Tag Archives: Virginia

Graduate School Opportunities Available Through Mercatus

One of the great parts of working at Mercatus is getting to interact with all of the bright and ambitious students that participate in our academic programs. Mercatus offers four unique graduate programs for students interested in political economy and public policy. The training and education that Mercatus provides are one of a kind.

As part of each program students get access to funding, practical experience, and a wide network of passionate, dedicated scholars. Many graduates from each program go on to develop successful careers in academia and public policy. Ninety-two percent of MA Fellowship graduates, for example, receive a job within 9 months of graduation. Whether you’re pursuing a Master’s, PhD, or law degree, there may be something for you at Mercatus.

The four programs and their details are below.  If you’re interested in learning more and applying, check out our website. Deadlines are right around the corner, with the PhD Fellowship deadline approaching at the end of this week.

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Mercatus PhD Fellowship

The PhD Fellowship is a competitive, full-time fellowship program for students pursuing a doctoral degree in economics at George Mason University. PhD Fellows take courses in market process economics, public choice, and institutional analysis and work on projects that use these lenses to understand global prosperity and change.

Students receive an award up to $200,000 (over five years) for full tuition support and a monthly stipend, as well as experience as a research assistant working closely with Mercatus-affiliated Mason faculty. The application deadline is February 1, 2018.

Mercatus MA Fellowship

The MA Fellowship is a tw0-year, competitive, full-time fellowship program for students pursuing a master’s degree in economics at George Mason University in preparation for a career in public policy. Fellows attend readings groups and career development workshops, spend at least 20 hours per week working with Mercatus scholars and staff, and complete a Mercatus Graduate Policy essay.

Students receive an award of up to $80,000 (over two years) for full tuition support and a monthly stipend, as well as practical experience conducting and disseminating research with Mercatus scholars and staff on pertinent policy issues. The application deadline is March 1, 2018.

Mercatus Adam Smith Fellowship

The Adam Smith Fellowship is a one-year, competitive fellowship program for PhD students at any university and in any discipline. The goal of this fellowship is to introduce students to a framework of ideas they may not otherwise encounter in their studies. Fellows meet a few times out of the year to engage in discussions on key foundational texts in the Austrian, Virginia, and Bloomington schools of political economy and learn how these texts may apply to their research interests.

Students receive a stipend up to $10,000 as well as travel, lodging, and all materials to attend workshops and seminars hosted by the Mercatus Center. The application deadline is March 15, 2018.

Mercatus Frédéric Bastiat Fellowship

The Frédéric Bastiat Fellowship is a one-year, competitive fellowship program for graduate students attending master’s, juris doctoral, and doctoral programs in a variety of disciplines. The goal of this fellowship is to introduce students to the Austrian, Virginia, and Bloomington school of political economy as academic foundations for pursuing contemporary policy analysis. Fellows meet a few times out of the year to engage in discussions on key foundational texts and interact with scholars that work on the cutting edge of policy analysis.

Students receive a stipend of up to $5,000 as well as travel, lodging, and all materials to attend workshops and seminars hosted by the Mercatus Center. The application deadline is March 15, 2018.

 

 

Mutant Capitalism rears its ugly head in Arlington

Confectionery-giant Nestlé plans to move its U.S. headquarters from California to 1812 North Moore in the Rosslyn area of Arlington in the next few years. This should be great news for the people of Arlington—a world-famous company has decided that Arlington County is the best place to be in the U.S. This must be due to our educated workforce and high quality of life, right?

Maybe. The real attraction might also be the $6 million of state handouts to Nestlé, along with an additional $6 million from Arlington County. Government handouts like these have become a way of life in the U.S. even though the results are often underwhelming.

Federal programs such as the New Markets Tax Credit Program have had at best small effects on economic development, and there is a good chance they just reallocate economic activity from one place to another rather than generate new economic activity. Local programs like Tax Increment Financing appear to largely reallocate economic activity as well. These programs might be good for the neighborhood or city that gets the handout, but it doesn’t help the residents of nearby places who are forced to contribute via their tax dollars.

