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The Economics of Regulation Part 3: How to Estimate the Effect of Regulatory Accumulation on the Economy? Exploring Endogenous Growth and Other Models

This post is the third part in a three part series spurred by a recent study by economists John Dawson and John Seater that estimates that the accumulation of federal regulation has slowed economic growth in the US by about 2% annually.  The first part discussed generally how Dawson and Seater’s study and other investigations into the consequences of regulation are important because they highlight the cumulative drag of our regulatory system. The second part went into detail on some of the ways that economists measure regulation, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each.  This post – the final one in the series – looks at how those measures of regulation are used to estimate the consequences of regulatory policy.  As always, economists do it with models.  In the case of Dawson and Seater, they appeal to a well-established family of endogenous growth models built upon the foundational principle of creative destruction, in the tradition of Joseph Schumpeter.

So, what is an endogenous growth model?

First, a brief discussion of models:  In a social or hard science, the ideal model is one that is useful (applicable to the real world using observable inputs to predict outcomes of interest), testable (predictions can be tested with observed outcomes), flexible (able to adapt to a wide variety of input data), and tractable (not too cumbersome to work with).  Suppose a map predicts that following a certain route will lead to a certain location.  When you follow that route in the real world, if you do not actually end up at the predicted location, you will probably stop using that map.  Same thing with models: if a model does a good job at predicting real world outcomes, then it sticks around until someone invents one that does an even better job.  If it doesn’t predict things well, then it usually gets abandoned quickly.

Economists have been obsessed with modeling the growth of national economies at least since Nobel prize winner Simon Kuznets began exploring how to measure GDP in the 1930s.  Growth models generally refer to models that try to represent how the scale of an economy, using metrics such as GDP, grows over time.  For a long time, economists relied on neoclassical growth models, which primarily use capital accumulation, population growth, technology, and productivity as the main explanatory factors in predicting the economic growth of a country. One of the first and most famous of such economic growth models is the Solow model, which has a one-to-one (simple) mapping from increasing levels of the accumulated stock of capital to increasing levels of GDP.  In the Solow model, GDP does not increase at the same rate as capital accumulation due to the diminishing marginal returns to capital.  Even though the Solow model was a breakthrough in describing the growth of GDP from capital stock accumulation, most factors in this growth process (and, generally speaking, in the growth processes of other models in the neoclassical family of growth models) are generated by economic decisions that are outside of the model. As a result, these factors are dubbed exogenous, as opposed to endogenous factors which are generated inside of the model as a result of the economic decisions made by the actors being modeled.

Much of the research into growth modeling over the subsequent decades following Solow’s breakthrough has been dedicated to trying to “endogenize” those exogenous forces (i.e. move them inside the model). For instance, a major accomplishment was endogenizing the savings rate – how much of household income was saved and invested in expanding firms’ capital stocks. Even with this endogenous savings rate, as well as exogenous growth in the population providing labor for production, the accumulating capital stocks in these neoclassical growth models could not explain all of the growth in GDP. The difference, called the Solow Residual, was interpreted as the growth in productivity due to technological development and was like manna from heaven for the actors in the economy – exogenously growing over time regardless of the decisions made by the actors in the model.

But it should be fairly obvious that decisions we make today can affect our future productivity through technological development, and not just through the accumulation of capital stocks or population growth. Technological development is not free. It is the result of someone’s decision to invest in developing technologies. Because technological development is the endogenous result of an economic decision, it can be affected by any factors that distort the incentives involved in such investment decisions (e.g., taxes and regulations). 

This is the primary improvement of endogenous growth theory over neoclassical growth models.  Endogenous growth models take into account the idea that innovative firms invest in both capital and technology, which has the aggregate effect of moving out the entire production possibilities curve.  Further, policies such as increasing regulatory restrictions or changing tax rates will affect the incentives and abilities of people in the economy to innovate and produce.  The Dawson and Seater study relies on a model originally developed by Pietro Peretto to examine the effects of taxes on economic growth.  Dawson and Seater adapt the model to include regulation as another endogenous variable, although they do not formally model the exact mechanism by which regulation affects investment choices in the same way as taxes.  Nonetheless, it’s perfectly feasible that regulation does affect investment, and, to a degree, it is simply an empirical question of how much.

