Tag Archives: President Obama

Undermining Competition is No Way to Compete

Money is tight for state and local governments, and that’s never more obvious than when lawmakers work to finalize budgets before the new fiscal year starts on July 1. A common priority for lawmakers, particularly in the revenue department, is to bring new business to the state. That’s why various state economic development websites claim to offer would-be-entrepreneurs the perfect set of enticements to start or expand one’s businesses.

Even on the national stage, President Obama frequently cites the need to compete with India and China in calling for more spending (or, to use his preferred phrase, “more investment”). Unfortunately, politicians often believe that the way to out-compete other governments is to undermine genuine competition at home by offering some firms and industries an uncompetitive edge.

This week, for example, the D.C. Council unanimously voted to give the daily deal company, LivingSocial, a $32,500,000 get-out-of-tax free card. Two years ago, the state of Illinois offered LivingSocial rival, Groupon, a similar though less-lucrative deal: $3,500,000 in state funds to hire 250 employees. In some industries, these types of special deals are business as usual. Film production companies, for example, can get special tax treatment in 40 out of 50 states. In Virginia, film production companies pay no sales tax on production-related products and are allowed refundable individual and corporate income tax credits. Needless to say, Virginia companies in other lines of work aren’t so lucky.

Interestingly, these types of deals are as likely to be opposed by progressives as they are to be opposed by market-oriented economists. In 2010, the left-leaning Center on Budget and Policy Priorities released a report that was critical of film subsidies. The author argued:

Like a Hollywood fantasy, claims that tax subsidies for film and TV productions — which nearly every state has adopted in recent years — are cost-effective tools of job and income creation are more fiction than fact. In the harsh light of reality, film subsidies offer little bang for the buck.

I couldn’t agree more. Back in March, I also found myself largely agreeing with the left-of-center D.C. Fiscal Policy Institute’s Ed Lazere, as we both lambasted government business incentives on the Kojo Nnamdi Show.

Though special deals for particular firms or industries are often sold in the name of competition, they are exceedingly anti-competitive. When one firm or one industry obtains a privilege from government, it obtains a measure of monopoly power. While the profits of the firm go up, so do the prices that consumers pay. And while it is harder to quantify, would-be competitors who aren’t so lucky to have government’s favor also lose. But that’s not all. Privileged firms tend to offer lower-quality products and they tend to be less-attentive to cost-cutting. Then there is the social waste associated with obtaining privileges: each year, firms expend millions of dollars on lobbying and other political activity in an attempt to obtain privilege. At the societal level, privileges undermine long-run growth and may even lead to short-term macroeconomic instability. Government-granted privileges are often dispensed on the basis of personal connection rather than merit. This, in turn, can undermine the legitimacy of both the public and the private sector. In a new paper, out soon, I document these and other problems with government-granted privilege.

There is nothing wrong with a government and its leaders attempting to compete with other governments. But the best way to compete is to offer a sound, economically free, environment in which any firm that creates value for its customers is free to prosper. It is a good indication that a government has failed to create such an environment if it feels the need to suspend or otherwise alter the rules of the game for certain favored firms and industries.

Net Worth is Down and that May Explain Why Stimulus Wasn’t Particularly Effective

This week saw the release of the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances. The news isn’t good. Median net worth fell 38.8 percent from 2007 to 2010. Predictably, the unhealthy diagnosis has occasioned a healthy dose of political posturing. For its part, the White House was quick to note that “the entire decline in household wealth took place before President Obama came into office” and that total wealth “has risen every year since he came into office.”

E21, in turn, pointed out that it was a little odd for the White House to emphasize the aggregate numbers rather than the median:

The claims made by the White House are disingenuous (at best) because they ignore the median U.S. household and focus instead on the increase in overall wealth, which has largely come from gains in the stock market. The White House is essentially saying that we shouldn’t worry about the plight of the typical family because Warren Buffett’s stock holdings have gone up in value by tens of billions of dollars since March 2009. The focus on aggregate household net worth is extremely comical when compared to previous statements made by the President and others in his Administration about the country’s lamentable concentration of wealth and income in the hands of a “fortunate few.” Someone should ask President Obama if this means we needn’t worry about income disparities anymore because total household income is up nearly 20% on an inflation-adjusted basis over the past 10 years?