In the Nestlé case, all of Virginia’s taxpayers are paying for Nestlé to locate in Arlington, which already has a relatively strong economy and is one of the wealthiest counties in Virginia. Why should taxpayers in struggling counties such as Buchanan or Dickenson County be forced to subsidize a company in Arlington? Government handouts to firms are often regressive since companies rarely want to locate in areas with a low-skill—and thus low-income—workforce. Everyone pays, but the most economically successful areas get the benefits.

Government officials often praise the jobs that these deals create and the Nestlé deal is no different: According to the performance agreement, Nestlé must create and maintain 748 new full-time jobs. And even if we ignore the fact that jobs are an economic cost, not a benefit, a closer look reveals that projections and reality usually diverge. For example, Buffalo awarded hundreds of millions of dollars to SolarCity, which promised to create 5,000 jobs. They have since revised that number down to 1,460. There are numerous other examples where the cost per job turned out to be higher than initially projected.

The grant performance agreement also estimates that Nestlé will provide $18.2 million in taxes to the county over the next 10 years, more than enough to offset the grant expenditure. But this doesn’t take into account what would have happened absent the handout. Perhaps some other company would have relocated here for free. Or a local company, or collection of companies, would have eventually rented out the space.

Government grants may also distort the real estate market: There’s a good chance no company had occupied 1812 North Moore because the rent was too high. If so, part of this grant is a handout to the owners of the building, Monday Properties, since now it does not have to lower its rent to attract a tenant. This may lead other property companies to lobby for and expect government handouts to help them find tenants.

Government grants often distort the economy by treating out-of-state companies differently than in-state companies. They encourage relocation by subsidizing it, which discourages expansion. A better strategy is to create a simple, non-intrusive business environment that treats all businesses equally.

Government grants are a characteristic of what my colleague Chris Koopman calls Mutant Capitalism and are antithetical to real capitalism and free enterprise. Capitalism involves businesses competing for consumers on an even playing field—there is no room for government favors that tilt the playing field towards one business or another.

Are state lotteries good sources of revenue?

By Olivia Gonzalez and Adam A. Millsap

With all the hype about the Powerball jackpot, we decided to look at the benefits and costs of state lotteries from the taxpayer’s perspective. The excitement around yesterday’s drawing is for good reason, with the jackpot reaching $1.5 billion – the largest thus far. But most taxpayers will never benefit from the actual prize money, with odds of winning as low as one in 292.2 million for the jackpot. So if few people will ever hit it big, there must be other benefits for taxpayers to justify the implementation of lotteries, right?

Of the 43 states that implement lotteries, the majority of lottery revenues – about 58% on average – go to awarding prizes. A relatively small proportion (7%) is used to pay for administration costs, such as salaries of government workers and advertising. The remaining category, and the primary purpose of implementing state lotteries, is revenue for government services. On average, about one third of state lottery revenues is directed to state funds for this purpose. The chart below displays the state-level breakdown of lottery revenue for the most recent year that data are available (2013).

lottery sales breakdown

It is surprising that such a small portion of state lottery sales actually make it to state funds, especially considering how much politicians advertise the benefits of state lotteries. A handful of states direct more than 50% of lottery revenues towards state funds: Rhode Island, Delaware, West Virginia, Oregon, and South Dakota. The other 38 states allocate significantly less with Arkansas and Massachusetts contributing the smallest percentage, only 21%.

Many states direct their lottery revenues towards education programs. The largest lottery system, New York’s, usually directs about 30% of their lottery sales to this area. Similarly, Florida’s lottery system transferred about one third of their funds, totaling $1.50 billion, to their Educational Enhancement Trust Fund (EETF) in 2013.

