Tag Archives: West Virginia

The use of locally-imposed selective taxes to fund public pension liabilities

Many eyes are on Kentucky policymakers as they grapple with finding a solution to their $40 billion state-reported unfunded public pension liability. As talks of a potential pension bill surface, various proposals have been made by legislators, but very few have gained traction. One such proposal stands out from the rest. A proposal that has since been shut down suggested imposing selective taxes on tobacco, prescription opiates, and outsourced labor to generate revenue to direct towards paying down the state’s pension debt. Despite its short-lived tenure, this selective tax proposal reflects a recent trend in pension funding reform; a trend that policymakers should be wary of. Implementing new taxes on select goods or services may seem like a good idea as it could, in theory, potentially raise additional revenues, but experience at the local level suggests otherwise.

In chapter 12 of a new Mercatus book on sin taxes, NYU professor Thad Calabrese examines the practice of locally-imposed selective taxes that are used to fund public pension liabilities and doesn’t find much evidence to support their continued usage.

Selective taxes are sales taxes that target specific goods and are also known as ‘sin taxes’ because of their popular usage in taxing less healthy goods such as cigarettes, junk food, or alcohol. In the examples that Calabrese examines, selective taxes are used to target insurance premiums as revenue sources for pensions.

Only a select few states have begun this practice – including Illinois, Pennsylvania, as well as municipalities in West Virginia and Missouri – but it may become more popular if courts begin to restrict the way in which current pension benefits can be modified. Once benefits are taken off the table as an avenue for reform, like in Illinois, policymakers will feel more pressure to find new revenue sources.

The proposal in Kentucky may seem appealing to policymakers, especially because of its potential to raise $600 million a year, but this estimate overlooks the unintended effects that such new taxes could facilitate. Thankfully, the proposal did not go through, but I think some time should be spent looking at what similar proposals have looked like at the local level, so that other states do not get tempted pick up where Kentucky left off.

Calabrese draws on the experiences in Pennsylvania and Illinois to examine how these taxes have operated, how the decoupling of setting and financing employee benefits tends to lead to these taxes, and how the use of these taxes is associated with significantly underfunded pension systems. Below I highlight Pennsylvania’s experience and caution against further usage of this mechanism for pension funding.

How it works (or doesn’t)

In 1895, Pennsylvania implemented a 2 percent tax on out-of-state fire and casualty insurance companies’ premiums on in-state property and then earmarked this for distribution to local governments to pay for pensions. Act 205 of 1984 replaced the original act in which the state of Pennsylvania allocated pension aid based on where the insured property was located and instead the new allocation was based on the number of public employees in a locality.

Calabrese explains how the funds were distributed:

“Each public employee was considered a ‘unit,’ and uniformed employees (such as police and fire) each represented two units. The pool of insurance tax revenue collected by the state was then divided by the sum of municipal units to arrive at a unit value. This distribution could subsidize local governments’ pension expenditures up to 100 percent of the annual cost. In 1985, this tax generated $62.3 million in revenues; as a result, each unit value was worth $1,146 – meaning that local governments received $1,146 for pension funding for each public employee and an additional $1,146 for pension funding for each uniformed public employee. Importantly, 75 percent of municipalities received enough funding from this revenue in 1985 to fully offset their pension costs.”

The new mechanism raised more funds, but it also unexpectedly raised costs. If a municipality had to contribute less than the $1,146 annually for a regular employee or $2,292 for a uniformed employee, for example, the municipality was essentially incentivized to increase benefits to public employees up to this limit, because local public employees would receive increased benefits at no direct budgetary cost to the municipality.

“…the tax likely increased insurance costs for residents and businesses (and then only a small fraction of the cost), but not directly for the government employer. Further, this system privileged benefits relative to other compensation, because these payments (borne at least statutorily by out-of-state companies) could only be used for financing pensions and not other forms of compensation.”

A tax originally implemented to fund pension costs statewide resulted in a system that encouraged more generous benefits.

Despite increased subsidies from the state, only 38 percent of municipalities received sufficient allocated funds from the pool to fully offset the costs of pensions. This was because annual pension contributions were growing at a faster rate than the rate at which the subsidy from the state insurance tax was growing.