So, now that you at least know that Dawson and Seater selected an accepted and feasible model—a model that, like a good map, makes reliable predictions about real world outcomes—you’re surely asking how that model provided empirical evidence of regulation’s effect on economic growth.  The answer depends on what empirical means.  Consider a much better established model: gravity.  A simple model of gravity states that an object in a vacuum near the Earth’s surface will accelerate towards the Earth at 9.81 meters per second squared. On other planets, that number may be higher or lower, depending on the planet’s massiveness and the object’s distance from the center of the planet.  In this analogy, consider taxes the equivalent of mass – we know from previous endogenous growth models that taxes have a fairly known effect on the economy, just like we know that mass has a known effect on the rate of acceleration from gravitational forces.  Dawson and Seater have effectively said that regulations must have a similar effect on the economy as taxes.  Maybe the coefficient isn’t 9.81, but the generalized model will allow them to estimate what that coefficient is – so long as they can measure the “mass” equivalent of regulation and control for “distance.”  They had to rely on the model, in fact, to produce the counterfactual, or to use a term from science experiments, a control group.  If you know that mass affects acceleration at some given constant, then you can figure out what acceleration is for a different level of mass without actually observing it.  Similarly, if you know that regulations affect economic growth in some established pattern, then you can deduce what economic growth would be without regulations.  Dawson and Seater appealed to an endogenous growth model (courtesy of Perreto) to simulate a counterfactual economy that maintained regulation levels seen in the year 1949.  By the year 2005, that counterfactual economy had become considerably larger than the actual economy – the one in which we’ve seen regulation increase to include over 1,000,000 restrictions.

Why a shutdown threat won’t work

There are many people who think that the Affordable Care Act (ACA) is bad policy. I am among them. There are also many who think that the current trajectory of government spending is unsustainable and economically harmful. I am also among them.

Then there are people who think it would be wise to shut down the federal government if they can’t get language passed that threatens to defund the ACA. (Notice that I didn’t say language that “defunds the ACA”; I said language that “threatens to defund the ACA.” Much of the ACA is actually funded through mandatory spending so Congress would need to pass a full repeal of the bill to defund it. What these folks want is language in the budget resolution saying that the ACA ought to be defunded. The bill might strip out some discretionary funding but most of the ACA would go forward.)

I am not among them.

To help us think through the options, let’s borrow from game theory and employ a decision tree. The House (H) can either choose to pass a continuing resolution (CR) that funds the ACA or a CR that calls for de-funding the ACA. The Senate (S) can choose to pass whatever the House sends them or to reject it. If they reject it, and no CR is passed by October 1, the federal government will shut down. In this case, as the CRS puts it, “substantial ACA implementation might continue during a lapse in annual appropriations that resulted in a temporary government shutdown.” If the Senate passes whatever the House sends them, then it will go to the President (P) who can either sign it or veto it.

At the end you can see the outcomes and the way that each group feels about them.

Options are happy, sad, neutral, and outwardly sad but secretly happy. (click on the images to enlarge):

decision tree

 To figure out the most likely outcome (the “equilibrium”) you do a fancy thing called “backwards induction.” It is actually quite simple: think about how each player would act at each stage, starting at the end of the game, and cross off implausible actions. This will help you eliminate unlikely outcomes. This is what I’ve done below, with dashed lines indicating an action that a particular player is unlikely to take.  

We can with confidence cross off the possibility that the President will veto a CR that keeps the government open and fully funds his signature initiative or that the Senate would reject such a bill.

We can also cross off the possibility that the President would sign or that the Senate would send him something that calls for defunding his signature initiative.

That leaves us with two plausible scenarios: the House doesn’t use the CR as a means to attack the ACA, the CR passes the Senate, and the President signs it. This is the top branch of the game tree. House Republicans will be neutral about this outcome since they will have escaped blame for a shutdown but will have done nothing to stop the ACA. Senate Democrats and the White House will be pleased.

The other somewhat plausible scenario is that the House passes a CR calling to defund the ACA, and the Senate rejects it. The government would shut down and the ACA would mostly be untouched. I’m guessing Republicans would get most of the blame for shutting down the government since they lack a bully pulpit, aren’t as gifted as the president at communicating, and the ideological stereotype is that Republicans would like to see the government shut down any way. The White House and Senate Democrats will be outraged—simply outraged—that Republicans would do this but they will secretly be happy to have one more reason to say Republicans should never be trusted with power.