The data presented here are from 2013, so it will be interesting to see how the recent Powerball jackpot revenues will affect lottery revenues more broadly in the future, especially since the Multi-State Lottery Association reduced the odds of winning in October of 2015 in the hope of boosting revenues. State officials argue that reducing the chances of winning allows the prize to grow larger, which increases the demand for tickets and revenue.

The revenue-generating function of state lotteries makes them implicit taxes. The portion of revenue generated from a state lottery that is not used to operate the lottery is just like tax revenue generated from a regular sales or excise tax. So even if lotteries are effective at raising revenue, are they effective tax policy?

Effective tax policy should take into account the tax’s ability to generate revenue as well as its efficiency, equity, transparency, and collectability. Research shows that state lotteries fall short in most of these categories.

The practice of dedicating portions of tax revenue to specific expenditure categories, also known as earmarking, can be detrimental to state budgets. Research that looks specifically at the earmarking of lottery revenues finds that educational expenditures remain unaffected, and sometimes even decline, following the implementation of a state lottery.

This result is due to how earmarking changes the incentives facing politicians. A 1999 study compares the results of lottery revenues directed specifically to fund education with revenues going to a state’s general fund. Patrick Pierce, one of the co-authors, explains that when funds are earmarked for education they go to the intended program but, “instead of adding to the funds for those programs, legislators factor in the lottery revenue and allocate less government money to the program budgets.”

Earmarking also affects total government expenditures, even though from a theoretical perspective it should have little effect since one source of funding is just as good as another. Nevertheless, many empirical studies find the opposite. Mercatus research corroborates this by demonstrating that earmarking tends to result in an increase in total government spending while having little effect on the program expenditures to which the funds are tied. This raises serious transparency concerns because it obscures increases in total government spending that voters may not want.

Last but not least, about four decades of studies have examined lottery tax equity and the majority of them find that lottery sales disproportionately draw from lower-income groups, making them regressive taxes. This only adds to the aforementioned concerns about the transparency, collectability, and revenue raising capabilities of lottery taxes.

Perhaps the effectiveness of lottery taxes can be best summed up by the authors of a 1993 study who wrote that “lotteries as a source of funding are neither efficient nor equitable substitutes for more traditional tax sources.”

Although at least three people walked away with millions of dollars yesterday, many taxpayers are not getting any benefits from their state’s lottery system.

We don’t need more federal infrastructure spending

Many of the presidential candidates on both sides of the aisle have expressed interest in fixing America’s infrastructure, including Donald Trump, Hilary Clinton, and Bernie Sanders. All of them claim that America’s roads and bridges are crumbling and that more money, often in the form of tax increases, is needed before they fall into further disrepair.

The provision of basic infrastructure is one of the most economically sound purposes of government. Good roads, bridges, and ports facilitate economic transactions and the exchange of ideas which helps foster innovation and economic growth. There is certainly room to debate which level of government – federal, state, or local – should provide which type of infrastructure, but I want to start by examining US infrastructure spending over time. To hear the candidates talk one would think that infrastructure spending has fallen of a cliff. What else could explain the current derelict state?

A quick look at the data shows that this simply isn’t true. A 2015 CBO report on public spending on transportation and water infrastructure provides the following figure.

CBO us infrastructure spending

In inflation adjusted dollars (the top panel) infrastructure spending has exhibited a positive trend and was higher on average post 1992 after the completion of the interstate highway system. (By the way, the original estimate for the interstate system was $25 billion over 12 years and it ended up costing $114 billion over 35 years.)

The bottom panel shows that spending as a % of GDP has declined since the early 80s, but it has never been very high, topping out at approximately 6% in 1965. Since the top panel shows an increase in the level of spending, the decline relative to GDP is due to the government increasing spending in other areas over this time period, not cutting spending on infrastructure.