To highlight a city with severely distressed pension plans, Philadelphia continued to struggle even following the implementation of the state insurance tax. The police pension plan, nonuniformed plan, and firefighter pension plan were all only 49, 47, and 45 percent funded, respectively. In 2009, the City Council passed a temporary 1 percentage point increase in their sales tax and when the temporary rate was renewed in 2014, any revenue in excess of $120 million was dedicated to the city’s pension plans. Additionally, the state permitted the city to pass a $2 per pack cigarette tax to fund a planned budget deficit for the school system; likely because its income tax capacity was largely exhausted.

Philadelphia’s new taxes technically generated new revenues, but they did little to improve the funding of the city’s pension plans.

The selective taxes implemented to fund pension liabilities in Pennsylvania were effectively a Band-Aid that was two small for the state’s pension funding problem, which in turn required the addition of more, insufficient pension Band-Aids. It merely created a public financing system that encouraged pension benefit growth which led to the passage of additional laws requiring certain pension funding levels. And when these funding levels were not met, even more laws were passed that provided temporary pension funding relief, which further grew liabilities for distressed municipalities.

Act 44 became law in 1993 and provided plan sponsors pension funding relief, but primarily by allowing sponsors to alter actuarial assumptions and thereby reduce required pension contributions. Another law delayed funding by manipulating how the required contribution was calculated, rather than providing any permanent fix.

Moving forward

Selective taxes for the purpose of funding pensions are still a relatively rare practice, but as pension liabilities grow and the landscape of reform options changes, it may become increasingly attractive to policymakers. As Calabrese has demonstrated in his book chapter, however, we should be wary of this avenue as it may only encourage the growth of pension liabilities without addressing the problem in any meaningful way. Reforming the structure of the pension plan or the level of benefits provided to current or future employees would provide the most long-term solution.

A solution with the long-term in mind and that doesn’t involve touching current beneficiaries includes moving future workers to defined contribution plans; plans that are better suited to keeping costs contained. The ballooning costs aren’t stemming solely from overly generous plan benefits, but more seriously are the result of their poor management and incentives for funding, only exacerbated by poor accounting practices. The problem is certainly complicated and moving towards the use of defined contribution plans wouldn’t eliminate all issues, but it would at least set governments on a more sustainable path.

At the very least, policymakers interested in long-term solutions should be cautioned against using selective taxes to fund pensions.

Many working-age males aren’t working: What should be done?

The steady disappearance of prime-age males (age 25-54) from the labor force has been occurring for decades and has recently become popular in policy circles. The prime-age male labor force participation rate began falling in the 1950s, and since January 1980 the percent of prime-age males not in the labor force has increased from 5.5% to 12.3%. In fact, since the economy started recovering from our latest recession in June 2009 the rate has increased by 1.3 percentage points.

The 12.3% of prime-age males not in the labor force nationwide masks substantial variation at the state level. The figure below shows the percentage of prime-age males not in the labor force—neither working nor looking for a job—by state in 2016 according to data from the Current Population Survey.

25-54 males NILF by state 2016

The lowest percentage was in Wyoming, where only 6.3% of prime males were out of the labor force. On the other end of the spectrum, over 20% of prime males were out of the labor force in West Virginia and Mississippi, a shocking number. Remember, prime-age males are generally not of school age and too young to retire, so the fact that one out of every five is not working or even looking for a job in some states is hard to fathom.

Several researchers have investigated the absence of these men from the labor force and there is some agreement on the cause. First, demand side factors play a role. The decline of manufacturing, traditionally a male dominated industry, reduced the demand for their labor. In a state like West Virginia, the decline of coal mining—another male dominated industry—has contributed as well.

Some of the most recent decline is due to less educated men dropping out as the demand for their skills continues to fall. Geographic mobility has also declined, so even when an adjacent state has a stronger labor market according to the figure above—for example West Virginia and Maryland—people aren’t moving to take advantage of it.

