks at how well states are run, or in some cases not so well run.  According to its web site, “24/7 Wall St. has completed one of the most comprehensive studies of state financial management ever performed by the mainstream media. It is based on evaluation principles used in the award-winning Best Run States In America ratings published by the Financial World Magazine during the 1990s. These studies were used by state governments to evaluate the efficiency of their own operations. The new 24/7 Wall St. study is meant to help businesses and individuals examine state operation with an unbiased eye.”

Take a look and see how your state does.  Spoiler alert:  Wyoming is the best and Kentucky is the worst.

On an unrelated note, Joe Henchman at the Tax Foundation cautions against the use of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities’ state budget gap data (note: I used this data in my paper on budget gaps—in part because it was timely and because it is so commonly cited). Joe writes:

The number is probably accurate from their methodology, but is ultimately meaningless. Here’s why:

  • A state “budget deficit” is the revenue projected (usually by the Governor’s office) minus hoped-for spending according to some formula, in the initial budget plan. For instance, say a state raised and spent $10 billion this year, but wants to spend $20 billion next year, projecting $11 billion in revenues. Ultimately they settle on spending $11 billion. That state has “closed a $9 billion budget deficit” even though revenues and spending are up from the previous year.
  • The exact method of estimating next year’s spending varies by state, with some starting with last year’s budget while others throw in additional wish list programs. Adding up all the states’ numbers is adding apples and oranges.
  • States must balance their budgets so there really is no cumulative state budget deficit in the end, at least on paper.
  • It’s routine for states to want to spend more than they actually can, at least at first, and having a deficit in the initial plan happens even in flush times. Thus, CBPP’s numbers overestimate the scope of actual state budget deficits.
  • CBPP also presents the deficits as a percent of each state’s general fund. While the general fund is usually the largest and most important part of a state’s budget, in many states it can represent less than half of the total budget. This number thus exaggerates the seriousness of a budget deficit.
  • A budget deficit could exist because of overly ambitious spending plans that are whittled down to reality, overly optimistic revenue projections, fiscal irresponsibility, or structural imbalance. CBPP’s tale of the recession causing everything and federal aid being the only salvation doesn’t fit the facts. For instance, California’s deficit this year includes unpaid bills kicked over from last year, so it’s the same money being double-counted. This irresponsibility is glossed over in CBPP’s report.