The increase in the level of spending over time is further revealed when looking at per capita spending. Using the data from the CBO report and US population data I created the following figure (dollars are adjusted for inflation and are in 2014 dollars).

infrastructure spend per cap

The top green line is total spending per capita, the middle red line is state and local spending with federal grants and loan subsidies subtracted out, and the bottom blue line is federal spending. Federal spending per capita has remained relatively flat while state and local spending experienced a big jump in the late 80s, which increased the total as well. This graph shows that the amount of infrastructure spending has largely increased when adjusted for inflation and population. It’s true that spending is down since the early 2000s but it’s still higher than at any point prior to the early 90s and higher than it was during the 35-year-construction of the interstate highway system.

Another interesting thing that jumps out is that state and local governments provide the bulk of infrastructure spending. The graph below depicts the percentage of total infrastructure spending that is done by state and local governments.

infrastructure spend state, local as percent of total

As shown in the graph state and local spending on infrastructure has accounted for roughly 75% of total infrastructure spending since the late 80s. Prior to that it averaged about 70% except for a dip to around 65% in the late 70s.

All of this data shows that the federal government – at least in terms of spending – has not ignored the country’s infrastructure over the last 50 plus years, despite the rhetoric one hears from the campaign trail. In fact, on a per capita basis total infrastructure spending has increased since the early 1980s, driven primarily by state and local governments.

And this brings up a second important point: state and local governments are and have always been the primary source of infrastructure spending. The federal government has historically played a small role in building and maintaining roads, bridges, and water infrastructure. And for good reason. As my colleague Veronique de Rugy has pointed out :

“…infrastructure spending by the federal government tends to suffer from massive cost overruns, waste, fraud, and abuse. As a result, many projects that look good on paper turn out to have much lower return on investments than planned.”

As evidence she notes that:

“According to the Danish researchers, American cost overruns reached on average $55 billion per year. This figure includes famous disasters like the Central Artery/Tunnel Project (CA/T), better known as the Boston Big Dig.22 By the time the Beantown highway project—the most expensive in American history—was completed in 2008 its price tag was a staggering $22 billion. The estimated cost in 1985 was $2.8 billion. The Big Dig also wrapped up 7 years behind schedule.”

Since state and local governments are doing the bulk of the financing anyway and most infrastructure is local in nature it is best to keep the federal government out as much as possible. States are also more likely to experiment with private methods of infrastructure funding. As de Rugy points out:

“…a number of states have started to finance and operate highways privately. In 1995, Virginia opened the Dulles Greenway, a 14-mile highway, paid for by private bond and equity issues. Similar private highway projects have been completed, or are being pursued, in California, Maryland, Minnesota, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas. In Indiana, Governor Mitch Daniels leased the highways and made a $4 billion profit for the state’s taxpayers. Consumers in Indiana were better off: the deal not only saved money, but the quality of the roads improved as they were run more efficiently.”

It remains an open question as to exactly how much more money should be devoted to America’s infrastructure. But even if the amount is substantial it’s not clear that the federal government needs to get any more involved than they already are. Infrastructure is largely a state and local issue and that is where the taxing and spending should take place, not in Washington D.C.

 

 

What to do when technology outpaces the law?

The recent cease-and-desist letters from the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles to taxi alternatives Uber Technologies and Lyft remind me of my first trip to D.C. in 1997. An awkward high school junior traveling alone, I landed at National Airport, followed the signs and hopped into a filthy Virginia-sanctioned taxicab. The heavy stench of stale cigarettes clung to the papers, cups and clothes littering the floor.

En route to my hotel, the driver suddenly stopped and, without explanation, got out of the car. After making a 10-minute payphone call, he nonchalantly resumed our drive. I reached the hotel unscathed, but the unpleasant trip — costing about $15 — seemed second-rate to a first-time cab rider.

A few years later, a freshman econ course revealed that economics can explain the sub-par service I received.

TaxiThat is me, writing in the Richmond Times Dispatch. I make the case that ride-sharing companies Uber and Lyft have solved many of the problems that plague traditional taxi models. But instead of thanking the companies, the Virginia DMV has issued cease-and-desist letters.

