Tag Archives: Oregon

A public sector retirement plan for Millennials

According to the Center for Retirement Research, about 52 percent of households are “at risk of not having enough to maintain their living standards in retirement” and that the retirement landscape is making “the outlook for retiring Baby Boomers and Generation Xers far less sanguine than for current retirees.” This growing problem for younger generations is highlighted by the Economic Policy Institute’s finding that almost half of households headed by someone between the ages of 32 and 61 have nothing saved for retirement. A confluence of factors has led to a predicament for millennials as they try to prepare for retirement in a drastically changing job market.

The millennial generation has grown to be an integral part of the workforce, and private sector companies are increasing their efforts to understand what they value most a job. A Deloitte survey reveals that a good work/life balance, opportunities to progress/be leaders, flexibility, and a sense of meaning emerge as the most important factors when evaluating job opportunities. What’s more, millennials are not likely to stick around for a job that doesn’t meet this criteria. The same survey found that if given the choice during the next year, one in four millennials would quit his or her current employer to join a new organization or to do something different.

This flightiness appears to be a characteristic of many young people and to be happening in tandem with, if not contributing to, an increasingly transient job market. This phenomenon, corroborated by other surveys, demonstrates that more and more millennial workers are changing jobs at a higher rate than previous generations. It is not as common to stick with your first or second job until retirement, as it once was for Baby Boomers. The “loyalty challenge” facing companies, paired with changes in technology and culture, has in turn been transforming the landscape of retirement options.

As workers become more transient, companies are forced to provide more portable retirement plan options. During the past two decades, the private sector has done just that by transitioning from offering primarily defined benefit retirement plans to offering more defined contribution plans. This change is to be expected in part because of the flexibility it provides for beneficiaries. Defined contribution plans allow for workers to take their benefits more easily with them from job to job.

The public sector has not quite caught up to this trend. Public sector plans have had much more difficulty staying solvent and much of this is because of the prevalence of defined benefit plans. Mercatus scholars, along with many economists, have long criticized the poor incentive structure of these plans. If these aren’t reason enough for policymakers to offer defined contribution plans in their place, then maybe their changing workforces will.

Much of the debate over growing pension liabilities has focused on whether public sector compensation costs are fair either in comparison to other states or to the private sector. But much less has been said about what is fair across generations.

Most pension reform efforts at the state level target changes in benefits for younger employees while preserving the benefits of older workers. Although this is largely the result of legal and political constraints, such changes have the potential to force younger generations of public-sector workers to shoulder a disproportionate share of the cost of reforms, as their retirement benefits become more uncertain, thus violating a crucial criterion of “intergenerational equity” for pension reform.

Pension experts Robert Novy-Marx and Joshua Rauh reveal in a 2008 study that the intergenerational transfer of pension debt could be quite large. They predict a 50 percent chance of underfunding across the states amounting to more than $750 billion, even before adjusting for risk. In other words, if left alone, the pension bills of today are going to be handed to the generations of tomorrow.

A new Mercatus paper uncovers how similar intergenerational equity issues have developed in the state of Oregon. The author, legal scholar Scott Shepard, writes:

“…the system radically favors (generally older) workers who started before 1996 and 2003, respectively – not just in expected ways, like seniority pay bumps, but in deeply structural ways; earlier-hired employees simply get a significantly better pay-and-benefit package for every minute of their climb up the seniority ladder.”

Oregon’s pension system, along with many other states’ plans, started out offering extremely generous benefits, but as this has grown increasingly unsustainable, the state is being forced to deal with reality and reign in benefits for newer workers.

The unfair retirement landscape that this creates is largely the result of many past poor policy decisions and although this difference in benefits between age groups is far from intentional, how Oregon – and other states in similar positions – responds can be. Changing demographic trends may lend reason for public pension officials to consider moving towards defined contribution plan structures, or at least providing the option.

Shepard strongly urges Oregon to make this shift. He describes a number of benefits; from the perspective of the state, taxpayers, and future generations:

“First, payments must be made when due, rather than being shifted off to future generations. This may seem painful to present taxpayers, but the long-term effect is to ensure a more honest government, in that politicians cannot make promises that their (unrepresented) descendants end up paying for generations later, long after the promisors have reaped the political benefits of making unfunded promises, only to have retired from the scene when payment comes due. This inability to promise now and pay later has a corollary benefit of thwarting the impulse to make extravagant pension promises, as the payments come due immediately, rather than being foisted off on future generations.”