Of course, people lose jobs all the time yet most find another one. Moreover, if someone isn’t working, how do they support themselves? The long-term increase in female labor force participation has allowed some men to rely on their spouse for income. Other family members and friends may also help. There is also evidence that men are increasingly relying on government aid, such as disability insurance, to support themselves.

These last two reasons, relying on a family member’s income or government aid, are supply-side reasons, since they affect a person’s willingness to accept a job rather than the demand for a person’s labor. A report by Obama’s Council of Economic Advisors argued that supply-side reasons were only a small part of the decline in the prime-age male labor force participation rate and that the lack of demand was the real culprit:

“Reductions in labor supply—in other words, prime-age men choosing not to work for a given set of labor market conditions—explain relatively little of the long-run trend…In contrast, reductions in the demand for labor, especially for lower-skilled men, appear to be an important component of the decline in prime-age male labor force participation.”

Other researchers, however, are less convinced. For example, AEI’s Nicholas Eberstadt thinks that supply-side factors play a larger role than the CEA acknowledges and he discusses these in his book Men Without Work. One piece of evidence he notes is the different not-in-labor-force (NILF) rates of native born and foreign born prime-age males: Since one would think that structural demand shocks would affect both native and foreign-born alike, the difference indicates that some other factor may be at work.

In the figure below, I subtract the foreign born not-in-labor-force rate from the native born rate by state. A positive number means that native prime-age males are less likely to be in the labor force than foreign-born prime age males. (Note: Foreign born only means a person was born in a country other than the U.S.: It does not mean that the person is not a citizen at the time the data was collected.)

25-54 native, foreign NILF diff

As shown in the figure, natives are less likely to be in the labor force (positive bar) in 34 of the 51 areas (DC included). For example, in Texas the percent of native prime-age men not in the labor force is 12.9% and the percentage of foreign-born not in the labor force is 5.9%, a 7 percentage point gap, which is what’s displayed in the figure above.

The difference in the NILF rate between the two groups is also striking when broken down by education, as shown in the next figure.

25-54 native, foreign males NILF by educ

In 2016, natives with less than a high school degree were four times more likely to be out of the labor force than foreign born, while natives with a high school degree were twice as likely to be out of the labor force. The NILF rates for some college or a bachelor’s or more are similar.

Mr. Eberstadt attributes some of this difference to the increase in incarceration rates since the 1970s. The U.S. imprisons a higher percentage of its population than almost any other country and it is very difficult to find a job with an arrest record or a conviction.

There aren’t much data combining employment and criminal history so it is hard to know exactly how much of a role crime plays in the difference between the NILF rates by education. Mr. Eberstadt provides some evidence in his book that shows that men with an arrest or conviction are much more likely to be out of the labor force than similar men without, but it is not perfectly comparable to the usual BLS data. That being said, it is reasonable to think that the mass incarceration of native prime-age males, primarily those with little formal education, has created a large group of unemployable, and thus unemployed, men.

Is incarceration a supply or demand side issue? On one hand, people with a criminal record are not really in demand, so in that sense it’s a demand issue. On the other hand, crime is a choice in many instances—people may choose a life of crime over other, non-criminal professions because it pays a higher wage than other available options or it somehow provides them with a more fulfilling life (e.g. Tony Soprano). In this sense crime and any subsequent incarceration is the result of a supply-side choice. Drug use that results in incarceration could also be thought of this way. I will let the reader decide which is more relevant to the NILF rates of prime-age males.

Criminal justice reform in the sense of fewer arrests and incarcerations would likely improve the prime-age male LFP rate, but the results would take years to show up in the data since such reforms don’t help the many men who have already served their time and want to work but are unable to find a job. Reforms that make it easier for convicted felons to find work would offer more immediate help, and there has been some efforts in this area. How successful they will be remains to be seen.

Other state reforms such as less occupational licensing would make it easier for people— including those with criminal convictions—to enter certain professions. There are also several ideas floating around that would make it easier for people to move to areas with better labor markets, such as making it easier to transfer unemployment benefits across state lines.

More economic growth would alleviate much of the demand side issues, and tax reform and reducing regulation would help on this front.