The best defense of the DMV is that they were simply following the law. From their perspective, Uber and Lyft look like motor carriers. And in Virginia, motor carriers are required to be licensed. To this, Uber and Lyft can reasonably reply that they are not motor carriers. They do not employ any drivers. Instead, they employ software engineers who create mobile applications used by drivers. Their service is simply to connect those with rides to those in need of rides. In this sense, the companies are no more motor carriers than Kayak or Priceline are airlines.

So what to do in this sort of area where technology seems to have outpaced the law?

My colleague Jerry Brito offers a simple idea:

[H]ow about allowing the innovation to continue apace while the government studies it and gets its regulatory house in order? Public officials like [Commissioner of the DMV] Mr. Holcomb might say that their job is to enforce the law, and while that’s true, public officials also have a responsibility to exercise discretion in the public interest. It’s clear that the Virginia legislature did not anticipate the invention of platforms like Uber and Lyft when they designed their motor carrier laws, so it would be perfectly reasonable for the DMV to work with the legislature to clarify the law without first banning the services.

You can read more of Jerry’s views in his latest column in Reason.

The barriers to brewing

Recently, Evan Feinberg of Generation Opportunity described some of the barriers craft brewers face. In one instance, a brewer — who does not prepare any food — was told he had to install a hood for a food oven that he did not even own. Another brewer — who does not use poultry in his beer — was nearly kept from operating because he did not have the equipment to handle raw chicken.

tasty beerThat’s Chris Koopman and me, writing at U.S. News and World Report. We have a new report on the regulatory barriers to craft brewing in Virginia. Here is an excerpt:

In aggregate, the number of regulatory procedures that we identify (12), the wait times to complete many of these procedures (in excess of 100 days), and the associated costs (e.g., $2,150 for a single license) represent formidable barriers to entry. All of these barriers are in addition to the standard regulatory hurdles that all small businesses must surmount (zoning ordinances, incorporations rules, and tax compliance costs). This means that starting a microbrewery in the state of Virginia requires as many procedures as starting a small business in China or Venezuela, countries notorious for their excessive barriers to entry.

I was astounded to learn that, among other reasons, the state may deny a license if regulators feel that the brewer is “physically unable to carry on the business,” is unable to “speak, understand, read and write the English language in a reasonably satisfactory manner” or if they feel that there are already too many brewers in a particular locality. You can read our new report here.

What would a business-cycle balanced budget rule look like in Illinois?

A few years ago, I testified before the U.S. House Judiciary Committee. I’d been invited to talk about the design of a federal balanced budget amendment and much of my testimony drew on the lessons offered from state experience. Since 49 of the 50 states have such requirements, and since these requirements vary from state to state, I noted that federal lawmakers could learn from the state laboratory.

The best requirement, I argued, would have the following characteristics:

  1. Require balance over some period longer than a year. This effectively disarms the strongest argument against a balanced budget amendment: namely, that it would force belt-tightening in the middle of a recession. In contrast, if budgets need to balance over a longer time period, then Congress is free to run deficits in particular years as long as they are countered by surpluses in others.
  2. Allow Congress some time to come into compliance. You don’t have to be a Keynesian to worry that a 45 percent reduction in the deficit overnight might be a shock to the system.
  3. Minimize the gamesmanship associated with revenue estimation: Across the country, states with balanced budget requirements have to estimate revenue throughout the year (I’m a member of Virginia’s Joint Advisory Board of Economists and our responsibility is to pass judgment on the validity of these estimates). But this invites all sorts of questions: what model to use for the economy, should revenue be scored dynamically or statically, etc. One way to sidestep all of these questions is to make the requirement retrospective: require that spending this year not exceed revenue from years past.

Michigan Republican Justin Amash has proposed an amendment along these lines. It would be phased-in over 9 years and from there on out would stipulate that outlays “not exceed the average annual revenue collected in the three prior years, adjusting in proportion to changes in population and inflation.” Because it requires balance over three years rather than one, Amash calls it the “business cycle balanced budget amendment.”