Offering defined contribution plans for workers can provide a more sustainable option that would prevent this equity issue from worsening.

In addition to the accountability and savings that offering a defined contribution option provides, like we have seen demonstrated in Utah and Michigan, this also has the potential to lead to higher worker satisfaction.

With millennials looking to save money for retirement through more portable means, policymakers will want to offer benefits packages that match these preferences. Private sector workers and some public – including Federal and public university – workers lie at the forefront of those benefiting from the defined contribution trend. Most state public plans, however, still fall behind, which has continuing implications for public plan solvency and intergenerational equity.

Are state lotteries good sources of revenue?

By Olivia Gonzalez and Adam A. Millsap

With all the hype about the Powerball jackpot, we decided to look at the benefits and costs of state lotteries from the taxpayer’s perspective. The excitement around yesterday’s drawing is for good reason, with the jackpot reaching $1.5 billion – the largest thus far. But most taxpayers will never benefit from the actual prize money, with odds of winning as low as one in 292.2 million for the jackpot. So if few people will ever hit it big, there must be other benefits for taxpayers to justify the implementation of lotteries, right?

Of the 43 states that implement lotteries, the majority of lottery revenues – about 58% on average – go to awarding prizes. A relatively small proportion (7%) is used to pay for administration costs, such as salaries of government workers and advertising. The remaining category, and the primary purpose of implementing state lotteries, is revenue for government services. On average, about one third of state lottery revenues is directed to state funds for this purpose. The chart below displays the state-level breakdown of lottery revenue for the most recent year that data are available (2013).

lottery sales breakdown

It is surprising that such a small portion of state lottery sales actually make it to state funds, especially considering how much politicians advertise the benefits of state lotteries. A handful of states direct more than 50% of lottery revenues towards state funds: Rhode Island, Delaware, West Virginia, Oregon, and South Dakota. The other 38 states allocate significantly less with Arkansas and Massachusetts contributing the smallest percentage, only 21%.

Many states direct their lottery revenues towards education programs. The largest lottery system, New York’s, usually directs about 30% of their lottery sales to this area. Similarly, Florida’s lottery system transferred about one third of their funds, totaling $1.50 billion, to their Educational Enhancement Trust Fund (EETF) in 2013.

The data presented here are from 2013, so it will be interesting to see how the recent Powerball jackpot revenues will affect lottery revenues more broadly in the future, especially since the Multi-State Lottery Association reduced the odds of winning in October of 2015 in the hope of boosting revenues. State officials argue that reducing the chances of winning allows the prize to grow larger, which increases the demand for tickets and revenue.

The revenue-generating function of state lotteries makes them implicit taxes. The portion of revenue generated from a state lottery that is not used to operate the lottery is just like tax revenue generated from a regular sales or excise tax. So even if lotteries are effective at raising revenue, are they effective tax policy?

Effective tax policy should take into account the tax’s ability to generate revenue as well as its efficiency, equity, transparency, and collectability. Research shows that state lotteries fall short in most of these categories.

The practice of dedicating portions of tax revenue to specific expenditure categories, also known as earmarking, can be detrimental to state budgets. Research that looks specifically at the earmarking of lottery revenues finds that educational expenditures remain unaffected, and sometimes even decline, following the implementation of a state lottery.

This result is due to how earmarking changes the incentives facing politicians. A 1999 study compares the results of lottery revenues directed specifically to fund education with revenues going to a state’s general fund. Patrick Pierce, one of the co-authors, explains that when funds are earmarked for education they go to the intended program but, “instead of adding to the funds for those programs, legislators factor in the lottery revenue and allocate less government money to the program budgets.”

Earmarking also affects total government expenditures, even though from a theoretical perspective it should have little effect since one source of funding is just as good as another. Nevertheless, many empirical studies find the opposite. Mercatus research corroborates this by demonstrating that earmarking tends to result in an increase in total government spending while having little effect on the program expenditures to which the funds are tied. This raises serious transparency concerns because it obscures increases in total government spending that voters may not want.