If Republicans see all of this, they will likely flinch, hold their noses, and pass a CR that doesn’t touch the ACA and hopefully come up with more constructive ways to challenge the policy. But, it is a close call for some House Republicans so for this reason, I’ve only partially crossed off the first bottom fork of the decision tree. decision tree 2

What the tree doesn’t indicate is the long run consequences of a government shutdown. Two and a half years ago, when Washington was staring down a different government shutdown, I drew from the experience of U.S. states to conclude that a shutdown is not in the interest of those who advocate for limited government:

As is often the case, we can look to the American states for some guidance. It turns out that in 23 U.S. states, the government will automatically shut down in the event that the governor and the legislature fail to agree on a budget. In his work on budget rulesDavid Primo examined the theoretical impact of these provisions from a game theoretic perspective. He noted that in states with an automatic shutdown provision, “the legislature will be able to achieve its ideal budget, so long as the governor prefers it to no spending.” (p. 102)

He therefore predicted that states with such a provision will spend more than states without such a rule. He then tested the hypothesis, controlling for a number of other factors known to impact state spending and found that states with an automatic shutdown provision actually spend about $64 more per capita than other states. As he notes, “This effect is remarkably large, given that shutdowns occur rarely.” (p. 103)

This suggests that the federal government’s automatic shutdown provision—by making Congress’s desired spending level a take-it-or-leave-it offer—tends to bias the government toward more spending. By extension, it also suggests that a government shutdown will shift negotiating power toward those who favor more spending. So, paradoxically, fiscally conservative tea partiers stand to lose the most if the federal government shuts down.

Perhaps it is time for them to rethink their support of a shutdown.

 

A time when politicians tried to coax ‘the opposition’ to their view

Rostenkowski,danOn May 28, 1986, Ronald Reagan delivered an Oval Office speech calling for tax reform: a revenue-neutral plan to reduce marginal tax rates and close scores of loopholes that privileged particular firms, industries, and individuals. The Great Communicator lived up to his reputation, delivering a flawless speech that somehow managed to evoke lofty images (“Two centuries later, a second American revolution for hope and opportunity is gathering force again”) and yet grounded these images in relatable prose (“No other issue will have more lasting impact on the well-being of your families and your future.”)

Democratic House Speaker Tip O’Neill asked Ways and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski to deliver the Democratic response. The choice was controversial. Over the previous five years, the Democrats had flopped in just about every one of their responses to the president. Rostenkowski, famous for his mumbled delivery and mixed metaphors, seemed unlikely to do any better. Here is what the congressman said:

Good evening, I’m Dan Rostenkowski from Chicago. Let me read you something that pretty well explains what tax reform is all about, and what Democrats are all about.

[Reading from a book] “The continued escape of privileged groups from taxation violates the fundamental democratic principle of fair treatment for all and undermines public confidence in the tax system.” That was Harry Truman’s message to Congress thirty-five years ago.

Trying to tax people fairly: That’s been the historic Democratic commitment. Our roots lie with working families all over the country, like the Polish neighborhood I grew up in on the northwest side of Chicago. Most of the people in my neighborhood worked hard in breweries, steel mills, packing houses; proud families who lived on their salaries. My parents and grandparents didn’t like to pay taxes. Who does? But like most Americans they were willing to pay their fair share as the price for a free country where everyone could make their own breaks.

Every year politicians promise to make the tax code fair and simple, but every year we seem to slip further behind. Now most of us pay taxes with bitterness and frustration. Working families file their tax forms with the nagging feeling that they’re the biggest suckers and chumps in the world. Their taxes are withheld at work, while the elite have enormous freedom to move their income from one tax shelter to another. That bitterness is about to boil over. And it’s time it did.

But this time there’s a difference in the push for tax reform. This time, it’s a Republican president who’s bucking his party’s tradition as protectors of big business and the wealthy. His words and feelings go back to Roosevelt and Truman and Kennedy. But the commitment comes from Ronald Reagan and that’s so important and so welcome.

Because, if the president’s plan is everything he says it is, he’ll have a great deal of Democratic support. That’s the real difference this time. A Republican president has joined the Democrats in Congress to try to redeem this long-standing commitment to a tax system that’s simple and fair. If we work together with good faith and determination, this time the people may win. This time I really think we can get tax reform.