Writing in Time, GMU’s Alex Tabarrok points to Sweden’s positive experience with a similar rule. And economists Glenn Hubbard and Tim Kane also endorse such a rule in their book, Balance.

Now, some Illinois state lawmakers have put together a proposal for a state rule that appears to be largely based on this model. It requires:

Appropriations for a fiscal year shall not exceed the average annual revenue collected for the 3 prior years, adjusting in proportion to changes in population and inflation.

(Unlike the Amash plan, however, the Illinois plan is not phased in over a number of years. Rather, it takes effect immediately upon passage of the bill.)

To see how it might work in a state, I decided to take the Amash Amendment for a test drive, using Illinois data. The solid blue line in the figure below charts Illinois’s actual general revenue from 1990 to 2012 in billions of current dollars. The dashed blue line phases in an Amash-type “business cycle” balanced budget rule. Once fully phased-in, it would limit spending to the average revenue of the three previous years, with an adjustment for inflation and population growth.

BCBBA

Notice three things:

  1. From 1990 to 2002, and from 2004 to 2007, the rule would have kept Illinois spending in line with Illinois revenue, and would have even allowed the state to run surpluses.
  2. In lean years (like 2008) when revenue levels off, the limit actually continues to rise. That’s because it is based on a longer time trend. This means that it wouldn’t require the sort of draconian budget cuts that balanced budget critics often fear. The accumulated surpluses from previous years could also be used to soften the blow.
  3. Lastly, note the (9 percent) revenue uptick from 2011 to 2012. The amendment would prudently make legislators wait a few years before they can go out and spend that money.

What are the best arguments against film subsidies?

The Academy Awards are nearly upon us, and that means long-winded acceptance speeches from actors and directors, filled with thanks for all the people who have helped them along the way. Listen closely to those speeches. Because they should really be thanking you.

That’s because each of the nine films up for Best Picture this year received some sort of government-granted privilege at your expense. “Captain Phillips,” for example, got a $300,000 grant from Virginia taxpayers, while the “Wolf of Wall Street” got to skip out on some $30 million in New York taxes.

And so, in the spirit of the Oscars, I now present my own awards for the best arguments against these privileges.

That’s me, writing at US News’s Economic Intelligence blog. Click here to read on.

Come Study at George Mason University

It is hard to believe but it’s been about 15 years since I attended my first Institute for Humane Studies weekend seminar at Claremont McKenna College. I can still remember the challenging conversations and stimulating lectures, especially those by Jeffrey Rogers Hummel and Lydia Ortega, both of San Jose State.

The most exciting idea I walked away from that weekend with was this: it’s possible to make a career out of advancing liberty.

From I.H.S. I learned about George Mason University. After doing quite a bit of research and attending a Public Choice Outreach Conference at GMU, I became convinced that the best thing I could do to set myself on the path of a career exploring the ideas of liberty was to get a graduate degree in economics from GMU. I eventually got my doctorate at GMU and now I have the best job in the world at the Mercatus Center.

George Mason University School of Public Policy 3351 Fairfax Drive Arlington (VA) 2013If you, too, have ever thought about such a career, now is the time to act on it. Here are a few opportunities:

The PhD Fellowship is a three-year, competitive, full-time fellowship program for students who are pursuing a doctoral degree in economics at George Mason University. It includes full tuition support, a stipend, and experience as a research assistant working closely with Mercatus-affiliated Mason faculty. It is a total award of up to $120,000 over three years. The application deadline is February 1, 2014.

The MA Fellowship is a two-year, competitive, full-time fellowship program for students pursuing a master’s degree in economics at George Mason University and interested in gaining advanced training in applied economics in preparation for a career in public policy. It includes full tuition support, a stipend, and practical experience as a research assistant working with Mercatus scholars. It is a total award of up to $80,000 over two years. The application deadline is March 1, 2014.