Last but not least, about four decades of studies have examined lottery tax equity and the majority of them find that lottery sales disproportionately draw from lower-income groups, making them regressive taxes. This only adds to the aforementioned concerns about the transparency, collectability, and revenue raising capabilities of lottery taxes.

Perhaps the effectiveness of lottery taxes can be best summed up by the authors of a 1993 study who wrote that “lotteries as a source of funding are neither efficient nor equitable substitutes for more traditional tax sources.”

Although at least three people walked away with millions of dollars yesterday, many taxpayers are not getting any benefits from their state’s lottery system.

Intergovernmental grant to gelato maker distorts market competition

Intergovernmental grants are grants that are given to one level of government by another e.g. federal to state/local or state to local. In addition to being used on public works and services they also subsidize the development of private goods. The Community Development Block Grant Program (CDBG) is a federally funded grant program that distributes grants and subsidized loans to local and state governments which then use them or award them to other businesses and non-profits. The grants can be used on a variety of projects. Since 1975 the CDBG program has given over $143 billion ($215 billion adjusted for inflation) to state and local governments. The graph below (click to enlarge) shows the total dollars by year adjusted for inflation (2009 dollars) and the number of entitlement grantees by year. While the total amount of funding has declined over time, it was still $2.8 billion in 2014.

cdbg dollars, grantees

Intergovernmental grant programs like CDBG are based on the incorrect idea that moving money around produces economic development and creates a net-positive amount of jobs. But only productive entrepreneurs who create value for consumers can create jobs. The CDBG program and others like it distort the entrepreneurial process and within-industry competition by giving an artificial advantage to the companies that receive grants. This results in more workers and capital flowing into the grant-receiving business rather than their unsubsidized competitors. For example, Brunswick, ME is giving a $350,000 CDBG to Gelato Fiasco to help the company buy new equipment. Meanwhile, nearby competitors Bohemian Coffeehouse, Little Dog Coffee Shop, and Dairy Queen are not receiving any grant money. Governments at all levels, such as Brunswick’s, should not pick winners and losers via a grant process that ultimately favors some constituents over others.

Some other projects that the CDBG program has helped fund are: a soybean processing plant in Arkansas, a new facility for a farmer’s market in Oregon, solar panels for houses in San Diego, and waterfront housing in Burlington, VT. Like the Gelato Fiasco example, these are all examples of private goods, not public, and the production of such goods is best left to the market. If private investors who are subject to market forces are unwilling to produce a private good then it is probably not a worthwhile venture, as the lack of private investment implies that the expected cost exceeds the expected revenue. Private investors and entrepreneurs want to make a profit and the profit incentive promotes wise investments. Governments don’t confront the same profit incentive and this often leads to wasteful spending.

At its best, a government can create the conditions that encourage economic development and job creation: the enforcement of private property rights, a court system to adjudicate disputes, a police force to maintain law and order, and perhaps some basic infrastructure. The scope of a local government should be limited to these tasks.

Are High Taxes on Smokeless Tobacco Encouraging People to Smoke?

President Obama’s recent budget proposal to pay for pre-school programs by increasing cigarette taxes highlights the confusion both on federal and state levels over taxing tobacco products. A recent Mercatus working paper questions the efficiency and utility of sin taxes in general. But even more fundamentally, tobacco tax policy may fail in its primary goal, which is to reduce the health risks of consuming tobacco.

Since the goal of tobacco taxes is to reduce tobacco’s harms by discouraging its use, the tax rates on various tobacco products should be commensurate with their health risks. If smoking carries four times higher cancer risks than using smokeless tobacco, then the tax rates on cigarettes should be four times higher than taxes on, for example, smokeless tobacco. Yet if cigarettes are taxed at a lower rate than this ratio, the policy may in fact encourage tobacco users to smoke as opposed to using less harmful smokeless tobacco.

A health policy that does not encourage riskier tobacco products should set the ratio of smokeless tobacco and cigarette taxes similar to their health risk ratios. According to a recent review of medical studies, snus (a common type of smokeless tobacco) users face considerably lower oral cancer, gastric cancer and cardiovascular disease risks compared to smokers (see Table 1). In addition, other studies found that, unlike smoking, snus does not lead to lung cancer (the table shows the lung cancer risk for nonsmokers compared to smokers). Importantly, snus users do not expose those around them to second hand smoking, further limiting its negative health impacts. Based on the relative health risks, snus taxes should be considerably lower than cigarette taxes.