But has something fundamentally changed the way some men view work? Would some, especially the younger ones, rather just live with their parents and play video games, as economist Erik Hurst argues? For those wanting to learn more about this issue, Mr. Eberstadt’s book is a good place to start.

More labor market freedom means more labor force participation

The U.S. labor force participation (LFP) rate has yet to bounce back to its pre-recession level. Some of the decline is due to retiring baby-boomers but even the prime-age LFP rate, which only counts people age 25 – 54 and thus less affected by retirement, has not recovered.

Economists and government officials are concerned about the weak recovery in labor force participation. A high LFP rate is usually a sign of a strong economy—people are either working or optimistic about their chances of finding a job. A low LFP rate is often a sign of little economic opportunity or disappointment with the employment options available.

The U.S. is a large, diverse country so the national LFP rate obscures substantial state variation in LFP rates. The figure below shows the age 16 and up LFP rates for the 50 states and the U.S. as a whole (black bar) in 2014. (data)

2014-state-lfp-rates

The rates range from a high of 72.6% in North Dakota to a low of 53.1% in West Virginia. The U.S. rate was 62.9%. Several of the states with relatively low rates are in the south, including Mississippi, Alabama and Arkansas. Florida and Arizona also had relatively low labor force participation, which is not surprising considering their reputations as retirement destinations.

There are several reasons why some states have more labor force participation than others. Demographics is one: states with a higher percentage of people over age 65 and between 16 and 22 will have lower rates on average since people in these age groups are often retired or in school full time. States also have different economies made up of different industries and at any given time some industries are thriving while others are struggling.

Federal and state regulation also play a role. Federal regulation disparately impacts different states because of the different industrial compositions of state economies. For example, states with large energy industries tend to be more affected by federal regulation than other states.

States also tax and regulate their labor markets differently. States have different occupational licensing standards, different minimum wages and different levels of payroll and income taxes among other things. Each of these things alters the incentive for businesses to hire or for people to join the labor market and thus affects states’ LFP rates.

We can see the relationship between labor market freedom and labor force participation in the figure below. The figure shows the relationship between the Economic Freedom of North America’s 2013 labor market freedom score (x-axis) and the 2014 labor force participation rate for each state (y-axis).

lab-mkt-freed-and-lfp-rate

As shown in the figure there is a positive relationship—more labor market freedom is associated with a higher LFP rate on average. States with lower freedom scores such as Mississippi, Kentucky and Alabama also had low LFP rates while states with higher freedom scores such as North Dakota, South Dakota and Virginia had higher LFP rates.

This is not an all-else-equal analysis and other variables—such as demographics and industry composition which I mentioned earlier—also play a role. That being said, state officials concerned about their state’s labor market should think about what they can do to increase labor market freedom—and economic freedom more broadly—in their state.

Are state lotteries good sources of revenue?

By Olivia Gonzalez and Adam A. Millsap

With all the hype about the Powerball jackpot, we decided to look at the benefits and costs of state lotteries from the taxpayer’s perspective. The excitement around yesterday’s drawing is for good reason, with the jackpot reaching $1.5 billion – the largest thus far. But most taxpayers will never benefit from the actual prize money, with odds of winning as low as one in 292.2 million for the jackpot. So if few people will ever hit it big, there must be other benefits for taxpayers to justify the implementation of lotteries, right?

Of the 43 states that implement lotteries, the majority of lottery revenues – about 58% on average – go to awarding prizes. A relatively small proportion (7%) is used to pay for administration costs, such as salaries of government workers and advertising. The remaining category, and the primary purpose of implementing state lotteries, is revenue for government services. On average, about one third of state lottery revenues is directed to state funds for this purpose. The chart below displays the state-level breakdown of lottery revenue for the most recent year that data are available (2013).

lottery sales breakdown

It is surprising that such a small portion of state lottery sales actually make it to state funds, especially considering how much politicians advertise the benefits of state lotteries. A handful of states direct more than 50% of lottery revenues towards state funds: Rhode Island, Delaware, West Virginia, Oregon, and South Dakota. The other 38 states allocate significantly less with Arkansas and Massachusetts contributing the smallest percentage, only 21%.