Framing aside, there is an important policy implication of such a large fall in net worth. Richard Clarida of Columbia University explained this point way back in March of 2009:

There is a second reason while the bang of the fiscal package will likely lag behind the bucks. Even if the global financial system soon restores some semblance of order and function, the collapse in global equity and housing market values has so impaired household wealth that private consumption (which represents 60% to 70% of GDP in G7 countries) is likely to lag – not lead – economic growth for some time, as households rebuild their balance sheets the old-fashioned way – by boosting their saving rates.

In our working paper last fall, Veronique and I explained this point further:

The current recession has resulted in an unprecedented collapse in net wealth. In other words, it is a deep “balance sheet”‖recession. But with personal wealth diminished and private credit impaired, some economists believe that stimulus is likely to be less effective than it would be in a different type of recession. This is because consumers are likely to use their stimulus money to rebuild their nest eggs, i.e., to pay off debts and save, not to buy new products as Keynesian theoreticians want them to.

The White House is interested in escaping blame for the collapse in median net wealth. That’s understandable; that’s what White Houses do. It is harder to escape from the policy implications of a balance sheet recession.

Trickle-Down Economics: Does Anyone Actually Believe In It?

I have heard a lot about “trickle-down economics” lately. The President has taken to using it in speeches. And pundits have increasingly invoked the idea. Back in February, I was asked about the term when I testified before a House committee and had to confess that I have never met an economist who has advocated anything close to “trickle down” economics.

The words “trickle down” imply that if you redistribute money to the wealthy, they will spend it (say, by hiring workers or by buying products) and it will somehow find its way into the hands of the poor. To the extent that any economists endorse such a notion, they are emphatically not free market economists.

This is not to say that there is no case for low taxation. There is a strong theoretical case for low taxation (so long as it is accompanied by low spending!). And it is backed by good empirical evidence.

But the case for low taxation is not—as the phrase “trickle down” implies—based on the idea that we should give money to a wealthy person so she can spend it. Instead, it is based on the idea that if we take money away from either a rich or a poor person when they engage in some activity, they will tend to engage in less of that activity.

If we tax work, people will tend to work less. If we tax consumption, people will tend to consume less. If we tax saving, people will tend to save less. The idea is rooted in basic microeconomics. Taxing labor, for example, makes leisure less expensive. So people choose more leisure. This is called the substitution effect.*

All this theory is well and good, but is there any evidence to back it up? Yes. Michael Keane offers a nice survey of labor supply and taxation studies in the December issue of the Journal of Economic Literature. He identifies at least two major patterns in the evidence:

  1. Women are more responsive to taxes than men (most economists think men are relatively unresponsive to labor taxes, especially in the short run).
  2. People—particularly women—are more responsive to taxes when they consider whether to work than they are when they consider how much to work. In the average study, the long-run elasticity for female labor is 3.6. This means that if a tax hike reduces after tax wages by 10 percent, female labor force participation tends to fall by about 36 percent. As Keane puts it, this is a “very large” effect.

In my view, both of these patterns make sense. Historically, women have been more likely than men to work at home and so higher taxes seem more relevant for them than for men (as more women work outside the home and as more men stay home, I’d expect this gender difference to narrow). It also makes sense that taxes have a larger effect on the decision to work at all than on the decision to work a certain number of hours. Most of us can’t tell our employers that we want to work 30 hours a week rather than 40. But we can tell our employer that we don’t want to work at all. And evidently a lot of people—particularly women—do tell their employers this when taxes are high.

So far, I’ve only discussed how taxes affect labor supply. But they may also depress consumption and investment. What is the overall effect on the economy?