Table 1. Comparative Health Risks

Health Risk Risk Ratio (Snus users vs. Smokers)
Oral Cancer 0.43
Gastric Cancer 0.60
Cardiovascular Diseases 0.55
Lung Cancer 0.14

So how do states fare? Table 2 shows the tax rates for cigarettes and smokeless tobacco for select states, which are calculated based on the data are from Tobacco Free Kids campaign (in the source, the tax rates are per ounce of snus and per pack of cigarettes). To make sure that we compare apples to apples, I account for the varying nicotine content in these products. According to a recent study, consuming one gram of snus delivers nicotine content equal to smoking a cigarette. That works out to about a can of snus (typically 1.2 oz) replacing approximately 35 cigarettes (almost two packs). So I convert state taxes to show rates per equivalent nicotine amounts. For simplicity, I focus only on the states that tax smokeless tobacco by ounce. Other states tax smokeless tobacco based on either wholesale or manufacturing prices rather than retail, making calculations trickier.

The relative cancer and cardiovascular disease risks of snus are lower than the risks of smoking, ranging between 0.14 and 0.6 (see Table 1). States with a high snus to cigarette tax ratio are essentially pushing tobacco users towards smoking, which carries higher health risks (coded red in the table). States with a moderate tax ratio are somewhat neutral (coded yellow). Their tax ratio is commensurate with relative health risks for some but not all risk sources. Finally, states with a low tax ratio generally encourage tobacco consumers to use a safer product (coded green).

Table 2. State Tobacco Taxes for Equivalent Nicotine Content

State Snus Tax (gram) Cigarette Tax (cigarette) Tax Ratio (Snus/Cigarette)
Arizona $0.01 $0.10 7.88%
Connecticut $0.04 $0.17 20.75%
Delaware $0.02 $0.08 23.81%
District of Columbia $0.03 $0.13 21.16%
Illinois $0.01 $0.10 10.69%
Iowa $0.04 $0.07 61.73%
Maine $0.07 $0.10 71.25%
Montana $0.03 $0.09 35.27%
Nebraska $0.02 $0.03 48.50%
New Jersey $0.03 $0.14 19.60%
New York $0.07 $0.22 32.44%
North Dakota $0.02 $0.02 96.20%
Oregon $0.06 $0.06 106.42%
Rhode Island $0.04 $0.17 20.39%
Texas $0.04 $0.07 59.54%
Vermont $0.07 $0.13 50.35%
Washington $0.09 $0.15 58.91%
Wyoming $0.02 $0.03 70.55%

Note: snus and cigarette taxes are rounded to nearest cent. The tax ratio is based on actual tax values.

The picture that emerges from the table is that of a confused health policy pursued by the states. Only two states in the list set the snus and cigarette tax rates at the level that does not steer consumer towards riskier tobacco products. Most states set the tax rates at levels that are commensurate with some risks but not the others. Specifically, most states do not account for the fact that snus does not cause lung cancer, which is one of the greatest risks of smoking. Finally, a few states may be steering tobacco users towards cigarettes by setting snus taxes too high (or cigarette taxes too low).

I am not claiming that smokeless tobacco is harmless or that states should promote smokeless tobacco as a substitute for cigarettes. As the National Cancer Institute points out, smokeless tobacco is not a safe alternative to smoking. It still carries increased health risks, including certain types of cancer and cardiovascular diseases. But current policy on tobacco taxes may result in the unintended consequence of pushing tobacco users away from less risky forms of tobacco towards riskier ones.

Distinguishing between Medicaid Expenditures and Health Outcomes

As the LA Times reports, the Obama administration has vowed not to approve any cuts to Medicaid during budget negotiations:

Preserving Medicaid funding became even more crucial to the Obama administration after the Supreme Court ruled last summer that states were not required to expand their Medicaid coverage. Administration officials are working hard to convince states to expand and do not want any federal funding cuts that could discourage governors from implementing the law.

“There is a big irony,” said Ron Pollack, executive director of Washington-based Families USA, a leading Medicaid advocate. “The fact that the Supreme Court undermined the Medicaid expansion is now resulting in greater support and a deeper commitment to making sure the program is not cut back.”