Many states direct their lottery revenues towards education programs. The largest lottery system, New York’s, usually directs about 30% of their lottery sales to this area. Similarly, Florida’s lottery system transferred about one third of their funds, totaling $1.50 billion, to their Educational Enhancement Trust Fund (EETF) in 2013.

The data presented here are from 2013, so it will be interesting to see how the recent Powerball jackpot revenues will affect lottery revenues more broadly in the future, especially since the Multi-State Lottery Association reduced the odds of winning in October of 2015 in the hope of boosting revenues. State officials argue that reducing the chances of winning allows the prize to grow larger, which increases the demand for tickets and revenue.

The revenue-generating function of state lotteries makes them implicit taxes. The portion of revenue generated from a state lottery that is not used to operate the lottery is just like tax revenue generated from a regular sales or excise tax. So even if lotteries are effective at raising revenue, are they effective tax policy?

Effective tax policy should take into account the tax’s ability to generate revenue as well as its efficiency, equity, transparency, and collectability. Research shows that state lotteries fall short in most of these categories.

The practice of dedicating portions of tax revenue to specific expenditure categories, also known as earmarking, can be detrimental to state budgets. Research that looks specifically at the earmarking of lottery revenues finds that educational expenditures remain unaffected, and sometimes even decline, following the implementation of a state lottery.

This result is due to how earmarking changes the incentives facing politicians. A 1999 study compares the results of lottery revenues directed specifically to fund education with revenues going to a state’s general fund. Patrick Pierce, one of the co-authors, explains that when funds are earmarked for education they go to the intended program but, “instead of adding to the funds for those programs, legislators factor in the lottery revenue and allocate less government money to the program budgets.”

Earmarking also affects total government expenditures, even though from a theoretical perspective it should have little effect since one source of funding is just as good as another. Nevertheless, many empirical studies find the opposite. Mercatus research corroborates this by demonstrating that earmarking tends to result in an increase in total government spending while having little effect on the program expenditures to which the funds are tied. This raises serious transparency concerns because it obscures increases in total government spending that voters may not want.

Last but not least, about four decades of studies have examined lottery tax equity and the majority of them find that lottery sales disproportionately draw from lower-income groups, making them regressive taxes. This only adds to the aforementioned concerns about the transparency, collectability, and revenue raising capabilities of lottery taxes.

Perhaps the effectiveness of lottery taxes can be best summed up by the authors of a 1993 study who wrote that “lotteries as a source of funding are neither efficient nor equitable substitutes for more traditional tax sources.”

Although at least three people walked away with millions of dollars yesterday, many taxpayers are not getting any benefits from their state’s lottery system.

New Research on West Virginia’s Medicaid Reforms

Today, the Mercatus Cetner released a new policy brief by Tami Gurley-Calvez on Medicaid reforms implemented in West Virginia, based on a working paper she wrote this fall.  In 2007 the state enacted a Medicaid redesign with one objective being to reduce the rate at which Medicaid patients visited emergency rooms for non-emergencies. Additionally, the plan, called Mountain Health Choices, was intended to incentivize healthy behaviors among Medicaid recipients.

The “choice” in the new plan was an option for women and children to opt into an enhanced plan or default into a basic plan. The enhanced plan offered greater benefits but required participants to agree to “doing [their] best to stay healthy’ and to agree to visit their primary care physician for non-emergency treatment. The objective of reducing ER visits was to both reduce healthcare costs for state taxpayers and to improve healthcare outcomes.

Gurley-Calvez finds that with the Mountain Health Choices reforms, patients on this enhanced plan did visit the emergency room at lower rates. However, patients who defaulted into the basic plan began to visit the emergency room at a higher rate, potentially because they were not eligible for treatment for some illnesses with a primary care doctor. She explains:

Based on this research, states should consider whether they can create a greater connection between health providers and members’ involvement in their own health care. However, policymakers must be cognizant of what drives member decision making in their policy designs. In the West Virginia case, a majority of members did not enroll in the enhanced plan in the short term despite additional health coverage and no direct monetary costs to enrollment. Further, states should consider the possible costs, both near term and future, of restricting treatment options by limiting coverage levels.