Then, he asked the audience to send letters of support:

Even if you can’t spell Rostenkowski, put down what they used to call my father and grandfather—Rosty. Just address it to R-0-S-T-Y, Washington, D.C. The post office will get it to me. Better yet, write your representative and your senator. And stand up for fairness and lower taxes.

This account comes from Jeffrey Birnbaum and Alan Murray’s classic history of the 1986 tax reform, Showdown at Gucci Gulch. They write:

When the speech was over, and the microphones were turned off, the camera crew did something Rothstein [Rostenkowski’s media consultant] had not seen before: they broke into applause. “That was my first clue we hit it over the fence,” Rothstein says.

The second clue was an ecstatic call from the White House. The third was the incredible response from the American people who deluged Washington with more than seventy-five thousand supportive letters addressed to “Rosty.”

I’m not one for nostalgia. I think many humans have a tendency to look at history through sepia-colored glasses that idealize our own political and cultural past.

But it is hard to read Rostenkowski’s speech without seeing the glaring contrast with today’s political rhetoric. The speech is still partisan in a way: He makes it seem as if Democrats had always wanted a simpler and fairer code and he congratulates Reagan for coming around to their view. This is, of course, ahistorical as both parties were at fault for a tax code riddled with loopholes. But the whole thrust of the speech seems designed to make the other side feel safe about moving towards Rostenkowski’s position.

As an economist, I’m accustomed to thinking about human interaction as exchange: when two people meet, there is almost always an opportunity for mutually beneficial exchange (though transactions costs mean that many of these opportunities are unrealized). And the more different these people are in their tastes and in their productive abilities, the greater the opportunity for exchange.

It is interesting that more politicians don’t see their task as one of getting “the other side” to feel comfortable about abandoning its position and moving toward the middle. Instead, politicians seem to increasingly address themselves to their own base. Unfortunately, what draws the base in often pushes the other side away.

In a follow-up post, I’ll address some possible explanations for this.

One Man’s Privilege is Another’s Punishment

When governments bestow privileges on particular firms, they also impose costs on others. A recent CNN report brings this to light (HT, Rob Raffety).

It tells the story of Bill Keith, an entrepreneur who started a small business out of his garage. He installs solar-powered attic fans that pump away hot air and lower cooling bills. The Obama campaign heard about him and sent someone out to meet (vet) him. Soon the campaign, and then the Administration, was featuring Mr. Keith in speeches and other materials. His story was perfect politics: small businessman meets green energy meets financial success.

Mr. Keith’s business soared, peaking at $5 million in revenue in 2009. But more recently he’s run into trouble:

Today, Keith’s solar star appears to be on a collision course with another Obama policy that may put him out of business. The irony is not lost on Keith: A man whose profile and company soared because of the administration’s energy policy [MM: it isn’t clear from the story what policy he actually benefited from, other than the loads of free advertising] is now falling apart because of a new Obama anti-dumping policy involving China.

While 95 percent of Keith’s fans are American-made, he has yet to find a U.S. company that can make the small customized solar panels that make his fans run.

So he has had to turn to—gasp—Chinese suppliers. And that has made him a target of the Administration’s so-called “anti-dumping” policy. Unless he can prove that the panels he buys are not Chinese-made, he faces tariffs as high as 250% (!). This is an effective rate of $270,000.

In response to CNN inquiries a White House spokesperson responded:

[T]hat the tariff “highlights the degree to which solar panel manufacturers have faced unfair competition from countries like China” and the president’s move to impose a tax on Chinese-made goods is a way to establish “a level playing field with China for American businesses and workers.”

There is a reason that economists are nearly unanimous in supporting free trade. Though tariffs such as those on imported solar panels are a privilege for domestic panel manufacturers, they are a burden for domestic consumers such as Mr. Keith. To make matters worse, economic theory and evidence long ago established the point that the costs borne by consumers outweigh the benefits bestowed on producers.

In this case, there is another cost: debasement of the English language. Notice the words used by the spokesperson. In order to establish a “level playing field” we need to tilt the playing field in favor of domestic producers at the expense of foreign producers and domestic consumers. So an uneven playing field is an even playing? Newspeak, much?