One of the best recent studies is that by President Obama’s former economic advisor, Christina Romer and her husband, macroeconomist David Romer. The Romers set out to understand the effect of taxation on an economy. But they knew that there was a major problem: taxes are not randomly increased or decreased. Instead, politicians tend to keep taxes low when the economy is in recession and raise them when the economy is booming. This makes it very difficult to disentangle cause and effect. So the Romers painstakingly analyzed decades of presidential speeches and government documents to identify exogenous tax changes (i.e., changes that were undertaken for reasons other than the condition of the economy). They then compared the performance of the economy following such exogenous changes. They concluded that exogenous tax increases are “highly contractionary.” As they put it in the conclusion:

Our results indicate that tax changes have very large effects on output. Our baseline specification implies that an exogenous tax increase of one percent of GDP lowers real GDP by almost three percent.

Now here is the irony: As I note above, few if any economists advocate redistributing resources to the wealthy in the hopes that they will trickle down to the rest of us. But over the objection of economists—particularly free market economists—policy makers do this all the time. Think of President Bush’s TARP. Or President Obama’s decision to extend TARP to the auto companies. Or his excursions into venture capital. In each case, money was actually transferred from taxpayers to the (mostly) wealthy managers and shareholders of private firms.

If words mean anything, each of these policies—and not, say, an across the board reduction in marginal income tax rates—should be labeled “trickle-down economics.” But in politics, words often mean nothing.

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*  You might be thinking that the income effect offsets this: By taxing income, you not only make leisure less expensive, you also make people feel poorer. In response to feeling poorer, they may feel that they need to work harder to make up for the loss income. This works for an individual, but as economists James Gwartney and Richard Stroup long ago explained in the American Economic Review, it does not work for society as a whole. This is because governments do something with the money they collect in taxes. And the income effect of spending government revenue makes people work less. So at the economy-wide level, the income effect from spending offsets the income effect from taxing. All you have left is the substitution effect and that unambiguously reduces labor supply.

 

Government Spending Has Shrunk…When You Ignore 44 Percent of Government Spending

Floyd Norris has made an astounding discovery. When you don’t count 44 percent of government spending, it appears that government spending has shrunk in recent years.

Writing in the New York Times, Mr. Norris asserts:

Spending by the federal government, adjusted for inflation, has risen at a slow rate under President Obama. But that increase has been more than offset by a fall in spending by state and local governments, which have been squeezed by weak tax receipts.

In the first quarter of this year, the real gross domestic product for the government — including state and local governments as well as federal — was 2 percent lower than it was three years earlier, when Barack Obama took office in early 2009.

The operative phrase here is “real gross domestic product for the government.” What Mr. Norris neglects to note is that real gross domestic product for the government is only about half of what governments actually spend. And when you look at total spending, it is actually up over the last three years, not down.

Let’s begin with government gross domestic product (GDP). This is the portion of government spending which is counted by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) when it tabulates national GDP. It consists of government consumption expenditures and gross investments. You can think of it as the tab for all items that the government buys on the open market: salaries of public employees, purchases of weapons for the military, investment in infrastructure, etc.

Among other things, however, government GDP does not include transfer payments such as Medicaid, Medicare, Social Security, Unemployment Insurance, Earned Income Tax Credits, Supplemental Nutritional Assistance, Housing Assistance, Supplemental Security Income, Pell Grants, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, WIC, LIHEAP…you get the point.

It turns out that real spending on everything other than government consumption and gross investment is up about 19 percent since Obama took office. And this is more than enough to offset what’s going on with consumption and gross investment. Thus, total spending is up 7.7 percent in real terms.

You can see this in this chart*:

There’s nothing wrong with using government GDP figures. They are used all the time to estimate things like the government purchases multiplier. And they are also helpful in understanding whether government is growing faster or slower than the private sector. But Mr. Norris does his readers a disservice to casually conflate government GDP and total government spending. How many people reading his column would know that he left out 44 percent of what government spends? Or that when you include that 44 percent, total spending actually rose over the last three years?