This case of attempted cost savings by changing incentives represents an ever-present challenge in public policy. Predicting how people will react to new policies in a changing world is difficult, and policymakers should not be overly confident that the incentives that they design will result in the outcomes that they anticipate.

The New York Times Database on Government Granted Privilege

Louise Story of the New York Times has earned her salary many times over this week. She and her colleagues have created a searchable database of targeted incentives (read: privileges) that states offer particular firms. To my knowledge, it is the most comprehensive database on the subject to date, containing information on over 150,000 awards.

Among her findings: Alaska, West Virginia, and Nebraska give up more per resident than any other state and Oklahoma and West Virginia “give up amounts equal to about one-third of their budgets, and Maine allocates nearly a fifth.”

Here is the database.

Also check out her articles, “How Taxpayers Bankroll Businesses,” “Winners and Losers in Texas,” and “When Hollywood Comes to Town.”

Readers of this blog know where to go for more information on the economic and social costs of government-granted privilege.

Red ink flows in state-run prepaid tuition programs

In three years the Prepaid Alabama College Tuition Program (PACT) will run dry. The State Treasurer reports PACT which pays $100 million in tuition a year, has $347 million in investments remaining. To fulfill its obligations to all 40,000 participants over the next 20 years, PACT needs an additional $843.9 million. The state Supreme Court recently struck down a potential solution put forth by the legislature: cap payouts to 2010 tuition levels and have beneficiaries make up the difference. The remedy didn’t pass scrutiny due to a 2010 law that promises PACT be 100 percent funded.

PACT worked for about 20 years until hit with the combination of unrelenting tuition inflation and a bear market which halved the plan’s investments.

Unfortunately, Alabama isn’t the only state with a prepaid program in the red. The Wall Street Journal reports South Carolina’s plan expects to run out of funds in 2017. Tennessee’s budget seeks an infusion of $15 million into its program. And West Virginia recently transferred funds from an unclaimed-property program to shore up its struggling prepaid plan.

In remarkably bad shape is IllinoisCrain’s Chicago Business finds that Illinois’ 12-year old $1.1 billion prepaid plan has the largest shortfall in the entire nation. Worse still, plan managers are making up for losses by embracing a huge amount of risk. In 2011, 47 percent of Illinois’ prepaid tuition plan was shifted into alternatives and investment expectations set at 8.75 percent. An expectation that far outstrips any other prepaid plan by a long-shot. (Florida has the country’s largest prepaid tuition plan and operates with an expected return of 4.3 percent on plan investments).

This year the agency that runs the prepaid program, the Illinois Student Assistance Commission ,has dropped that return assumption to 7.5 percent.  According to its actuarial report College Illinois! has enough money to pay out tuition for a few more years.

Prepaid plans are a type of 529 plan (the other is the college savings program) that allow parents to purchase contracts (or credits) for their children’s education.  The prepaid tuition plan locks-in tuition for the current year for eligible in-state colleges. Contributions are invested and benefits paid from those funds. To remain well-funded asset performance must track or exceed tuition increases. Given the rapid increase in college tuition which on average has increased 5.6 percent per year over the rate of inflation in just the past decade, it’s easy to see why so many plans have gone bust.

PACT participants who may not recoup their initial investments are understandably upset, “everything about the way the plan was promoted implied it was backed by the state.”

But, just how good is the state’s guarantee?

That is often in the fine-print. The WSJ finds three levels of guarantee in operation. 1) Full Faith and Credit – the state promises to pay for shortfalls if the fund goes dry. (Washington, Texas, Ohio, Mississippi and Florida)  2) Legislative appropriation – the legislature must consider an appropriation to cover shortfalls. (Illinois, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina and West Virginia)  and 3) Fund Assets – the plan is solely backed by the assets in the plan. (Alabama, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee.)