Net Worth is Down and that May Explain Why Stimulus Wasn’t Particularly Effective

This week saw the release of the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances. The news isn’t good. Median net worth fell 38.8 percent from 2007 to 2010. Predictably, the unhealthy diagnosis has occasioned a healthy dose of political posturing. For its part, the White House was quick to note that “the entire decline in household wealth took place before President Obama came into office” and that total wealth “has risen every year since he came into office.”

E21, in turn, pointed out that it was a little odd for the White House to emphasize the aggregate numbers rather than the median:

The claims made by the White House are disingenuous (at best) because they ignore the median U.S. household and focus instead on the increase in overall wealth, which has largely come from gains in the stock market. The White House is essentially saying that we shouldn’t worry about the plight of the typical family because Warren Buffett’s stock holdings have gone up in value by tens of billions of dollars since March 2009. The focus on aggregate household net worth is extremely comical when compared to previous statements made by the President and others in his Administration about the country’s lamentable concentration of wealth and income in the hands of a “fortunate few.” Someone should ask President Obama if this means we needn’t worry about income disparities anymore because total household income is up nearly 20% on an inflation-adjusted basis over the past 10 years?

Framing aside, there is an important policy implication of such a large fall in net worth. Richard Clarida of Columbia University explained this point way back in March of 2009:

There is a second reason while the bang of the fiscal package will likely lag behind the bucks. Even if the global financial system soon restores some semblance of order and function, the collapse in global equity and housing market values has so impaired household wealth that private consumption (which represents 60% to 70% of GDP in G7 countries) is likely to lag – not lead – economic growth for some time, as households rebuild their balance sheets the old-fashioned way – by boosting their saving rates.

In our working paper last fall, Veronique and I explained this point further:

The current recession has resulted in an unprecedented collapse in net wealth. In other words, it is a deep “balance sheet”‖recession. But with personal wealth diminished and private credit impaired, some economists believe that stimulus is likely to be less effective than it would be in a different type of recession. This is because consumers are likely to use their stimulus money to rebuild their nest eggs, i.e., to pay off debts and save, not to buy new products as Keynesian theoreticians want them to.

The White House is interested in escaping blame for the collapse in median net wealth. That’s understandable; that’s what White Houses do. It is harder to escape from the policy implications of a balance sheet recession.

Real Spending Per Person: White House vs. Paul Ryan

Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan’s spending plan has been released. Both sides are going to characterize it as a $6.2 trillion dollar cut in federal spending. Of course, in Washington a “cut” is rarely a cut. Usually, when politicians speak of cuts, they mean cuts in reference to what some other politician wants to spend. In this case, the chairman actually wants 2021 spending to be about $1 trillion greater than 2011 spending. But since the President wants 2021 spending to be nearly $2 trillion greater and since the annual differences between the two plans add up to about $6.2 trillion over ten years, Ryan’s plan will be called a cut.

But what about inflation? And what about population growth?

Since inflation erodes the value of dollars over time and since population growth spreads those dollars over an ever-expanding group of people, some will argue that we must increase spending just to maintain the same level of government services.

I would note that in the non-political world, we expect technological improvements and efficiency gains to make things cheaper over time (witness computing power, smart phones, and plasma TVs–all of which have gotten cheaper in real terms over time). But let us make the reasonable assumption that government is incapable of efficiency gains. In this case, we should examine “real, per capita spending.” That is, after controlling for inflation and population growth, how much more or less will the federal government be spending per man, woman, and child?

The chart below shows real per capita spending under the President’s plan (red) and under the Congressman’s plan (blue). By 2020 (I don’t have inflation projections out to 2021), the president wants to spend $1,012 more per person in real terms. In contrast, the Chairman wants to spend $470 less per person. To put this another way, the President would increase real per capita spending by about 8% while the Chairman would decrease it by about 4%.

Just about everyone agrees that fiscal calamity awaits inaction. And numerous studies suggest that spending cuts are far more effective at addressing fiscal problems than revenue increases. In this context, is a 4% cut in spending really–as Ezra Klein characterizes it–“completely, almost gleefully, unacceptable“?

Dog Bites Man: Politicians are Interested in Politics, Not Policy

Yesterday Vero testified before the House Ways and Means Committee. The topic was “Impediments to Job Creation.” The other witnesses were Stanford Professor Edward Lazear, AEI Resident Scholar Andrew Biggs, and Center for American Progress Senior Economist Heather Boushey.