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*Technical note: when the BEA calculates real government GDP, it uses chained 2005 dollars. It does not calculate real total spending, offering only the nominal figures in Table 3.1. I have therefore used 2005 inflation conversion factors found here to convert total spending from Table 3.1 and government GDP from Table 1.1.5 into real figures. When you do it this way, real government GDP actually rose slightly (0.41 percent) under Obama. In other words, the 2 percent drop in real government GDP looks like a slight increase if you use a different inflation conversion method.

Why Favor Manufacturing?

Pop Quiz: Did the Tea Act of 1773 raise or lower taxes on tea?

I suspect that many Americans believe that it must have raised taxes. We all know that it got the colonists quite upset. They must have been mad because they felt they were “taxed enough already,” right?

Wrong. The Tea Act actually lowered taxes. What got the colonists so upset was that it didn’t lower everyone’s taxes. It only lowered the taxes paid by one firm: the East India Tea Company. Historically, Americans don’t just oppose high taxation. They oppose inequitable taxation. That’s why I find it particularly puzzling that politicians in both parties are going out of their way to single out the manufacturing sector for favorable tax treatment.

"Boston Tea Party" by W.D. Cooper, Image in the Public Domain

The big government sponsored enterprise of the 18th Century was the British owned East India Tea Company. Like the GSEs of our time, the Company benefited from a number of government-granted perquisites, including a government charter and a monopoly on trade in the East. The Tea Act added one more privilege: inequitable taxation.

In 1767, in an effort to raise money, Parliament had passed the Townshend Acts which had imposed taxes on a number of colonial goods, including tea. But colonial resistance had led to partial repeal of these acts in 1770. After this, the only tax that remained was the tax on tea and it was paid by all companies that dealt in the trade. This wasn’t ideal for the Americans, but it was enough to make them stop protesting.

All of that changed in 1773 when Parliament passed the Tea Act. Unlike the Townshend Acts, the Tea Act was not designed to raise revenue. In fact, it didn’t raise a single tax. Yet it sparked the most concentrated and violent protests in the simmering dispute between the mother country and the colonies.

The Tea Act exempted the East India Tea Company from the tea tax, permitting the company to undercut its rivals and giving it a monopoly in the tea trade. To use an increasingly common phrase from today, the act “picked winners and losers.” Perceiving themselves the losers, Americans were outraged. In Charleston they left the tea to rot on the docks. In New York and Philadelphia they sent it back to Britain. And, of course, in Boston they threw it into the harbor.

All of this has been going through my mind as I have been reading President Obama’s corporate income tax proposal. I’d like to be reading that the president plans to lower the rate for all U.S. firms. After all, there is bipartisan consensus that our corporate tax rate is highly uncompetitive. Instead, I’m reading that the president’s plan calls for preferential treatment of manufacturers.

Why? Because it has become politically popular to favor the manufacturing sector. Just ask Rick Santorum. He would cut the corporate tax rate to 17.5 percent for all firms except manufacturers. They would pay zero.

Apparently politicians are convinced that because manufacturers “make things” that we can see and touch, they ought to be treated favorably. But does the consumer who buys a college education derive any less value than the consumer who buys a Ford? Are those who spend thousands of dollars a year on health care, hospitality, insurance, banking, travel, and hundreds of other activities just imagining that these services are worthwhile? Are the workers in these industries any less worthy than the workers on an assembly line?

We all want to know what will be the next big industry of tomorrow. But this is a question that must be left up to the American consumer. Whenever a politician awards special privileges to one industry or another, he attempts to substitute his judgment for that of the consumer. In the process, the politician artificially draws labor and capital into the favored industries. Think of housing during the 1990s and 2000s. Lured by favorable tax and regulatory treatment, millions of workers went into housing, finance, and related industries. When it turned out the public didn’t want as many houses as the politicians did, all of these workers were stranded with outdated skill sets.

How many factory workers will lose their jobs when it turns out that political interest in manufacturing doesn’t guarantee customer interest in manufacturing?