Paying for Medicaid remains a major challenge for states. The program has been jointly funded by states and the federal government since it was created. And many states, including California, Illinois and New York, have had to make painful cutbacks in recent years to balance their budgets by reducing physician fees and paring benefits, such as dental care.

However, protecting Medicaid spending — without changing incentives for the healthcare industry or patients — does not necessarily mean improved health outcomes for beneficiaries. As of 2011, nearly one-third of doctors said that they would not accept new Medicaid patients because they are losing money on those who they do see, indicating not only a lower quality of care for Medicaid patients compared to those on private insurance, but reduced access to care. Under the current Medicaid structure, states are incentivized to spend more to receive larger federal matching funds grants, but at the same time federal requirements limit opportunities to improve quality of care through innovation.

The State Health Flexibility Act proposed by Representative Todd Rokita (R-IN) proposes a way to change these incentives. Under the State Health Flexibility Act, state funding for Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program would be capped at current spending levels. At the same time, states would be released from many federal Medicaid mandates and instead would have the flexibility to determine eligibility and benefits at the state level. Rokita proposed this bill last year, and parts of the bill made it into the House budget.

While this bill seems unlikely to make any progress under the current administration, it mirrors reforms proposed by at least one democratic state governor. Oregon’s Governor John Kitzhaber, a former emergency room doctor, received a Medicaid waiver in 2011 to receive a one-time $1.9 billion payment from the federal government to close the state’s Medicaid funding gap. In exchange, he promised to repay this money if the state failed to keep Medicaid costs growth at a rate two-percent below the rest of the country. Kitzhaber sought to achieve this by allowing local knowledge to guide cost savings. The Washington Post reports:

Oregon divided the state into 15 region and gave each one a set amount to care for each patient. These regions can divvy their dollars however they please, so long as patients hit certain quality metrics, like ensuring that adolescents get well-care visits and that steps are taken to control high blood pressure.

The hope is that each of the 15 regions, known as coordinated care organizations, will invest only in the most cost-effective health care. A behavioral health worker who can prevent emergency admissions becomes a lot more valuable, the thinking goes, when Medicaid funding is limited.

While the Oregon plan is not a block grant — the federal government has not capped the amount that it will provide to the state — it does share some similarities with the State Health Flexibility Act. The state and its designated regions have a strong incentive to provide their Medicaid recipients better health outcomes at lower costs because if they fail the state will have to repay $1.9 billion to the federal government. Additionally, the state and the regions have the freedom to find cost savings at the level of patients and hospitals, which isn’t possible under federal requirements.

Tennessee Valley Authority downgraded by S&P

The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)’s bond rating has been downgraded from AAA to AA+, though, “the fundamental financial strength of the TVA is unchanged.” The TVA is a wholly-owned entity of the federal government, and the downgrade reflects, “the negative outlook of the United States as the TVA’s sponsoring sovereign.” Moody’s confirmed the TVA’s AAA rating on the basis that TVA is self-funded and a self-sufficient public power system that finances its operations based on its own user-generated revenues. In the event of fiscal stress, the TVA operates under an implicit federal guarantee.

The TVA doesn’t think the downgrade will have any material impact on its finances as the authority’s stand-alone credit rating remains unchanged (at least  in the short-term, according to S&P) and it doesn’t rely on federal subsidies.

S&P downgraded several other power authorities in the United States: Texas, Oregon, Arizona, New York and Florida, Arizona and Colorado.

 

Oregon’s Millionaire’s Tax Doesn’t Pan Out

To close its $3.8 billion FY 2010- FY 2011 projected budget gap, Oregon has relied on an evaporating stimulus, budget cuts of roughly 9 percent and tax increases. The state’s income tax was raised with a new top rate of 11 percent. However the tax on the richest two percent of residents hasn’t performed as expected. Last year the new tax rate brought in $180 million. This year collections dropped to $130 million. The Wall Street Journal writes this shouldn’t be suprising. A full quarter of “rich tax filers seem to have gone missing.” it’s likely millionaires will be looking for other places to domicile. The tax applies to stocks and capital which means Oregon has “virtually the highest capital gains tax in North America.”