The Adam Smith Fellowship is a one-year, competitive fellowship for graduate students attending PhD programs at any university, in a variety of fields, including economics, philosophy, political science, and sociology. Smith Fellows receive a stipend and attend workshops and seminars on the Austrian, Virginia, and Bloomington schools of political economy. It is a total award of up to $10,000 for the year. The application deadline is March 15, 2014.

What would real reform in Virginia look like?

A couple of months ago, I blogged about Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell and the gifts he and his family have received from businessman Jonnie Williams, Jr. The comments were eventually picked up by journalist Katie Watson, first in a column and then in an interview with the local CBS affiliate. Eventually the Richmond Times Dispatch invited me to turn the blog into an OpEd and this last Sunday Bart Hinkle of the Dispatch elaborated on the point in an excellent post. I suspect many readers will agree that Hinkle made the point far more eloquently than I:

Many have wondered why McDonnell, otherwise a paragon of rectitude, would take such swag. But nobody has asked why Williams would give it — because the answer is obvious. Star Scientific has not made a profit in a decade. But it might, if the governor were to place the weight of the state on the economic scales.…Virginia’s governor has a lot of quo to give whether or not he takes a fistful of quid.

Image by hin255

Image by hin255

 

In my view, Virginians need to think as constructively as possible about the sorts of reforms that would prevent scandals like this from happening in the future. Unfortunately, my guess is that the political response will focus—to use Hinkle’s words—on the quid and not on the quo. I believe this would be a huge missed opportunity.

In Virginia, gifts to public officials valued at $50 or more are permitted but must be disclosed, while gifts of any value to family members of public officials are permitted and do not need to be disclosed at all. Just about every article I’ve read on the matter emphasizes this point and I’d guess that a number of legislators are busy drawing up bills to change these laws as I type. For his part, the governor himself has indicated an interest in changing the ethics laws, though he’s offered no specifics.

It’s understandable that this is peoples’ first instinct: If business owners are giving money to elected officials and their family members in return for special treatment from government, it seems only natural that there ought to be a law forbidding such gifts to elected officials and their families. I’m not opposed to such laws per se. But it would be a mistake to think that they are going to solve the problem.

Water flows downhill. And as long as elected officials are expected to dole out lucrative privileges to particular firms, particular firms will want to play in the political sandbox.

Even if Virginia adopted a complete ban on all gifts of any size to elected officials and their family members, I predict firms and their leaders would still donate to political action committees, they’d endorse candidates, they’d sponsor third-party political advertisements, they’d organize get-out-the-vote efforts, and they’d host fundraisers and campaign events. In an endless game of whack-a-mole, reformers could no doubt try to curtail these efforts too (with the First Amendment a likely casualty). But so long as businesses face such lucrative incentives to play politics, the reformers will always be one step behind.

A better—more permanent, and more direct—reform would strike at the heart of the quid-pro-quo problem. It would limit the government’s ability to favor particular firms in the first place. This would require the elimination of all targeted tax exemptions and credits. The state could then use the extra money obtained from closing loopholes to lower its corporate and individual tax rates. The state would also need to eliminate all programs that make grants or loans to particular firms (you can see a listing of such programs here).

In one fell swoop, these types of reforms would instantly remove the incentive for firms to seek the favor of politicians. These reforms would also improve the economic climate of Virginia. Without government assistance, industries would be more competitive, lowering their prices and improving the quality of their products. Firms would pay more attention to trends in customer desires rather than political trends. This would help ensure that labor and capital would be allocated on the basis of genuine costs and benefits rather than political costs and benefits. And millions of dollars that are now wasted in seeking government-granted privilege could be put to more valuable uses.

This does not mean that the state would be powerless to entice firms to relocate here. Governors, legislators, and mayors across the state could and should work to make sure that Virginia’s tax and regulatory regimes are the least burdensome in the nation. Elected officials (and their spouses) could and should tout the state’s superior business climate.

And one of their talking points would be the fact that all businesses in Virginia get the same fair shake, whether they donate to politicians or not.