President Obama’s former economic advisor, Christina Romer, recently parted with her former boss and questioned the wisdom of favoring manufacturers. In doing so she joined a venerable American tradition in opposing inequitable taxation. It would be nice if more Americans joined her.

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Update: Veronique de Rugy weighs in with a nice post here.

Maybe We Need a Super Democrat?

The Super Committee has failed. What now?

As I have said before, it is very difficult to look at the long-run fiscal projections and conclude that the impending debt crisis is anything but a major spending problem. According to the CBO, when my daughter graduates from college, federal revenue will be right at its historical average of 18.4 percent of GDP. At the same time, federal spending will consume more than 35 percent of GDP—more than 15 percentage points above the 20 percent average that has prevailed my entire life.

So the long-run explosion in spending—which is driven almost entirely by entitlements and interest payments—must be arrested. How?

In my view, it takes a Democrat.

Only Nixon could go to China. Only Carter could deregulate. Only Reagan could sign the first arms reduction treaties. Only Clinton could sign welfare reform. Lasting and meaningful reforms often require politicians to cross the ideological divide. Given the partisan divide right now, it is very difficult for me to imagine that any Republican president would be successful in reducing entitlement spending. But a Democrat could do it.

And one piece of evidence for this is a 2004 paper in the Journal of Public Economics by the economist José Tavares. He writes:

In a panel of large fiscal adjustments in OECD countries during the last 40 years, we find evidence that left-wing and right-wing cabinets are partisan: the left tends to reduce the deficit by raising tax revenues while the right relies mostly on spending cuts. Our testable hypothesis is that cabinets can signal commitment by undertaking fiscal adjustments in ways that are not favored by their constituencies. In other words, the left gains credibility when it cuts spending while the right becomes more credible when it increases tax revenues. Probit estimates of the determinants of persistence in fiscal adjustments confirm that spending cuts by the left and tax increases by the right are associated with persistent adjustments.

So if it is spending cuts that we need, then these cuts are likely to be more sustainable (“persistent”) if they are executed by a left-leaning government.

Unfortunately, I don’t see much evidence that President Obama is keen to follow this course. His best shot at it came when his own deficit-reduction panel (the Bowles-Simpson Commission) endorsed a mostly-spending-cuts approach. He ignored them.

Big Bank Profits and Government Intervention

Zachary Goldfarb had an interesting piece in the Washington Post this week. He writes:

President Obama has called people who work on Wall Street “fat-cat bankers,” and his reelection campaign has sought to harness public frustration with Wall Street. Financial executives retort that the president’s pursuit of financial regulations is punitive and that new rules may be “holding us back.”

But both sides face an inconvenient fact: During Obama’s tenure, Wall Street has roared back, even as the broader economy has struggled.…Wall Street firms — independent companies and the securities-trading arms of banks — are doing even better. They earned more in the first 21/ 2 years of the Obama administration than they did during the eight years of the George W. Bush administration, industry data show.…

Behind this turnaround, in significant measure, are government policies that helped the financial sector avert collapse and then gave financial firms huge benefits on the path to recovery. For example, the federal government invested hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars in banks — low-cost money that the firms used for high-yielding investments on which they made big profits.

Later, Goldfarb was interviewed on NPR. Near the end of the interview, he says:

But the president has also refrained from taking some of the toughest actions that some economists and outside analysts would like him to have taken. For example, forcing banks or attempting to force banks to forgive the debts of homeowners, or partially forgive the debts of homeowners, or forcing banks to break up into pieces and end, definitively, the too-big-to-fail problem.

So in a sense, Obama has tried to strike a middle ground, harnessing frustration, sharing in frustration of the public regarding the financial sector, but not taking the fundamental actions that would radically restructure the financial industry and perhaps cause there to be more fairness across the country when it comes to the disparate treatment of Wall Street and the rest of the country.

In my view, a “middle ground” would be to a) not bail out banks, and b) not break them up or force them to forgive debts. Instead, the conventional wisdom holds that the moderate position is to a) bail out private firms and then b) force their hands.