All of the witnesses, I thought, did an excellent job. But Vero was particularly good.

Politicians on both sides seemed keen to establish that the economy was healthy when their guy was in the White House and unhealthy when the other guy was in (nevermind that no serious macroeconomist would argue that it is ever this simple). This put Democrats in the awkward position of extolling the virtues of the Clinton Administration’s economic policies. It is true, of course, that the 1990s were a prosperous time. But does it matter to these Democrats that—comparatively speaking—the policies that emerged when Clinton was in office were significantly more market-friendly than those that have characterized the last twelve years? Consider:

Arguably, the most-significant anti-market policy of the Clinton years was the 1993 marginal income tax hike. But just to put that in perspective, recall that this legislation raised the top marginal rate by 8.6 percentage points from 31 percent to 39.6 percent. Now recall that Reagan had lowered it over 40 percentage points from 70 percent (!) to 28 percent.

On balance, it is hard to characterize the Clinton years as anything but a marginal improvement in economic freedom (indeed, that’s what the data show).

Why, again, were Democrats so eager to remind us of the prosperity of the Clinton years?

Oh yeah, because their guy was in power. Which brings me to the Republicans. For their part, they were eager to defend the Bush record. Never mind that during that presidency:

  • Spending as a share of GDP rose from 18.2 percent to 25 percent.
  • The president pushed, and got, the first new entitlement—Medicare prescription drug benefits—in nearly half a century.
  • The president imposed steel tariffs as high as 30 percent.
  • No fewer than FOUR countercyclical fiscal policy measures were undertaken: cash rebates in 2001, countercyclical investment incentives known as “bonus depreciation” in early 2002, tax rebates in 2003, and more rebates in the 2008 stimulus bill (it is seldom remembered that Obama’s 2009 stimulus bill was the second such bill during the Great Recession).
  • Congress passed and the president signed a sweeping and wholly-unprecedented bailout of hundreds of financial firms (prompting the president to acknowledge that he had “abandoned free-market principles.”).

Against this backdrop, politicians of both parties seem obsessed over the Bush tax cuts. Nevermind the fact that they were temporary, that they only reduced the top rate by 4.6 percentage points, and that they did not coincide with concomitant reductions in spending.

Does that sound like a strikingly free-market record to you? Indeed, the data show that it is not.

Why, again are Republicans so eager to remind us of the good-ol’ Bush years?

What Spending Contraction?

Eileen has a great response to Ezra Klein’s piece on the “anti-stimulus.” Klein writes that “[state] budget shortfalls are the equivalent of a massive anti-stimulus, which some experts believe has overwhelmed the $787 billion stimulus passed by the federal government in 2009.” Have state budget cuts really overwhelmed federal budget expansions?

The National Governors Association, in conjunction with the National Association of State Budget Officers, recently released their “Fiscal Survey of States. In it, they show that, indeed, aggregate state general fund expenditures declined by 4.3% in 2009 and 6.8% in 2010. Assuming fiscal stimulus actually works (and that is not a point that should be readily conceded), it is plausible that these huge declines would be enough to offset any increases in spending by the federal government. But the fact is they come nowhere close to offsetting the Federal Government’s massive spending spree.

If you pop over to the White House’s Office of Management and Budget website, you can see what the Federal Government has been up to. At the same time that aggregate state spending was falling by 4.3% and 6.8%, federal spending was increasing by a whopping 17.9% (2009) and 5.8% (2010). This, combined with the fact that the Federal Government spends trillions while states spend hundreds of billions (in the aggregate), means that the state spending contraction comes nowhere close to offsetting the federal spending increase.

In the chart below, I combine the data from NGA/NASBO with the data from the White House Office of Management and Budget. You judge for yourself. Does this look like a massive fiscal contraction to you?

Talk on States Fiscal Health at GMU, April 21

George Mason University’s Department of Public and International Affairs is hosting Ray Scheppach, executive director of the National Governors Association, on April 21 from 4 to 6 PM for a talk entitled “The State Fiscal Situation, Health Care Reform and Federalism.” This should be of interest for most of the readers of this blog. The talk will be in Enterprise Hall on GMU’s Fairfax Campus. Continue reading