Alabama’s PACT participants found they had little recourse in 2009.  Since the state doesn’t guarantee payment of tuition,they were technically out of luck. However, after a series of demonstrations and hearings in 2010 the Alabama legislature granted a $548 million bailout, tiding the plan over for the next three years. And then what? The state legislature filed a bill last week to tweak the previous solution to the court’s liking. It is again proposing to cap tuition payouts at 2010 levels.

Strangely, in spite of the risk present in pre-paid tuition plans they continue to provide a “flight to safety” for some investors. Last year growth in pre-paid plans outstripped growth in 529 college savings plans. The lure of higher returns attracts some who are banking on the ability of governments to keep their promise to pay it out regardless of market performance or the fine-print.

The State of Laziness

According to Bloomberg, here are the top ten laziest states:

Louisiana, Mississippi, Arkansas, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, West Virginia, South Carolina, Alabama, Delaware.

(I have no idea whether this survey method is valid).

Though it is provocative to label the good people of Louisiana “lazy,” I suspect that much of the observed difference in behavior can be traced not to inherent differences in the people but to differences in the institutions in which those people operate: the laws, the economy, the culture, etc. that constrains and shapes their actions.

A few years back, the Nobel laureate economist Ed Prescott (of Arizona State) analyzed the difference between American and European working habits. There was a time, in the early 1970s, when Europeans worked more than Americans. Now this is reversed: “Americans work 50 percent more than do the Germans, French, and Italians.” Prescott finds that differences in marginal tax rates are the predominant factor. So Europeans aren’t any lazier than we; they just face different incentives.

I wonder what institutional differences can explain differences in work effort across the U.S. states?

One can’t help but notice the over-representation of the South. Two centuries ago, Montesquieu wrote:

You will find in the climates of the north, peoples with few vices, many virtues, sincerity and truthfulness. Approach the south, you will think you are leaving morality itself, the passions become more vivacious and multiply crimes… The heat can be so excessive that the body is totally without force. The resignation passes to the spirit and leads people to be without curiosity, nor the desire for noble enterprise.

I seem to recall a similar observation from John Adams, but can’t locate it just now…or maybe I just don’t want to put in the effort to find it.

Legal Plunder

How does law enforcement finance operations? Increasingly, police departments across the country pay for their activities, equipment and supplies by seizing the assets of people who have never committed a crime. It’s a process called civil forfeiture, and it’s at best, controversial. At worst, it provides direct monetary incentive for states and the federal government to steal property from innocent citizens. Gives a whole new meaning to Bastiat’s “legal plunder.”

Radley Balko explains how civil forfeiture perverts the “protect and serve” motto by introducing a profit motive: Continue reading

A Blizzard of Fees

Taxes are being raised in many corners of state and local government to help fill shortfalls. Many states look to raise taxes on the politically low-cost: “vices”, like cigarettes and alcohol, or goods and services used by tourists – hotels, rental cars, other little-noticed items. In addition to the largest ever hike in federal cigarette taxes (from 39 cents per pack to $1.01 per pack) a few weeks ago. Over 20 states are considering similar hikes this year, including New York with the highest state cigarette tax in the nation. Alcohol tax hikes are proposed in Oregon,  New Jersey,  California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, and North Carolina, car rentals in Colorado, and  cell phone ringtones in Kentucky, “we’re seeing a blizzard of new fees to help states balance their budgets,” reports Sujit CanagaRetna, a senior fiscal analyst with the Southern Legislative Conference of the Council of State Governments.

And it may become even harder for consumers to avoid. West Virginia is talking about taxing internet, catalog and telephone sales.They make a novel argument.  Internet sales are undertaken by wealthier consumers – those with computers and credit cards – and thus represent a “loophole…benefiting those who are more well off.”  Of course, this argument gets weaker when one extends it to catalog and telephone sales. Brick and Mortar shops like the idea.  eBay doesn’t.

The state is part of a consortium that has been pushing for a Streamlined Sales and Use Tax, as it is known,  for several years.  The consortium and federal supporters argue that the expansion of Internet sales has eroded sales tax collections, which are an important source of revenue for states.  But technology taxes are also a huge temptation for governments that have shown little fiscal restraint or responsible budgeting. Once such a tax is levied, creeping increases will be impossible for legislators to resist.