A Nobelist on Fiscal Stimulus

Tyler Cowen and Ira Stoll both link to an interview of new-Nobelist Thomas Sargent by Art Rolnick of the Minneapolis Fed. Here is the Nobel Laureate on fiscal stimulus:

In early 2009, President Obama’s economic advisers seem to have understated the substantial professional uncertainty and disagreement about the wisdom of implementing a large fiscal stimulus. In early 2009, I recall President Obama as having said that while there was ample disagreement among economists about the appropriate monetary policy and regulatory responses to the financial crisis, there was widespread agreement in favor of a big fiscal stimulus among the vast majority of informed economists. His advisers surely knew that was not an accurate description of the full range of professional opinion. President Obama should have been told that there are respectable reasons for doubting that fiscal stimulus packages promote prosperity, and that there are serious economic researchers who remain unconvinced.

In my view, economic journalists have largely dropped the ball on this one. From the Wall Street Journal on left, most journalists seem to take the President for his word when he claims widespread agreement on the merits of fiscal stimulus. I think it is pretty difficult to read a sampling of fiscal stimulus papers from the last 5 to 10 years and find anything that resembles a consensus.

Even in the face of more recent academic critiques, the Administration seems to have dug in its heels. A top Administration official recently told Roll Call that the new stimulus plan “will indisputably add to economic growth and add to job creation.”

Hopefully Mr. Sargent’s recognition by the Royal Swedish Academy will shed some light on the rather significant “disputes” among macroeconomists regarding fiscal stimulus.

By the way, Tyler calls this interview, “the single most readable link” in his post and “the best introduction to Sargent on policy and method for non-economists.” I agree. Sargent has some very interesting and cogent things to say about the moral hazards of government deposit insurance, the link between the generosity of unemployment benefits and Europe’s problem with long-term unemployment, and the relative merits of the formulaic balanced budget rules of the Maastricht Treaty compared with the simple and “unspoken” balanced budget rules that reigned during the gold standard era. Indisputably interesting stuff.

Do Revenues Need to be Part of the Debt Solution?

“You can’t reduce the deficit to the levels that it needs to be reduced without having some revenues in the mix.”

So said President Obama in his press conference yesterday. Is the President correct?

We are not the first nation to wrestle with unsustainable debts. And fortunately for us, we can learn from the measures that others have taken. That is why the work of Harvard’s Alberto Alesina and Silvia Ardagna is so important. Examining 37 years of data from 21 similarly-situated nations (fellow members of the OECD) they identified 107 episodes of “fiscal adjustment” (basically efforts to get debt levels under control).  They then broke these down according to how successful they were (did they manage to rein in the debt?) and how they impacted the economy (did they cause the economy to expand or to contract?). 

Let’s first look at the instances in which austerity worked. As shown by the two left bars in the graph below, in cases where austerity actually succeeded in reducing debts, spending as a share of GDP fell by about 2 percentage points while revenue also fell by half a percentage point. In other words, contrary to the President’s assertion, successful austerity does not seem to require a revenue increase. Contrast this with the instances in which austerity failed to reduce debts. This is shown by the two right bars below. Among the instances in which austerity didn’t work, the spending reductions were more modest (only .8 percentage point reduction) and revenue increased—rather substantially (1.41 percent of GDP). 

Alesina and Ardagna also looked at what happened to the economy after austerity. Sometimes it expanded rapidly; sometimes it didn’t. The results of their analysis is below. Among the instances in which austerity was followed by significant economic growth, spending had been reduced by about 2.19 percentage points as a share of GDP while revenue had only been raised 0.34 percentage points. Meanwhile, among the instances in which austerity was not followed by significant growth, spending was reduced much less (0.7 percent of GDP) and revenue was increased much more (1.2 percent of GDP). 

 

 I should make one more point. Republicans sometimes use the phrase “cut and grow” to imply that spending reductions will give the economy a lift. I think this overstates the case. As Alesina put it in his Mercatus Working Paper (p. 5):

Fiscal adjustments (reductions) on the spending side are almost as likely to be associated with high growth (i.e. a successful episode) as fiscal expansions on the spending side.

In other words, spending cuts are about as likely as spending increases to lead to rapid growth. Readers of this blog probably know that spending increases typically don’t lead to large and sustainable growth spurts. So we shouldn’t cut spending because we think it will make the economy grow. We should cut spending because it is mathematically impossible for government to constantly outpace the growth of the private sector on which it depends. And as Herbert Stein famously remarked, something that can’t go on forever, won’t.

Can a reduction in government spending stimulate the economy?

This, of course, is quite relevant given the latest news. To help find the answer, I consulted my graduate macroeconomics text. There, on pp. 546-7, I found this passage:

[A] small reduction in current government purchases could signal large future reductions, and therefore cause consumption to rise by more than the fall in government purchases.

Surprisingly, these possibilities are more than just theoretical curiosities. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) show that fiscal reform packages in Denmark and Ireland in the 1980s caused consumption booms, and they argue that effects operating through expectations were the reason. Similarly, Alesina and Perotti (1997) show that deficit reductions coming from cuts in government employment and transfers are much more likely to be maintained than reductions coming from tax increases, and that, consistent with the importance of expectations, the first type of deficit reduction is often expansionary while the second type usually is not.

I did my graduate work at George Mason, so you may be thinking that this is some free-market fundamental text. It is actually David Romer’s Advanced Macroeconomics (David, of course, is the husband of President Obama’s former CEA chair, Christina Romer).

Since Mr. Romer wrote the passage above (the second edition was published in 2000), the case for expansionary spending cuts has, if anything, strengthened. Consider this 2010 piece by Harvard’s Alberto Alesina. He finds:

[N]ot all fiscal adjustments cause recessions. Countries that have made spending adjustments to reduce their deficits have made large, credible, and decisive cuts. Even in the very short run, many reductions of budget deficits, even sharp ones, have been followed immediately by sustained growth rather than recessions.

Or consider this 2010 piece by David Henderson. It focuses on the Canadian experience of cutting spending in the 1990s. He writes:

Canada was able to escape from chronic deficits and trimmed its debt from nearly 70 percent of GDP to 29 percent of GDP, all without sacrificing growth.

What’s more, “There were six to seven dollars in budget cuts for every dollar of tax increases.”

Or consider another piece, also by Henderson, focusing on post-WWII spending cuts in the U.S. He writes:

In the four years from peak World War II spending in 1944 to 1948, the U.S. government cut spending by $72 billion—a 75-percent reduction. It brought federal spending down from a peak of 44 percent of gross national product (GNP) in 1944 to only 8.9 percent in 1948.

The post-WWII U.S. economy is widely regarded to have been quite healthy. This, of course, confounded Keynesians like Paul Samuelson who had predicted that war demobilization would lead to the “greatest period of unemployment and industrial dislocation which any economy has ever faced.” (emphasis original)

Or try this 2010 piece by Goldman Sachs economists Ben Broadbent and Kevin Daly. They report:

In a review of every major fiscal correction in the OECD since 1975, we find that decisive budgetary adjustments that have focused on reducing government expenditure have (i) been successful in correcting fiscal imbalances; (ii) typically boosted growth; and (iii) resulted in significant bond and equity market outperformance. Tax-driven fiscal adjustments, by contrast, typically fail to correct fiscal imbalances and are damaging for growth.

In contrast, some people are pointing to a new IMF report that claims “fiscal consolidation typically reduces output and raises unemployment in the short term.” But as Alberto Alesina argues, the IMF findings are not all that different from his own. Critically, the IMF agrees that “tax increases are much worse for the economy than spending cuts.” Moreover, the IMF agrees that “after a few years, even large (but spending based) fiscal adjustments create growth for the economy.”

To me, the evidence suggests that Obama’s Deficit Commission chairs are on the right track in emphasizing 75 percent spending cuts relative to 25 percent revenue increases.